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Corban Villa

Publications and source records attributed to Corban Villa.

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A Queryable Graph-Based Security Analysis Framework for O-RAN

The Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) replaces vendor-locked RANs with a modular and interoperable architecture that fosters competition and accelerates innovation. With this openness comes increased complexity and a larger attack surface, making security a critical concern. Today, assessing O-RAN security requires manually cross-referencing dozens of specifications, vendor whitepapers, and academic studies, which is error-prone and static. In this paper, we present a graph-based framework that transforms this static corpus into a single, queryable database. Our graph representation contains over 350 nodes and more than 1,250 relationships, distilled from specifications, academic papers, open-source projects, and vulnerability databases. To keep this resource current, we integrate a hybrid data extraction pipeline that couples deterministic parsing of structured specifications with Large Language Model (LLM)-assisted extraction for evolving specifications and unstructured literature. Querying the graph reveals three actionable findings within our curated corpus: critical infrastructure such as the O-DU, SMO, and O-Cloud carries dozens of specification-level threats yet has little or no empirical coverage; memory-safety weaknesses account for 11 of the 21 CWE occurrences associated with the analyzed CVEs; and fuzzing uncovered 18 of the 20 CVEs attributed to research papers. We provide the database, pipeline, and queries as open-source artifacts.

cs.CR

Antiproof: Synthesizing Vulnerability Detectors and Proofs of Exploitability

Discovering vulnerabilities before attackers exploit them requires high recall and reliable automatic validation, but existing approaches struggle to achieve both without prohibitive cost. We present Antiproof, an end-to-end vulnerability discovery system that combines neuro-symbolic detector synthesis for high-recall discovery with proof-of-exploitability oracles for automatic validation. Antiproof learns and iteratively refines static detectors from vulnerability datasets, then validates candidates by verifying whether executable proofs demonstrate concrete attacker capabilities. Evaluated on BountyBench and our curated KEVBench dataset, Antiproof detects 64 of 66 vulnerabilities, improving recall by more than 60 percentage points over static-analysis and neuro-symbolic baselines. In a scan of 50 widely deployed systems, Antiproof uncovered several hundred previously unknown vulnerabilities. We are responsibly disclosing all confirmed zero-days and have received 12 CVE assignments to date, including remote code execution vulnerabilities in Ray, SGLang, vLLM, and LiteLLM that could allow attackers to take over LLM training and inference systems.

cs.CR

Prismata: Confining Cross-Site Prompt Injection in Web Agents

Autonomous web agents promise to automate everyday browsing tasks, but inherit one of the web's oldest attack surfaces. Cross-Site Scripting proved that mixing trusted and untrusted content is dangerous, even on benign pages. Agents resurface this risk by interpreting natural language as instructions, allowing third-party and user-generated content to hijack the agent via prompt injection. The core challenge is that deriving a task-specific security policy requires reasoning over page structure that is entangled with the attacker's content. We present Prismata, a defense enforcing contextual least privilege for web agents, constraining both what the agent sees and what it can do. Prismata's dynamic trust derivation produces permission labels for page content, with structural confinement guarantees, inspired by classical integrity models, that bound any labeling errors so that labels can only decrease in privilege and mislabelings are bounded. Prismata's mechanical confinement enforces these labels by redacting content and restricting agent capabilities. Importantly, these mechanisms require no developer annotations, so Prismata supports the long tail of websites. Across recent published web agent attacks, including adaptive variants, Prismata substantially reduces attack success while preserving benign task utility.

cs.CR

Chai: Agentic Discovery of Cryptographic Misuse Vulnerabilities

AI-assisted vulnerability discovery has proven effective for bug classes like memory safety, where instrumentation confirms memory violations and efficiently filters false positives. Many dangerous vulnerability classes, such as cryptographic misuse, however, lack any comparable instrumentation. In this work, we present Chai, an AI-based system that discovers and validates cryptographic misuse vulnerabilities through naturally occurring signals. To achieve this, Chai rethinks the classical technique of differential testing by leveraging AI to 1) improve precision for detecting real security issues in libraries, and 2) repurpose commonly overlooked discrepancies as leads for tangible vulnerabilities in downstream applications. In doing so, Chai inverts the prevailing paradigm of AI vulnerability discovery: instead of auditing one codebase for many flaws, it catalogs flaws at the library level and propagates them across a cryptographic dependency graph, delivering compounding efficiency gains. We evaluate Chai across X.509, JWT, and SAML libraries. Chai discovered a previously unknown critical vulnerability in an SSL library that powers billions of devices, along with security bugs in one library behind a major web browser and another in major Linux distributions. In total, these techniques surfaced over 100 vulnerabilities.

cs.CR