arXiv subjects

Constantin Ickstadt

Publications and source records attributed to Constantin Ickstadt.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On the equivalence of semidefinite programming and zero-sum semidefinite games

By results of Dantzig (1951) and Adler (2013), computing the optimal solutions of a linear program is equivalent to finding optimal strategies in zero-sum bimatrix games. Dantzig's original result was incomplete, in the sense that the reduction of a linear program to a zero-sum game did not work for all possible linear programs. We show that, under a natural constraint qualification requiring either the existence of strongly optimal primal-dual solutions or of a strictly unbounded direction, computing the solution of a semidefinite program is equivalent to finding optimal strategies in an associated zero-sum semidefinite game. Our work builds upon Ickstadt, Theobald, and Tsigaridas (2024), where, similar to Dantzig's work, the proposed reduction cannot handle a certain subclass of semidefinite programs. Our main proof ingredients for the equivalence result include: (i) a semidefinite generalization of von Stengel's (2023) extension of Dantzig's construction; (ii) techniques for handling more general duality phenomena in the semidefinite setting; and (iii) an explicit bound for the (coordinates) of the solutions of a semidefinite program. As a by-product, the game value provides a certificate: it is zero if and only if strongly optimal solutions exist, and otherwise optimal strategies yield an infeasibility certificate for the primal or dual program.

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arXiv2025

Semidefinite network games: multiplayer minimax and complementarity problems

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of network games, we introduce and study semidefinite network games. In this model, each player selects a positive semidefinite matrix with trace equal to one, known as a density matrix, to engage in a two-player game with every neighboring node. The player's payoff is the cumulative payoff acquired from these edge games. Initially, we focus on the zero-sum setting, where the sum of all players' payoffs is equal to zero. We establish that, in this class of games, Nash equilibria can be characterized as the projection of a spectrahedron. Furthermore, we show that determining whether a semidefinite network game is a zero-sum game is equivalent to deciding if the value of a semidefinite program is zero. Beyond the zero-sum case, we characterize Nash equilibria as the solutions of a semidefinite linear complementarity problem.

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arXiv2025

A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=6 or larger. We answer it positively for the remaining case n=5, which had been open since 1999. The problem can be translated to a combinatorial question about the vertices of a pair of simple n-polytopes with 2n facets. We introduce a novel obstruction based on the index of an equilibrium, which states that equilibrium vertices belong to two equal-sized disjoint stable sets of the graph of the polytope. This bound is verified directly using the known classification of the 159,375 combinatorial types of dual neighborly polytopes in dimension 5 with 10 facets. Non-neighborly polytopes are analyzed with additional combinatorial techniques where the bound is used for their disjoint facets.

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arXiv2025

Nash equilibria in semidefinite games and Lemke-Howson paths

We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as semidefinite complementarity problems and develop symbolic-numeric techniques to trace generalized Lemke-Howson paths. These paths generalize the piecewise affine-linear trajectories of the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm for bimatrix games, replacing them with nonlinear curve branches governed by eigenvalue complementarity conditions. A key feature of our framework is the introduction of event points, which correspond to curve singularities. We analyze the local behavior near these points using Puiseux series expansions. We prove the smoothness of the curve branches under suitable non-degeneracy conditions and establish connections between our approach and both the classical combinatorial and homotopy-theoretic interpretations of the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

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arXiv2024

Semidefinite games

We introduce and study the class of semidefinite games, which generalizes bimatrix games and finite $N$-person games, by replacing the simplex of the mixed strategies for each player by a slice of the positive semidefinite cone in the space of real symmetric matrices. For semidefinite two-player zero-sum games, we show that the optimal strategies can be computed by semidefinite programming. Furthermore, we show that two-player semidefinite zero-sum games are almost equivalent to semidefinite programming, generalizing Dantzig's result on the almost equivalence of bimatrix games and linear programming. For general two-player semidefinite games, we prove a spectrahedral characterization of the Nash equilibria. Moreover, we give constructions of semidefinite games with many Nash equilibria. In particular, we give a construction of semidefinite games whose number of connected components of Nash equilibria exceeds the long standing best known construction for many Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, which was presented by von Stengel in 1999.

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