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Cristina Nita-Rotaru

Publications and source records attributed to Cristina Nita-Rotaru.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Localize-and-Detect: Auditing Task-Level Poisoning in Instruction-Tuned Models

Instruction fine-tuning adapts a pretrained language model to follow instructions by training it on instruction--response pairs from a collection of tasks, such as summarization and question answering. Task-level poisoning exploits this task structure to manipulate the fine-tuned model into producing attacker-specified biased content on a particular target task, without requiring an explicit input trigger. Detecting such attacks is challenging because there is no explicit trigger to identify, the target task and biased content are unknown, and benign fine-tuning itself changes model behavior. We introduce Localize-and-Detect, a two-stage black-box auditing method for task-level poisoning that requires only outputs from both the base and fine-tuned models. In the first stage, we localize the target task by identifying candidate tasks on which the fine-tuned and base models have the largest differences in their next-token distributions. In the second stage, we search the shortlisted tasks for biased content that repeatedly appears in the fine-tuned model's responses but not in those of the base model. We evaluate Localize-and-Detect on 216 poisoned models across two model families, varying the target task, poisoning mode, poison budget, and type of biased content. Our evaluation demonstrates that Localize-and-Detect can effectively localize target tasks and detect biased content across a range of poisoning settings and models, with detection that tracks attack success and few false positives on clean models.

cs.CR↗

PANDA: A Decentralized Architecture with Flexible Orchestration for Scalable, Fault-Tolerant Multi-Agent Systems

Existing architectures for LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) cannot reliably and efficiently solve multi-step tasks at scale: they struggle to support large numbers of agents and concurrent tasks, tolerate failures, govern agent interactions, and accommodate the diverse planning and execution patterns different tasks require. We present PANDA, a decentralized architecture that connects a large collective of heterogeneous, independently administered agents, letting them discover each other's capabilities and self-organize into small specialized teams per task. PANDA scales by decoupling collective communication from team communication, allowing agents to participate in multiple teams simultaneously, load-balancing tasks across the collective, and scheduling concurrent work within each agent. PANDA further separates the underlying architecture from the orchestration strategy, supporting three planning and execution patterns (star, chain, and mesh) that can be selected according to the structure and requirements of each task. PANDA detects infrastructure and orchestration failures and recovers affected tasks by dynamically replanning around failed components. Finally, to provide governance without a centralized service that would limit scalability, PANDA uses a web-of-trust model to constrain agent interactions to established trust relationships. We evaluate PANDA on the HotPotQA benchmark, demonstrating that it scales to thousands of agents, assembles teams in milliseconds, matches state-of-the-art accuracy at up to 8x the efficiency, and sustains 100% task completion under faults where existing systems fail.

cs.MA↗

Beyond Predictable Paths: Redefining AI Security Incident Reporting for Agents

AI agents are being deployed rapidly, accompanied by a growing number of AI-specific attacks and corresponding incidents. As incident reporting becomes increasingly important for legal compliance, governance, accountability, and security; current frameworks must be adapted to the unique characteristics of AI agents. In this paper, two editorial authors compare AI systems and AI agents and, drawing on input from 23 experts in academia and industry, identify the information required for reporting incidents where the security of AI agents is harmed. %involving AI agents. Potential reporting elements include, for example, agent memory and memory accesses, actual and potential levels of autonomy, and tool usage. Based on these findings, we identify several open research questions, including how to efficiently record incidents and how to determine whether vulnerabilities and incidents generalize. Expert feedback also highlighted potential reporting weaknesses, such as risks of data leakage and attacks targeting the reporting infrastructure itself, creating additional research needs. Lastly, we summarize privacy requirements and outline research directions for the secure and trustworthy deployment of AI agents.

cs.CR↗

RFCLLM: Evaluating LLMs' Reasoning Ability of Network Protocol State Machines

Mapping textual specifications into formal representations is essential for ensuring the correctness of protocol designs and implementations. LLM-generated mappings, used for networking security or testing, are assumed to capture a perfect understanding of the specification, which may not hold in practice. The goal of this paper is to assess the extent to which LLMs can interpret the specification correctly. We examine the degree to which an LLM's implicit representation of a finite-state transition system-defined via natural language descriptions-aligns with a manually generated ground-truth model. We designed 4 tasks and 1482 task queries for 16 protocols. We evaluated different judge biases, observed the inherent difficulty gaps between tasks, looked into the effect of 4 context types, and the influence of protocol characteristics. Our work contributes to a step toward verifying whether LLMs can really be trusted in FSM (Finite State Machine) reasoning of protocol specifications.

