arXiv subjects

Dávid Csercsik

Publications and source records attributed to Dávid Csercsik.

12 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A model-based analysis of the AggregateEU mechanism: Implications of overbidding and non-commitment

AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade natural gas in the European Union. Throughout the consultation process, AggregateEU has been mocked as `Tinder of the European gas markets' as it helps consumers and suppliers find partners, but leaves it up to the matched partners to decide whether to contract for potential trade. The non-commitment nature leads to substantial overbidding and many non-realised matches. We propose a quantitative modelling framework to study the effect of overbidding in the AggergateEU demand aggregation or joint purchasing mechanism. We conclude that the mechanism is prone to overbidding and that overbidding has ambiguous effects on trade. Depending on the parameters, overbidding may facilitate trade, but may also result in highly inefficient outcomes when overbidding is combined with miscoordination over the delivery points. Suggested remedies include allowing for convex bids, restrictions on overbidding, or giving up part of the non-binding character of the market. Our results suggest that a potential future mechanism allowing the coordination of multiple delivery points could enhance the efficiency of gas markets.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

Overprocurement of balancing capacity may increase the welfare in the cross-zonal energy-reserve coallocation problem

When the traded energy and reserve products between zones are co-allocated to optimize the infrastructure usage, both deterministic and stochastic flows have to be accounted for on interconnector lines. We focus on allocation models, which guarantee deliverability in the context of the portfolio bidding European day-ahead market framework, assuming a flow-based description of network constraints. In such models, as each unit of allocated reserve supply implies additional cost, it is straightforward to assume that the amount of allocated reserve is equal to the accepted reserve demand quantity. However, as it is illustrated by the proposed work, overprocurement of reserves may imply counterintuitive benefits. Reserve supplies not used for balancing may be used for congestion management, thus allowing valuable additional flows in the network.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2025

Optimal bidding in multiperiod day-ahead electricity markets assuming non-uniform uncertainty of clearing prices

In a recent publication, using a simple two-period model, which is already capable to capture essential non-convex multiperiod bids, Richstein et al. have shown that in the case of optimal bidding, multi-part bidding always ensures a higher expected profit for the bidder, compared to simple bidding and block-bidding. The model proposed in their analysis assumes a uniform distribution of the market-clearing prices in both periods. In this paper, we study how the conclusions of the analysis are affected, if a very simple, symmetric, stepwise-constant but non-uniform distribution is assumed in the case of the market-clearing price. We show that the results of Richstein et al. also hold in this case.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Optimal Parametrization of the Gale-Shapley Preallocation Method for Combinatorial Auction-based Channel Assignment

Algorithms based on combinatorial auctions show significant potential regarding their application for channel assignment problems in multi-connectivity ultra-reliable wireless networks. However the computational effort required by such algorithms grows fast with the number of users and resources. Therefore, preallocation-based combinatorial auction represents a promising approach for these setups. The aim of the preallocation is to constrain the number of bids submitted by participants in the combinatorial auction process, thus reducing computational demands and enabling numerical feasibility of the auction problem. Reduction of bid number is achieved via limiting the number of items (channels) considered by auction participants (tenants) in their bids. Thus the aim of preallocation is to non-exclusively assign channels to tenants. This assignment serves as a basis for the later bid generation in the auction procedure. In this paper we analyze the optimal parametrization of the many-to-many Gale-Shapley preallocation method and formulate recommendations for optimal performance. Numerical assessments illustrate that the appropriate preallocation has significant impact on the performance and computational demand.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Bid-aggregation based clearing of day-ahead electricity markets

In this work we propose a heuristic clearing method of day-ahead electricity markets. In the first part of the process, a computationally less demanding problem is solved using an approximation of the cumulative demand and supply curves, which are derived via the aggregation of simple bids. Based on the outcome of this problem, estimated ranges for the clearing prices of individual periods are determined. In the final step, the clearing for the original bid set is solved, taking into account the price ranges determined previously as constraints. Adding such constraints reduces the feasibility region of the clearing problem. By removing simple bids whose acceptance or rejection is already determined by the assumed price range constraints, the size of the problem is also significantly reduced. Via simple examples, we show that due to the possible paradox rejection of block bids the proposed bid-aggregation based approach may result in a suboptimal solution or in an infeasible problem, but we also point out that these pitfalls of the algorithm may be avoided by using different aggregation patterns. We propose to construct multiple different aggregation patterns and to use parallel computing to enhance the performance of the algorithm. We test the proposed approach on setups of various problem sizes, and conclude that in the case of parallel computing with 4 threads a high success rate and a significant gain in computational speed may be achieved.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Solidarity in natural gas storage: A potential allocation mechanism of stored quantities among several players during times of crisis

