arXiv subjects

Christopher A. Choquette-Choo

Publications and source records attributed to Christopher A. Choquette-Choo.

51 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

PaLM 2 Technical Report

We introduce PaLM 2, a new state-of-the-art language model that has better multilingual and reasoning capabilities and is more compute-efficient than its predecessor PaLM. PaLM 2 is a Transformer-based model trained using a mixture of objectives. Through extensive evaluations on English and multilingual language, and reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that PaLM 2 has significantly improved quality on downstream tasks across different model sizes, while simultaneously exhibiting faster and more efficient inference compared to PaLM. This improved efficiency enables broader deployment while also allowing the model to respond faster, for a more natural pace of interaction. PaLM 2 demonstrates robust reasoning capabilities exemplified by large improvements over PaLM on BIG-Bench and other reasoning tasks. PaLM 2 exhibits stable performance on a suite of responsible AI evaluations, and enables inference-time control over toxicity without additional overhead or impact on other capabilities. Overall, PaLM 2 achieves state-of-the-art performance across a diverse set of tasks and capabilities. When discussing the PaLM 2 family, it is important to distinguish between pre-trained models (of various sizes), fine-tuned variants of these models, and the user-facing products that use these models. In particular, user-facing products typically include additional pre- and post-processing steps. Additionally, the underlying models may evolve over time. Therefore, one should not expect the performance of user-facing products to exactly match the results reported in this report.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Preventing Verbatim Memorization in Language Models Gives a False Sense of Privacy

Studying data memorization in neural language models helps us understand the risks (e.g., to privacy or copyright) associated with models regurgitating training data and aids in the development of countermeasures. Many prior works -- and some recently deployed defenses -- focus on "verbatim memorization", defined as a model generation that exactly matches a substring from the training set. We argue that verbatim memorization definitions are too restrictive and fail to capture more subtle forms of memorization. Specifically, we design and implement an efficient defense that perfectly prevents all verbatim memorization. And yet, we demonstrate that this "perfect" filter does not prevent the leakage of training data. Indeed, it is easily circumvented by plausible and minimally modified "style-transfer" prompts -- and in some cases even the non-modified original prompts -- to extract memorized information. We conclude by discussing potential alternative definitions and why defining memorization is a difficult yet crucial open question for neural language models.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

MADLAD-400: A Multilingual And Document-Level Large Audited Dataset

We introduce MADLAD-400, a manually audited, general domain 3T token monolingual dataset based on CommonCrawl, spanning 419 languages. We discuss the limitations revealed by self-auditing MADLAD-400, and the role data auditing had in the dataset creation process. We then train and release a 10.7B-parameter multilingual machine translation model on 250 billion tokens covering over 450 languages using publicly available data, and find that it is competitive with models that are significantly larger, and report the results on different domains. In addition, we train a 8B-parameter language model, and assess the results on few-shot translation. We make the baseline models available to the research community.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Private Federated Learning with Autotuned Compression

We propose new techniques for reducing communication in private federated learning without the need for setting or tuning compression rates. Our on-the-fly methods automatically adjust the compression rate based on the error induced during training, while maintaining provable privacy guarantees through the use of secure aggregation and differential privacy. Our techniques are provably instance-optimal for mean estimation, meaning that they can adapt to the ``hardness of the problem" with minimal interactivity. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on real-world datasets by achieving favorable compression rates without the need for tuning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Federated Learning of Gboard Language Models with Differential Privacy

We train language models (LMs) with federated learning (FL) and differential privacy (DP) in the Google Keyboard (Gboard). We apply the DP-Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (DP-FTRL)~\citep{kairouz21b} algorithm to achieve meaningfully formal DP guarantees without requiring uniform sampling of client devices. To provide favorable privacy-utility trade-offs, we introduce a new client participation criterion and discuss the implication of its configuration in large scale systems. We show how quantile-based clip estimation~\citep{andrew2019differentially} can be combined with DP-FTRL to adaptively choose the clip norm during training or reduce the hyperparameter tuning in preparation for training. With the help of pretraining on public data, we train and deploy more than twenty Gboard LMs that achieve high utility and $ρ-$zCDP privacy guarantees with $ρ\in (0.2, 2)$, with two models additionally trained with secure aggregation~\citep{bonawitz2017practical}. We are happy to announce that all the next word prediction neural network LMs in Gboard now have DP guarantees, and all future launches of Gboard neural network LMs will require DP guarantees. We summarize our experience and provide concrete suggestions on DP training for practitioners.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Multi-Epoch Matrix Factorization Mechanisms for Private Machine Learning

