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Clément Contet

Publications and source records attributed to Clément Contet.

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Prompt Injection Vulnerability of Consensus Generating Applications in Digital Democracy

Large Language Models (LLMs) are gaining traction as a method to generate consensus statements and aggregate preferences in digital democracy experiments. Yet, LLMs could introduce critical vulnerabilities in these systems. Here, we examine the vulnerability and robustness of off-the-shelf consensus-generating LLMs to prompt-injection attacks, in which texts are injected to amplify particular viewpoints, erase certain opinions, or divert consensus toward unrelated or irrelevant topics. We construct attack-free and adversarial variants of prompts containing public policy questions and opinion texts, classify opinion and consensus valences with a fine-tuned BERT model, and estimate LLM-human majority agreement rates. Across topics, default LLaMA 3.1 8B Instruct, GPT-4.1 Nano, and Apertus 8B exhibit widespread vulnerability, specially when disagreement and disagreement are finely balanced, for attacks that shift consensus toward positions aligned with GB-unionist conservative manifestos relative to pro-independence left manifestos, and for rational, instruction-like rhetorical strategies. A robustness pipeline combining GPT-OSS-SafeGuard injection detection, structured opinion representations, and GSPO-based reinforcement learning substantially reduces directional failures whenever the underlying consensus has a clear positive or negative valence. These findings advance our understanding of both the vulnerabilities and the potential defenses of consensus-generating LLMs in digital democracy applications.

cs.CY

Explaining Tournament Solutions with Minimal Supports

Tournaments are widely used models to represent pairwise dominance between candidates, alternatives, or teams. We study the problem of providing certified explanations for why a candidate appears among the winners under various tournament rules. To this end, we identify minimal supports, minimal sub-tournaments in which the candidate is guaranteed to win regardless of how the rest of the tournament is completed (that is, the candidate is a necessary winner of the sub-tournament). This notion corresponds to an abductive explanation for the question,"Why does the winner win the tournament?", a central concept in formal explainable AI. We focus on common tournament solutions: the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Copeland rule, the Borda rule, the maximin rule, and the weighted uncovered set. For each rule we determine the size of the smallest minimal supports, and we present polynomial-time algorithms to compute them for all solutions except for the weighted uncovered set, for which the problem is NP-complete. Finally, we show how minimal supports can serve to produce compact, certified, and intuitive explanations for tournament solutions.

cs.AI

Algorithmic Shortlisting in Participatory Budgeting

Participatory budgeting is a democratic innovation that allows citizens to propose and vote on public investment projects. To help organizers manage large volumes of submissions, we design and test privacy-preserving methods for algorithmic shortlisting. These algorithms predict which projects are likely to be funded using only project features and anonymous historical voting data. We demonstrate the limitations of a naive approach that uses a large language model to rank projects based on past success and propose a vote-based pipeline that enables state-of-the-art LLMs to perform on par with classical machine learning. Our findings indicate that user preferences in participatory budgeting are stable enough to allow algorithmic shortlisting to approximate an initial selection of projects effectively.

cs.CY

Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting

We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.

cs.AI