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Connor Rudy Sullivan

Publications and source records attributed to Connor Rudy Sullivan.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

SBA: A Practical Memory Performance Denial-of-Service Attack

Modern cloud platforms use memory bandwidth regulation to isolate co-located workloads, implicitly assuming that high aggregate bandwidth consumption implies high interference. We show that this assumption is fundamentally flawed. We present the Single-Bank Attack (SBA), a practical memory denial-of-service attack that induces extreme cross-core slowdowns---over three orders of magnitude on memory-intensive victims (e.g., LLM decode)---while consuming less than 1 GB/s of memory bandwidth. SBA exploits the gap between peak and worst-case DRAM throughput by concentrating memory write operations on a single bank, forcing persistent row conflicts and frequent write draining, thereby collapsing the memory service rate. Across Intel and AMD systems, including DDR5- and HBM2E-based platforms, SBA consistently causes orders-of-magnitude slowdowns under realistic multi-tenant settings, revealing a fundamental limitation of bandwidth-centric memory isolation. We further show that this localized contention propagates system-wide: single-bank congestion saturates memory controller queues and induces back-pressure into shared cache and coherence structures, ultimately throttling memory request injection across cores. Consequently, severe interference can arise even at low aggregate bandwidth, evading existing bandwidth-based QoS mechanisms such as Intel RDT MBA. To address this limitation, we propose IQ-MemGuard, a lightweight, software-based memory bandwidth regulator that detects sustained contention using microarchitectural signals and selectively throttles pathological request injection. Our implementation on an Intel platform effectively mitigates SBA, whereas Intel's hardware QoS mechanism fails completely.

cs.AR↗

Per-Bank Memory Bandwidth Regulation for Predictable and Performant Real-Time System

Modern multicore system-on-chips (SoCs) share off-chip DRAM across cores, where bank-level interference can significantly degrade performance and threaten real-time guarantees. While prior work has focused on per-core bandwidth regulation, these approaches treat main memory as a monolithic resource and overlook DRAM's inherent bank-level parallelism. We show that DRAM interference is fundamentally a bank-level phenomenon. We characterize the guaranteed bandwidth of modern DRAM, demonstrate that it remains effectively constant across generations, and show how this limitation can be exploited by single-bank attacks. These results highlight the need for bank-aware memory management for predictable and efficient real-time systems. We design and implement a novel per-bank memory bandwidth regulator in an open-source RISC-V SoC and evaluate it using FireSim with both synthetic and real-world workloads. Our evaluation demonstrates that per-bank regulation effectively mitigates adversarial bank contention and achieves a 5.74x average throughput improvement for best-effort workloads over traditional bank-oblivious approaches while providing the same-level of performance isolation guarantees for real-time workloads.

cs.AR↗