We introduce new differentially private (DP) mechanisms for gradient-based machine learning (ML) with multiple passes (epochs) over a dataset, substantially improving the achievable privacy-utility-computation tradeoffs. We formalize the problem of DP mechanisms for adaptive streams with multiple participations and introduce a non-trivial extension of online matrix factorization DP mechanisms to our setting. This includes establishing the necessary theory for sensitivity calculations and efficient computation of optimal matrices. For some applications like $>\!\! 10,000$ SGD steps, applying these optimal techniques becomes computationally expensive. We thus design an efficient Fourier-transform-based mechanism with only a minor utility loss. Extensive empirical evaluation on both example-level DP for image classification and user-level DP for language modeling demonstrate substantial improvements over all previous methods, including the widely-used DP-SGD . Though our primary application is to ML, our main DP results are applicable to arbitrary linear queries and hence may have much broader applicability.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Proof-of-Learning is Currently More Broken Than You Think

Proof-of-Learning (PoL) proposes that a model owner logs training checkpoints to establish a proof of having expended the computation necessary for training. The authors of PoL forego cryptographic approaches and trade rigorous security guarantees for scalability to deep learning. They empirically argued the benefit of this approach by showing how spoofing--computing a proof for a stolen model--is as expensive as obtaining the proof honestly by training the model. However, recent work has provided a counter-example and thus has invalidated this observation. In this work we demonstrate, first, that while it is true that current PoL verification is not robust to adversaries, recent work has largely underestimated this lack of robustness. This is because existing spoofing strategies are either unreproducible or target weakened instantiations of PoL--meaning they are easily thwarted by changing hyperparameters of the verification. Instead, we introduce the first spoofing strategies that can be reproduced across different configurations of the PoL verification and can be done for a fraction of the cost of previous spoofing strategies. This is possible because we identify key vulnerabilities of PoL and systematically analyze the underlying assumptions needed for robust verification of a proof. On the theoretical side, we show how realizing these assumptions reduces to open problems in learning theory.We conclude that one cannot develop a provably robust PoL verification mechanism without further understanding of optimization in deep learning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Fine-Tuning with Differential Privacy Necessitates an Additional Hyperparameter Search

Models need to be trained with privacy-preserving learning algorithms to prevent leakage of possibly sensitive information contained in their training data. However, canonical algorithms like differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) do not benefit from model scale in the same way as non-private learning. This manifests itself in the form of unappealing tradeoffs between privacy and utility (accuracy) when using DP-SGD on complex tasks. To remediate this tension, a paradigm is emerging: fine-tuning with differential privacy from a model pretrained on public (i.e., non-sensitive) training data. In this work, we identify an oversight of existing approaches for differentially private fine tuning. They do not tailor the fine-tuning approach to the specifics of learning with privacy. Our main result is to show how carefully selecting the layers being fine-tuned in the pretrained neural network allows us to establish new state-of-the-art tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy. For instance, we achieve 77.9% accuracy for $(\varepsilon, δ)=(2, 10^{-5})$ on CIFAR-100 for a model pretrained on ImageNet. Our work calls for additional hyperparameter search to configure the differentially private fine-tuning procedure itself.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

The Fundamental Price of Secure Aggregation in Differentially Private Federated Learning

We consider the problem of training a $d$ dimensional model with distributed differential privacy (DP) where secure aggregation (SecAgg) is used to ensure that the server only sees the noisy sum of $n$ model updates in every training round. Taking into account the constraints imposed by SecAgg, we characterize the fundamental communication cost required to obtain the best accuracy achievable under $\varepsilon$ central DP (i.e. under a fully trusted server and no communication constraints). Our results show that $\tilde{O}\left( \min(n^2\varepsilon^2, d) \right)$ bits per client are both sufficient and necessary, and this fundamental limit can be achieved by a linear scheme based on sparse random projections. This provides a significant improvement relative to state-of-the-art SecAgg distributed DP schemes which use $\tilde{O}(d\log(d/\varepsilon^2))$ bits per client. Empirically, we evaluate our proposed scheme on real-world federated learning tasks. We find that our theoretical analysis is well matched in practice. In particular, we show that we can reduce the communication cost significantly to under $1.2$ bits per parameter in realistic privacy settings without decreasing test-time performance. Our work hence theoretically and empirically specifies the fundamental price of using SecAgg.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Label-Only Membership Inference Attacks