cs.CL↗

Quantum Disruption: An SOK of How Post-Quantum Attackers Reshape Blockchain Security and Performance

As quantum computing advances, classical cryptographic systems - signature schemes, key exchange protocols, public-key encryption, and certain hash constructions - that secure most blockchain platforms come under threat, raising serious concerns about their long-term security and integrity. Transitioning to post-quantum primitives is rarely straightforward: their larger sizes and higher computation costs can have unintended consequences, and in some cases make such a transition impractical. We examine the impact of post-quantum migration on blockchain systems across three dimensions. First, we dissect the cryptographic primitives most vulnerable to quantum attacks within the consensus, identity, and transaction-validation layers. Next, we survey proposed post-quantum adaptations and evaluate their practical feasibility. Finally, we assess how substituting classical primitives with post-quantum alternatives affects system performance, protocol behavior, and the underlying incentive and trust structures. Our findings show that PQ adoption is far from a drop-in replacement: it demands careful architectural reconsideration, as naive substitution risks destabilizing core protocol operations and weakening the security and efficiency guarantees blockchains rely upon.

cs.CR↗

ALIBI: Adaptive Agentic Attacks on LLM-Based Vulnerability Detectors via Adversarial Code Comments

Large language models are increasingly deployed for security-sensitive tasks such as vulnerability detection and code review. Their reliance on natural-language context embedded in source code exposes a previously underexplored attack surface: adversarial comments that can influence a detector's reasoning without changing program behavior. We study LLM-based vulnerability detectors against a new adversary: a coding agent that implements new functionality, deliberately introduces vulnerabilities, and strategically inserts adversarial source-code comments to evade detection. We present ALIBI, an automated adaptive black-box attack framework that generates and iteratively refines adversarial comments using detector reasoning and feedback. We transform real-world vulnerability-fixing commits into coding tasks and evaluate four representative LLM-based vulnerability detectors, ranging from specialized open-weight reasoning models to frontier multi-agent systems. All evaluated detectors are highly vulnerable: attack success rates exceed 90% across 125 real-world null-pointer dereference vulnerabilities, reaching 100% on one system. The framework also generalizes beyond this vulnerability class. Adversarial comments steering detector reasoning or fabricating external tool results prove most effective, while iterative refinement based on detector feedback further increases attack success. Finally, prompt-level defenses provide limited robustness against adaptive attacks, whereas architectural isolation and pre-detector comment sanitization substantially improve resilience. Our findings expose a fundamental attack surface in current LLM-based vulnerability detectors and motivate security-aware designs that carefully calibrate trust between natural-language context and program evidence.

cs.CR↗

SLFS: a Flexible, Low-Cost Distributed File System Using Serverless Designs

Large-scale distributed file systems must provision resources for peak demand, yet file access patterns fluctuate significantly, leaving substantial capacity idle during off-peak periods. Existing scaling mechanisms operate at the granularity of entire servers and take minutes to hours, making them unable to track the rapid, fine-grained load variations that file systems commonly experience. Serverless computing, with its millisecond-granularity elasticity and pay-per-use pricing, offers a compelling alternative. We present SLFS, the first distributed file system built with serverless functions for both data and metadata operations. SLFS implements file services on top of key-value stores, keeping function operations simple and short, and introduces a novel multi-threaded, short-lived server design that overcomes the cold-start problem while maintaining low cost. A policy-enforcing coordinator efficiently maps files to function instances, scales the system elastically, and controls function lifetimes to balance performance and cost. SLFS can flexibly run on diverse storage backends -- from cloud-native services like S3 to user-managed key-value stores -- enabling configurable cost-performance trade-offs. Our evaluation shows that SLFS mitigates cold starts by 580$\times$ compared to the base serverless design and outperforms $λ$FS, EFS, and Ceph at up to 63%, 68%, and 63% lower cost, respectively.

cs.DC↗

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their design exposes them to indirect prompt injection attacks embedded in untrusted web content, enabling adversaries to hijack agent behavior and violate user intent. Despite growing awareness of this threat, existing evaluations rely on fixed attack templates, manually selected injection surfaces, or narrowly scoped scenarios, limiting their ability to capture realistic, adaptive attacks encountered in practice. We present MUZZLE, an automated agentic framework for evaluating the security of web agents against indirect prompt injection attacks. MUZZLE utilizes the agent's trajectories to automatically identify high-salience injection surfaces, and adaptively generate context-aware malicious instructions that target violations of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Unlike prior approaches, MUZZLE adapts its attack strategy based on the agent's observed execution trajectory and iteratively refines attacks using feedback from failed executions. We evaluate MUZZLE across diverse web applications, user tasks, and agent configurations, demonstrating its ability to automatically and adaptively assess the security of web agents with minimal human intervention. Our results show that MUZZLE effectively discovers 44 new attacks on 4 web applications with 10 adversarial objectives that violate confidentiality, availability, or privacy properties across different LLMs and agent scaffolds. MUZZLE also identifies novel attack strategies, including 3 cross-application prompt injection attacks and an agent-tailored phishing scenario.

