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Christopher P. Chambers

Publications and source records attributed to Christopher P. Chambers.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2023

Recovering utility

We provide sufficient conditions under which a utility function may be recovered from a finite choice experiment. Identification, as is commonly understood in decision theory, is not enough. We provide a general recoverability result that is widely applicable to modern theories of choice under uncertainty. Key is to allow for a monetary environment, in which an objective notion of monotonicity is meaningful. In such environments, we show that subjective expected utility, as well as variational preferences, and other parametrizations of utilities over uncertain acts are recoverable. We also consider utility recovery in a statistical model with noise and random deviations from utility maximization.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2022

Decreasing Impatience

We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexit y axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we show that they are equivalent to a geometric average of generalized quasi-hype rbolic discount rates. Finally, they emerge through parimutuel preference aggregation of exponential discount factors.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Recovering Preferences from Finite Data

We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying "true" preference. Our conditions are weak, and therefore valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, menu choice and intertemporal consumption. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2020

Spherical Preferences

We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after each marginal change has been shifted in a direction that is orthogonal to both. We show that continuous preferences satisfy orthogonal independence if and only if they are spherical: their indifference curves are spheres with the same center, with preference being "monotone" either away or towards the center. Spherical preferences include linear preferences as a special (limiting) case. We discuss different applications to economic and political environments. Our result delivers Euclidean preferences in models of spatial voting, quadratic welfare aggregation in social choice, and expected utility in models of choice under uncertainty.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2018

A characterization of "Phelpsian" statistical discrimination

We establish that statistical discrimination is possible if and only if it is impossible to uniquely identify the signal structure observed by an employer from a realized empirical distribution of skills. The impossibility of statistical discrimination is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a fair, skill-dependent, remuneration for workers. Finally, we connect the statistical discrimination literature to Bayesian persuasion, establishing that if discrimination is absent, then the optimal signaling problem results in a linear payoff function (as well as a kind of converse).

econ.TH↗
arXiv2018

Preference Identification

An experimenter seeks to learn a subject's preference relation. The experimenter produces pairs of alternatives. For each pair, the subject is asked to choose. We argue that, in general, large but finite data do not give close approximations of the subject's preference, even when the limiting (countably infinite) data are enough to infer the preference perfectly. We provide sufficient conditions on the set of alternatives, preferences, and sequences of pairs so that the observation of finitely many choices allows the experimenter to learn the subject's preference with arbitrary precision. While preferences can be identified under our sufficient conditions, we show that it is harder to identify utility functions. We illustrate our results with several examples, including consumer choice, expected utility, and preferences in the Anscombe-Aumann model.

econ.TH↗