arXiv subjects

Clemens Thielen

Publications and source records attributed to Clemens Thielen.

24 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

One-Exact Approximate Pareto Sets

Papadimitriou and Yannakakis show that the polynomial-time solvability of a certain singleobjective problem determines the class of multiobjective optimization problems that admit a polynomial-time computable $(1+\varepsilon, \dots , 1+\varepsilon)$-approximate Pareto set (also called an $\varepsilon$-Pareto set). Similarly, in this article, we characterize the class of problems having a polynomial-time computable approximate $\varepsilon$-Pareto set that is exact in one objective by the efficient solvability of an appropriate singleobjective problem. This class includes important problems such as multiobjective shortest path and spanning tree, and the approximation guarantee we provide is, in general, best possible. Furthermore, for biobjective problems from this class, we provide an algorithm that computes a one-exact $\varepsilon$-Pareto set of cardinality at most twice the cardinality of a smallest such set and show that this factor of 2 is best possible. For three or more objective functions, however, we prove that no constant-factor approximation on the size of the set can be obtained efficiently.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Who witnesses The Witness? Finding witnesses in The Witness is hard and sometimes impossible

We analyze the computational complexity of the many types of pencil-and-paper-style puzzles featured in the 2016 puzzle video game The Witness. In all puzzles, the goal is to draw a simple path in a rectangular grid graph from a start vertex to a destination vertex. The different puzzle types place different constraints on the path: preventing some edges from being visited (broken edges); forcing some edges or vertices to be visited (hexagons); forcing some cells to have certain numbers of incident path edges (triangles); or forcing the regions formed by the path to be partially monochromatic (squares), have exactly two special cells (stars), or be singly covered by given shapes (polyominoes) and/or negatively counting shapes (antipolyominoes). We show that any one of these clue types (except the first) is enough to make path finding NP-complete ("witnesses exist but are hard to find"), even for rectangular boards. Furthermore, we show that a final clue type (antibody), which necessarily "cancels" the effect of another clue in the same region, makes path finding $Σ_2$-complete ("witnesses do not exist"), even with a single antibody (combined with many anti/polyominoes), and the problem gets no harder with many antibodies. On the positive side, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for monomino clues, by reducing to hexagon clues on the boundary of the puzzle, even in the presence of broken edges, and solving "subset Hamiltonian path" for terminals on the boundary of an embedded planar graph in polynomial time.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2017

A General Approximation Method for Bicriteria Minimization Problems

We present a general technique for approximating bicriteria minimization problems with positive-valued, polynomially computable objective functions. Given $0<ε\leq1$ and a polynomial-time $α$-approximation algorithm for the corresponding weighted sum problem, we show how to obtain a bicriteria $(α\cdot(1+2ε),α\cdot(1+\frac{2}ε))$-approximation algorithm for the budget-constrained problem whose running time is polynomial in the encoding length of the input and linear in $\frac{1}ε$. Moreover, we show that our method can be extended to compute an $(α\cdot(1+2ε),α\cdot(1+\frac{2}ε))$-approximate Pareto curve under the same assumptions. Our technique applies to many minimization problems to which most previous algorithms for computing approximate Pareto curves cannot be applied because the corresponding gap problem is $\textsf{NP}$-hard to solve. For maximization problems, however, we show that approximation results similar to the ones presented here for minimization problems are impossible to obtain in polynomial time unless $\textsf{P}=\textsf{NP}$.

math.OC↗

arXiv2016

A Network Simplex Method for the Budget-Constrained Minimum Cost Flow Problem

We present a specialized network simplex algorithm for the budget-constrained minimum cost flow problem, which is an extension of the traditional minimum cost flow problem by a second kind of costs associated with each edge, whose total value in a feasible flow is constrained by a given budget B. We present a fully combinatorial description of the algorithm that is based on a novel incorporation of two kinds of integral node potentials and three kinds of reduced costs. We prove optimality criteria and combine two methods that are commonly used to avoid cycling in traditional network simplex algorithms into new techniques that are applicable to our problem. With these techniques and our definition of the reduced costs, we are able to prove a pseudo-polynomial running time of the overall procedure, which can be further improved by incorporating Dantzig's pivoting rule. Moreover, we present computational results that compare our procedure with Gurobi.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2016

On the Complexity and Approximability of Budget-Constrained Minimum Cost Flows

We investigate the complexity and approximability of the budget-constrained minimum cost flow problem, which is an extension of the traditional minimum cost flow problem by a second kind of costs associated with each edge, whose total value in a feasible flow is constrained by a given budget B. This problem can, e.g., be seen as the application of the ε-constraint method to the bicriteria minimum cost flow problem. We show that we can solve the problem exactly in weakly polynomial time $O(\log M \cdot MCF(m,n,C,U))$, where C, U, and M are upper bounds on the largest absolute cost, largest capacity, and largest absolute value of any number occuring in the input, respectively, and MCF(m,n,C,U) denotes the complexity of finding a traditional minimum cost flow. Moreover, we present two fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for the problem on general graphs and one with an improved running-time for the problem on acyclic graphs.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2009

Complexity of Strong Implementability

We consider the question of implementability of a social choice function in a classical setting where the preferences of finitely many selfish individuals with private information have to be aggregated towards a social choice. This is one of the central questions in mechanism design. If the concept of weak implementation is considered, the Revelation Principle states that one can restrict attention to truthful implementations and direct revelation mechanisms, which implies that implementability of a social choice function is easy to check. For the concept of strong implementation, however, the Revelation Principle becomes invalid, and the complexity of deciding whether a given social choice function is strongly implementable has been open so far. In this paper, we show by using methods from polyhedral theory that strong implementability of a social choice function can be decided in polynomial space and that each of the payments needed for strong implementation can always be chosen to be of polynomial encoding length. Moreover, we show that strong implementability of a social choice function involving only a single selfish individual can be decided in polynomial time via linear programming.

cs.CC↗