cs.CR↗

PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMs

When practitioners fine-tune LLMs on unvetted datasets, an adversary can exploit the data supply chain through task-level poisoning: inserting a small number of crafted instruction-response pairs that cause the model to embed attacker-specified entities, such as a country, in outputs for a targeted task family while behaving normally elsewhere. We introduce PoisonForge, a benchmark that parameterizes this threat along four dimensions (bias type, poisoning mode, appearance count, and target output length) and evaluates 12 open-weight models (from 2B to 32B parameters) across five families under a primarily 1% poison budget. With only 10 poisoned examples among 1,000 fine-tuning examples, 11 of 12 models exceed a 70% attack success rate (ASR) in their most vulnerable configuration. Meanwhile, unintended leakage to non-target tasks remains below 0.5%, and models perform well on standard benchmarks. We analyze in detail the factors contributing to attack success. We observe that multiple appearances of an entity increase the ASR, the optimal poisoning mode depends on the semantic structure of the target entity, and ASR drops monotonically with the task output length. A correlation analysis and risk prediction model confirm that poisoning design choices, rather than model scale, are the primary causes of attack success, and that these patterns generalize to predict attack success on new tasks. We release all configurations, pipelines, and analysis code to support reproducible comparisons.

cs.CR↗

MAGIQ: A Post-Quantum Multi-Agentic AI Governance System with Provable Security

Our computing ecosystem is being transformed by two emerging paradigms: the increased deployment of agentic AI systems and advancements in quantum computing. With respect to agentic AI systems, one of the most critical problems is creating secure governing architectures that ensure agents follow their owners' communication and interaction policies and can be held accountable for the messages they exchange with other agents. With respect to quantum computing, existing systems must be retrofitted and new cryptographic mechanisms must be designed to ensure long-term security and quantum resistance. In fact, NIST recommends that standard public-key cryptographic algorithms, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and elliptic-curve constructions (ECC), be deprecated starting in 2030 and disallowed after 2035. In this paper, we present MAGIQ, a framework for policy definition and enforcement in multi-agent AI systems using novel, highly efficient, quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols with proven security guarantees. MAGIQ (i) allows users to define rich communication and access-control policy budgets for agent-to-agent sessions and tasks, including global budgets for one-to-many agent sessions; (ii) enforces such policies using post-quantum cryptographic primitives; (iii) supports session-based enforcement of policies for agent-to-agent and one-to-many agent sessions; and (iv) provides accountability of agents to their users through message attribution. We formally model and prove the correctness and security of the system using the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We evaluate the computation and communication overhead of our framework and compare it with the state-of-the-art agentic AI framework SAGA. MAGIQ is a first step toward post-quantum-secure solutions for agentic AI systems.

cs.LG↗

APWA: A Distributed Architecture for Parallelizable Agentic Workflows

Autonomous multi-agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable abilities in independently solving complex tasks in a wide breadth of application domains. However, these systems hit critical reasoning, coordination, and computational scaling bottlenecks as the size and complexity of their tasks grow. These limitations hinder multi-agent systems from achieving high-throughput processing for highly parallelizable tasks, despite the availability of parallel computing and reasoning primitives in the underlying LLMs. We introduce the Agent-Parallel Workload Architecture (APWA), a distributed multi-agent system architecture designed for the efficient processing of heavily parallelizable agentic workloads. APWA facilitates parallel execution by decomposing workflows into non-interfering subproblems that can be processed using independent resources without cross-communication. It supports heterogeneous data and parallel processing patterns, and it accommodates tasks from a wide breadth of domains. In our evaluation, we demonstrate that APWA can dynamically decompose complex queries into parallelizable workflows and scales on larger tasks in settings where prior systems fail completely.

cs.AI↗

Attacks and Mitigations for Distributed Governance of Agentic AI under Byzantine Adversaries