Membership inference attacks are one of the simplest forms of privacy leakage for machine learning models: given a data point and model, determine whether the point was used to train the model. Existing membership inference attacks exploit models' abnormal confidence when queried on their training data. These attacks do not apply if the adversary only gets access to models' predicted labels, without a confidence measure. In this paper, we introduce label-only membership inference attacks. Instead of relying on confidence scores, our attacks evaluate the robustness of a model's predicted labels under perturbations to obtain a fine-grained membership signal. These perturbations include common data augmentations or adversarial examples. We empirically show that our label-only membership inference attacks perform on par with prior attacks that required access to model confidences. We further demonstrate that label-only attacks break multiple defenses against membership inference attacks that (implicitly or explicitly) rely on a phenomenon we call confidence masking. These defenses modify a model's confidence scores in order to thwart attacks, but leave the model's predicted labels unchanged. Our label-only attacks demonstrate that confidence-masking is not a viable defense strategy against membership inference. Finally, we investigate worst-case label-only attacks, that infer membership for a small number of outlier data points. We show that label-only attacks also match confidence-based attacks in this setting. We find that training models with differential privacy and (strong) L2 regularization are the only known defense strategies that successfully prevents all attacks. This remains true even when the differential privacy budget is too high to offer meaningful provable guarantees.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

CaPC Learning: Confidential and Private Collaborative Learning

Machine learning benefits from large training datasets, which may not always be possible to collect by any single entity, especially when using privacy-sensitive data. In many contexts, such as healthcare and finance, separate parties may wish to collaborate and learn from each other's data but are prevented from doing so due to privacy regulations. Some regulations prevent explicit sharing of data between parties by joining datasets in a central location (confidentiality). Others also limit implicit sharing of data, e.g., through model predictions (privacy). There is currently no method that enables machine learning in such a setting, where both confidentiality and privacy need to be preserved, to prevent both explicit and implicit sharing of data. Federated learning only provides confidentiality, not privacy, since gradients shared still contain private information. Differentially private learning assumes unreasonably large datasets. Furthermore, both of these learning paradigms produce a central model whose architecture was previously agreed upon by all parties rather than enabling collaborative learning where each party learns and improves their own local model. We introduce Confidential and Private Collaborative (CaPC) learning, the first method provably achieving both confidentiality and privacy in a collaborative setting. We leverage secure multi-party computation (MPC), homomorphic encryption (HE), and other techniques in combination with privately aggregated teacher models. We demonstrate how CaPC allows participants to collaborate without having to explicitly join their training sets or train a central model. Each party is able to improve the accuracy and fairness of their model, even in settings where each party has a model that performs well on their own dataset or when datasets are not IID and model architectures are heterogeneous across parties.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Proof-of-Learning: Definitions and Practice

Training machine learning (ML) models typically involves expensive iterative optimization. Once the model's final parameters are released, there is currently no mechanism for the entity which trained the model to prove that these parameters were indeed the result of this optimization procedure. Such a mechanism would support security of ML applications in several ways. For instance, it would simplify ownership resolution when multiple parties contest ownership of a specific model. It would also facilitate the distributed training across untrusted workers where Byzantine workers might otherwise mount a denial-of-service by returning incorrect model updates. In this paper, we remediate this problem by introducing the concept of proof-of-learning in ML. Inspired by research on both proof-of-work and verified computations, we observe how a seminal training algorithm, stochastic gradient descent, accumulates secret information due to its stochasticity. This produces a natural construction for a proof-of-learning which demonstrates that a party has expended the compute require to obtain a set of model parameters correctly. In particular, our analyses and experiments show that an adversary seeking to illegitimately manufacture a proof-of-learning needs to perform *at least* as much work than is needed for gradient descent itself. We also instantiate a concrete proof-of-learning mechanism in both of the scenarios described above. In model ownership resolution, it protects the intellectual property of models released publicly. In distributed training, it preserves availability of the training procedure. Our empirical evaluation validates that our proof-of-learning mechanism is robust to variance induced by the hardware (ML accelerators) and software stacks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Entangled Watermarks as a Defense against Model Extraction