The recently experienced disruptions in the EU's energy supply pointed out that supply crises pose a real thread and the member states must be better prepared do deal with the related challenges. According to the current practice, member states fill their gas storages independently, while it is not clear how solidarity could be put into practice in the future, i.e. how the accumulated reserves of one or more members may be potentially redistributed to help others in need. In this paper we propose some possible guidelines for a potential solidarity framework, and formalize a game-theoretic model in order to capture the basic features of the problem, considering the related uncertainty of the future conditions related to gas storage levels and possible transmission bottlenecks as well. The proposed mechanism of supply-security related cooperation is based on voluntary participation, and may contribute to the more efficient utilization of storage capacities. Via the computational model we demonstrate the operation of the proposed framework on a simple example and show that under the assumption of risk-averse participants, the concept exhibits potential.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2021

Preallocation-based Combinatorial Auction for Efficient Fair Channel Assignments in Multi-Connectivity Networks

We consider a general multi-connectivity framework, intended for ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) services, and propose a novel, preallocation-based combinatorial auction approach for the efficient allocation of channels. We compare the performance of the proposed method with several other state-of-the-art and alternative channel-allocation algorithms. The two proposed performance metrics are the capacity-based and the utility-based context. In the first case, every unit of additional capacity is regarded as beneficial for any tenant, independent of the already allocated quantity, and the main measure is the total throughput of the system. In the second case, we assume a minimal and maximal required capacity value for each tenant, and consider the implied utility values accordingly. In addition to the total system performance, we also analyze fairness and computational requirements in both contexts. We conclude that at the cost of higher but still plausible computational time, the fairness-enhanced version of the proposed preallocation based combinatorial auction algorithm outperforms every other considered method when one considers total system performance and fairness simultaneously, and performs especially well in the utility context. Therefore, the proposed algorithm may be regarded as candidate scheme for URLLC channel allocation problems, where minimal and maximal capacity requirements have to be considered.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Quantitative supply security related significance measures for gas reservoires

Computational models corresponding to supply security in natural gas networks aim to describe flows and consumption values in the case of component failures or unforseen pipeline shutdowns. The role of natural gas reservoires in this process has only been marginally analyzed in such models, and typically only on the level of countries. In this paper we define a computational framework, which is capable of interpreting real flow and reservoir data to assign a quantitative supply security related measure to reservoires, depending on how much the given reservoir is critical in the process of restoring consumption outages in the network.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2020

Strategic bidding via the interplay of minimum income condition orders in day-ahead power exchanges

In this paper we study the so-called minimum income condition order, which is used in some day-ahead electricity power exchanges to represent the production-related costs of generating units. This order belongs to the family of complex orders, which imply non-convexities in the market clearing problem. We demonstrate via simple numerical examples that if more of such bids are present in the market, their interplay may open the possibility of strategic bidding. More precisely, we show that by the manipulation of bid parameters, a strategic player may increase its own profit and potentially induce the deactivation of an other minimum income condition order, which would be accepted under truthful bidding. Furthermore, we show that if we modify the objective function used in the market clearing according to principles suggested in the literature, it is possible to prevent the possibility of such strategic bidding, but the modification raises other issues.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2020

Introduction of flexible production bids and combined package-price bids in a framework of integrated power-reserve market coupling

In this article we propose a multi-zonal integrated energy-reserve market model. We assume that bidders may submit their demand and supply bids on the one hand in the form of conventional hourly step bids and block bids, which are cleared and paid according to market clearing prices (MCPs). On the other hand, suppliers may submit so called flexible production bids, while both suppliers and consumers may submit fill-or-kill type package-priced combined bids -- these bids are accepted if their acceptance implies an improvement in the resulting total social welfare, which the market clearing algorithm aims to optimize. The model includes network constraints for the nominal case (if no reserves are activated) and also for perturbed cases when the allocated reserves are activated.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2020

Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network Capacities

In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assuming that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of bidding for route-quantity pairs. Each participant defines a limited number of routes and places multiple bids, corresponding to various quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mechanism assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its called convex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model are determined according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle. We compare the efficiency of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the method currently used for pipeline capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneous ascending clock auction of pipeline capacities) via simulation, according to various measures, such as resulting utility of players, utilization of network capacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2019

Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks

Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "externalities," the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine's power index as a major transit country.

econ.TH↗