Agentic AI governance is a critical component of agentic AI infrastructure ensuring that agents follow their owner's communication and interaction policies, and providing protection against attacks from malicious agents. The state-of-the-art solution, SAGA, assumes a logically centralized point of trust, the Provider, which serves as a repository for user and agent information and actively enforces policies. While SAGA provides protection against malicious agents, it remains vulnerable to a malicious Provider that deviates from the protocol, undermining the security of the identity and access control infrastructure. Deployment on both private and public clouds, each susceptible to insider threats, further increases the risk of Provider compromise. In this work, we analyze the attacks that can be mounted from a compromised Provider, taking into account the different system components and realistic deployments. We identify and execute several concrete attacks with devastating effects: undermining agent attributability, extracting private data, or bypassing access control. We then present three types of solutions for securing the Provider that offer different trade-offs between security and performance. We first present SAGA-BFT, a fully byzantine-resilient architecture that provides the strongest protection, but incurs significant performance degradation, due to the high-cost of byzantine resilient protocols. We then propose SAGA-MON and SAGA-AUD, two novel solutions that leverage lightweight server-side monitoring or client-side auditing to provide protection against most classes of attacks with minimal overhead. Finally, we propose SAGA-HYB, a hybrid architecture that combines byzantine-resilience with monitoring and auditing to trade-off security for performance. We evaluate all the architectures and compare them with SAGA. We discuss which solution is best and under what conditions.

cs.CR↗

Quantum-Resistant Networks: A Review of Primitives, Protocols and Best Practices

Large-scale quantum computers threaten the public-key cryptographic foundations underpinning today's network security infrastructures. While significant progress has been made in standardizing post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives and adapting individual protocols such as TLS and SSH, far less attention has been paid to the broader architectural consequences of the post-quantum transition for networked systems. In particular, many real-world deployments such as mobile networks, industrial control systems, IoT environments, and regulated infrastructures cannot assume the universal availability, deployability, or desirability of PQ public-key infrastructures. This paper presents the first comprehensive systematization of PQ-resistant network architectures, focusing on key distribution and management as a system-level design problem rather than a protocol-local substitution. We introduce a unified taxonomy spanning cryptographic foundations (symmetric-only, PQ-PKI, hybrid, and information-theoretic multi-path), key-distribution architectures (centralized, hierarchical, replicated, threshold, MPC-backed, and serverless), trust and threat models, key-management lifecycle, and deployment environments. Using this framework, we analyze the security, scalability, and operational trade-offs of a wide range of architectures under realistic PQ adversary assumptions, including harvest-now, decrypt-later attacks and partial infrastructure compromise. Our study highlights fundamental gaps in existing approaches, clarifies when PQ-PKI is necessary or avoidable, and identifies promising research directions for building cryptographically agile, quantum-resilient network infrastructures.

cs.CR↗

Automated Channel Fault Analysis with Tofu

Distributed protocols are the linchpin of the modern internet, underpinning every internet service. This has in turn motivated a massive body of research ensuring the security, reliability, and performance of distributed protocols. In these works, a wide-ranging assumption is that distributed protocols operate over faulty or attacker-controlled channels, where messages can be arbitrarily inserted, dropped, replayed, or reordered. Formal verification work targeting distributed protocols typically defines its own notion of faulty or malicious channels, then constructively proves their protocol is correct with respect to it. In this work we take a fundamentally different approach: we develop a rigorous methodology for automatically conducting channel fault analysis on distributed protocols, and we introduce Tofu, a generalizable tool that implements our methodology. Tofu provides sound, complete analysis, synthesizing channel fault-based attack traces on arbitrary linear temporal logic (LTL) protocol specifications or proving the absence of such through an exhaustive state-space search. We demonstrate the applicability of Tofu by employing it to study TCP.

cs.CR↗

Classifying Implementations of Cryptographic Primitives and Protocols that Use Post-Quantum Algorithms

Classification techniques can be used to analyze system behaviors, network protocols, and cryptographic primitives based on identifiable traits. While useful for defense, such classification can also be leveraged by attackers to infer system configurations, detect vulnerabilities, and tailor attacks such as denial-of-service, key recovery, or downgrade attacks. In this paper, we study the feasibility of classifying post-quantum (PQ) algorithms by analyzing implementations of key exchange and digital signatures, their use within secure protocols, and their integration into SNARK generation libraries. Unlike traditional cryptography, PQ algorithms have larger memory requirements and variable computational costs. Our research examines two post-quantum cryptography libraries, liboqs and CIRCL, evaluating TLS, SSH, QUIC, OpenVPN, and OpenID Connect (OIDC) across Windows, Ubuntu, and macOS. We also analyze pysnark and lattice_zksnark for SNARK generation and verification on Ubuntu. Experimental results show that (1) classical and PQ key exchange and signature algorithms can be distinguished with accuracies of 98% and 100%; (2) specific PQ algorithms can be identified with 97% accuracy for key exchange and 86% for signatures; (3) implementations of the same algorithm in liboqs and CIRCL are distinguishable with up to 100% accuracy; and (4) within CIRCL, PQ and hybrid key exchange implementations can be distinguished with 97% accuracy. For secure protocols, we can determine whether key exchange is classical or PQ and identify the PQ algorithm used. SNARK generation and verification in pysnark and lattice_zksnark are distinguishable with 100% accuracy. We demonstrate real-world applicability by identifying PQ-enabled TLS domains in the Tranco dataset and integrating our methods into QUARTZ, an open-source risk and threat analyzer by Cisco.