Machine learning involves expensive data collection and training procedures. Model owners may be concerned that valuable intellectual property can be leaked if adversaries mount model extraction attacks. As it is difficult to defend against model extraction without sacrificing significant prediction accuracy, watermarking instead leverages unused model capacity to have the model overfit to outlier input-output pairs. Such pairs are watermarks, which are not sampled from the task distribution and are only known to the defender. The defender then demonstrates knowledge of the input-output pairs to claim ownership of the model at inference. The effectiveness of watermarks remains limited because they are distinct from the task distribution and can thus be easily removed through compression or other forms of knowledge transfer. We introduce Entangled Watermarking Embeddings (EWE). Our approach encourages the model to learn features for classifying data that is sampled from the task distribution and data that encodes watermarks. An adversary attempting to remove watermarks that are entangled with legitimate data is also forced to sacrifice performance on legitimate data. Experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Speech Commands validate that the defender can claim model ownership with 95\% confidence with less than 100 queries to the stolen copy, at a modest cost below 0.81 percentage points on average in the defended model's performance.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Machine Unlearning

Once users have shared their data online, it is generally difficult for them to revoke access and ask for the data to be deleted. Machine learning (ML) exacerbates this problem because any model trained with said data may have memorized it, putting users at risk of a successful privacy attack exposing their information. Yet, having models unlearn is notoriously difficult. We introduce SISA training, a framework that expedites the unlearning process by strategically limiting the influence of a data point in the training procedure. While our framework is applicable to any learning algorithm, it is designed to achieve the largest improvements for stateful algorithms like stochastic gradient descent for deep neural networks. SISA training reduces the computational overhead associated with unlearning, even in the worst-case setting where unlearning requests are made uniformly across the training set. In some cases, the service provider may have a prior on the distribution of unlearning requests that will be issued by users. We may take this prior into account to partition and order data accordingly, and further decrease overhead from unlearning. Our evaluation spans several datasets from different domains, with corresponding motivations for unlearning. Under no distributional assumptions, for simple learning tasks, we observe that SISA training improves time to unlearn points from the Purchase dataset by 4.63x, and 2.45x for the SVHN dataset, over retraining from scratch. SISA training also provides a speed-up of 1.36x in retraining for complex learning tasks such as ImageNet classification; aided by transfer learning, this results in a small degradation in accuracy. Our work contributes to practical data governance in machine unlearning.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

A multi-label, dual-output deep neural network for automated bug triaging

Bug tracking enables the monitoring and resolution of issues and bugs within organizations. Bug triaging, or assigning bugs to the owner(s) who will resolve them, is a critical component of this process because there are many incorrect assignments that waste developer time and reduce bug resolution throughput. In this work, we explore the use of a novel two-output deep neural network architecture (Dual DNN) for triaging a bug to both an individual team and developer, simultaneously. Dual DNN leverages this simultaneous prediction by exploiting its own guess of the team classes to aid in developer assignment. A multi-label classification approach is used for each of the two outputs to learn from all interim owners, not just the last one who closed the bug. We make use of a heuristic combination of the interim owners (owner-importance-weighted labeling) which is converted into a probability mass function (pmf). We employ a two-stage learning scheme, whereby the team portion of the model is trained first and then held static to train the team--developer and bug--developer relationships. The scheme employed to encode the team--developer relationships is based on an organizational chart (org chart), which renders the model robust to organizational changes as it can adapt to role changes within an organization. There is an observed average lift (with respect to both team and developer assignment) of 13%-points in 11-fold incremental-learning cross-validation (IL-CV) accuracy for Dual DNN utilizing owner-weighted labels compared with the traditional multi-class classification approach. Furthermore, Dual DNN with owner-weighted labels achieves average 11-fold IL-CV accuracies of 76% (team assignment) and 55% (developer assignment), outperforming reference models by 14%- and 25%-points, respectively, on a proprietary dataset with 236,865 entries.

cs.SE↗