arXiv subjects

D. Challet

Publications and source records attributed to D. Challet.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2002

Exact Hurst exponent and crossover behavior in a limit order market model

An exclusion particle model is considered as a highly simplified model of a limit order market. Its price behavior reproduces the well known crossover from over-diffusion (Hurst exponent H>1/2) to diffusion (H=1/2) when the time horizon is increased, provided that orders are allowed to be canceled. For early times a mapping to the totally asymmetric exclusion process yields the exact result H=2/3 which is in good agreement with empirical data. The underlying universality class of the exclusion process suggests some robustness of the exponent with respect to changes in the trading rules. In the crossover regime the Hurst plot has a scaling property where the bulk deposition/cancellation rate is the critical parameter. Analytical results are fully supported by numerical simulations.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2002

Optimal combinations of imperfect objects

We address the question of how to make best use of imperfect objects, such as defective analog and digital components. We show that perfect, or near-perfect, devices can be constructed by taking combinations of such defects. Any remaining objects can be recycled efficiently. In addition to its practical applications, our `defect combination problem' provides a novel generalization of classical optimization problems.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2001

Continuum time limit and stationary states of the Minority Game

We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for the continuum time limit of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of the Minority Game can be understood by a careful theoretical analysis of such equations. In particular, i) we confirm that the stationary state properties are given by the ground state configurations of a disordered (soft) spin system; ii) we derive the full stationary state distribution; iii) we characterize the dependence on initial conditions in the symmetric phase and iv) we clarify the behavior of the system as a function of the learning rate. This leaves us with a complete and coherent picture of the collective behavior of the Minority Game. Strikingly we find that the temperature like parameter which is introduced in the choice behavior of individual agents turns out to play the role, at the collective level, of the inverse of a thermodynamic temperature.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2001

Minority Games and stylized facts

The Minority Game is a generic model of competing adaptive agents, which is often believed to be a model of financial markets. We discuss to which extend this is a reasonable statement, and present minimal modifications that make this model reproduce stylized facts. The resulting model shows that without speculators, prices follow random walks, and that stylized facts disappear if enough speculators take into account their market impact.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2000

From Minority Games to real markets

We address the question of market efficiency using the Minority Game (MG) model. First we show that removing unrealistic features of the MG leads to models which reproduce a scaling behavior close to what is observed in real markets. In particular we find that i) fat tails and clustered volatility arise at the phase transition point and that ii) the crossover to random walk behavior of prices is a finite size effect. This, on one hand, suggests that markets operate close to criticality, where the market is marginally efficient. On the other it allows one to measure the distance from criticality of real market, using cross-over times. The artificial market described by the MG is then studied as an ecosystem with different_species_ of traders. This clarifies the nature of the interaction and the particular role played by the various populations.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2000

Trading behavior and excess volatility in toy markets

We study the relation between the trading behavior of agents and volatility in toy markets of adaptive inductively rational agents. We show that excess volatility, in such simplified markets, arises as a consequence of {\em i)} the neglect of market impact implicit in price taking behavior and of {\em ii)} excessive reactivity of agents. These issues are dealt with in detail in the simple case without public information. We also derive, for the general case, the critical learning rate above which trading behavior leads to turbulent dynamics of the market.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2000

Comment on: Thermal model for Adaptive Competition in a Market

We show that the dynamical equations describing the collective behavior of the model introduced by Cavagna et al. i) are not their Eqs. (5,6) but rather ii) are the same as those of the minority game (MG). As a consequence the analytic solution of the MG presented in [PRL, 84, 1824 (2000)] holds also for this model. Finally we show that iii) the the large temperature behavior of the model is different, due to small simulation times, from that discussed by Cavagna et al.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv1999

Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: Minority Games

We study analytically a simple game theoretical model of heterogeneous interacting agents. We show that the stationary state of the system is described by the ground state of a disordered spin model which is exactly solvable within the simple replica symmetric ansatz. Such a stationary state differs from the Nash equilibrium where each agent maximizes her own utility. The latter turns out to be characterized by a replica symmetry broken structure. Numerical results fully agree with our analytic findings.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