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Christoph Frisch

Publications and source records attributed to Christoph Frisch.

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Physical Layer Security in a Private 5G Network for Industrial and Mobility Application

Cellular communication technologies such as 5G are deployed on a large scale around the world. Compared to other communication technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth, or Ultra Wideband, the 5G communication standard describes support for a large variety of use cases, e.g., Internet of Things, vehicular, industrial, and campus-wide communications. An organization can operate a Private 5G network to provide connectivity to devices in their manufacturing environment. Physical Layer Key Generation (PLKG) is a method to generate a symmetric secret on two nodes despite the presence of a potential passive eavesdropper. To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the first to implement PLKG in a real Private 5G network. Therefore, it highlights the possibility of integrating PLKG in the communication technology highly relevant for industrial applications. This paper exemplifies the establishment of a long-term symmetric key between an aerial vehicle and IT infrastructure both located in a manufacturing environment and communicating via the radio interface of the Private 5G network.

cs.IT

The Wiretap Channel for Capacitive PUF-Based Security Enclosures

In order to protect devices from physical manipulations, protective security enclosures were developed. However, these battery-backed solutions come with a reduced lifetime, and have to be actively and continuously monitored. In order to overcome these drawbacks, batteryless capacitive enclosures based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been developed that generate a key-encryption-key (KEK) for decryption of the key chain. In order to reproduce the PUF-key reliably and to compensate the effect of noise and environmental influences, the key generation includes error correction codes. However, drilling attacks that aim at partially destroying the enclosure also alter the PUF-response and are subjected to the same error correction procedures. Correcting attack effects, however, is highly undesirable as it would destroy the security concept of the enclosure. In general, designing error correction codes such that they provide tamper-sensitivity to attacks, while still correcting noise and environmental effects is a challenging task. We tackle this problem by first analyzing the behavior of the PUF-response under external influences and different post-processing parameters. From this, we derive a system model of the PUF-based enclosure, and construct a wiretap channel implementation from q-ary polar codes. We verify the obtained error correction scheme in a Monte Carlo simulation and demonstrate that our wiretap channel implementation achieves a physical layer security of 100 bits for 306 bits of entropy for the PUF-secret. Through this, we further develop capacitive PUF-based security enclosures and bring them one step closer to their commercial deployment.

cs.CR

Efficient Bound for Conditional Min-Entropy of Physical Unclonable Functions Beyond IID

The remaining min-entropy of a secret generated by fuzzy extraction from a Physical Unclonable Function is typically estimated under the assumption of independent and identically distributed PUF responses, but this assumption does not hold in practice. This work analyzes the more realistic case that the responses are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. For this case, we extend the (n-k) bound and a tighter bound by Delvaux et al. In particular, we suggest a grouping bound which provides a trade off for accuracy vs computational effort. Comparison to previous bounds shows the accuracy and efficiency of our bound. We also adapt the key rank (a tool from side-channel analysis) to cross-validate the state-of-the-art and our proposed min-entropy bounds based on publicly available PUF data from real hardware.

eess.SP