cs.CR↗

Phantom: General Backdoor Attacks on Retrieval Augmented Language Generation

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs), by anchoring, adapting, and personalizing their responses to the most relevant knowledge sources. It is particularly useful in chatbot applications, allowing developers to customize LLM output without expensive retraining. Despite their significant utility in various applications, RAG systems present new security risks. In this work, we propose a novel attack that allows an adversary to inject a single malicious document into a RAG system's knowledge base, and mount a backdoor poisoning attack. We design Phantom, a general two-stage optimization framework against RAG systems, that crafts a malicious poisoned document leading to an integrity violation in the model's output. First, the document is constructed to be retrieved only when a specific naturally occurring trigger sequence of tokens appears in the victim's queries. Second, the document is further optimized with crafted adversarial text that induces various adversarial objectives on the LLM output, including refusal to answer, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors.We demonstrate our attacks on multiple open-source LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama, and show that they transfer to closed-source models such as GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4. Finally, we successfully demonstrate our attack on an end-to-end black-box production RAG system: NVIDIA's "Chat with RTX''.

cs.CR↗

It Takes a Village: Bridging the Gaps between Current and Formal Specifications for Protocols

Formal specifications have numerous benefits for both designers and users of network protocols. They provide clear, unambiguous representations, which are useful as documentation and for testing. They can help reveal disagreements about what a protocol "is" and identify areas where further work is needed to resolve ambiguities or internal inconsistencies. They also provide a foundation for formal reasoning, making it possible to establish important security and correctness guarantees on all inputs and in every environment. Despite these advantages, formal methods are not widely used to design, implement, and validate network protocols today. Instead, Internet protocols are usually described in informal documents, such as IETF Requests for Comments (RFCs) or IEEE standards. These documents primarily consist of lengthy prose descriptions, accompanied by pseudocode, header descriptions, state machine diagrams, and reference implementations which are used for interoperability testing. So, while RFCs and reference implementations were only intended to help guide the social process used by protocol designers, they have evolved into the closest things to formal specifications the Internet community has. In this paper, we discuss the different roles that specifications play in the networking and formal methods communities. We then illustrate the potential benefits of specifying protocols formally, presenting highlights from several recent success stories. Finally, we identify key differences between how formal specifications are understood by the two communities and suggest possible strategies to bridge the gaps.

cs.NI↗

Cross-Service Token: Finding Attacks in 5G Core Networks

5G marks a major departure from previous cellular architectures, by transitioning from a monolithic design of the core network to a Service-Based Architecture (SBA) where services are modularized as Network Functions (NFs) which communicate with each other via standard-defined HTTP-based APIs called Service-Based Interfaces (SBIs). These NFs are deployed in private and public cloud infrastructure, and an access control framework based on OAuth restricts how they communicate with each other and obtain access to resources. Given the increased vulnerabilities of clouds to insiders, it is important to study the security of the 5G Core services for vulnerabilities that allow attackers to use compromised NFs to obtain unauthorized access to resources. We present FivGeeFuzz, a grammar-based fuzzing framework designed to uncover security flaws in 5G core SBIs. FivGeeFuzz automatically derives grammars from 3GPP API specifications to generate malformed, unexpected, or semantically inconsistent inputs, and it integrates automated bug detection with manual validation and root-cause analysis. We evaluate our approach on free5GC, the only open-source 5G core implementing Release 17-compliant SBIs with an access control mechanism. Using FivGeeFuzz, we discovered 8 previously unknown vulnerabilities in free5GC, leading to runtime crashes, improper error handling, and unauthorized access to resources, including a very severe attack we call Cross-Service Token Attack. All bugs were confirmed by the free5GC team, 7 have already been patched, and the remaining one has a patch under development.

cs.CR↗