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Daiki Kishishita

Publications and source records attributed to Daiki Kishishita.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Feedback Design in the Shadow of Strategic Communication

We study optimal feedback design when evaluations affect subsequent strategic communication within organizations. A firm designs public feedback about an employee's potential before the employee communicates private information about project-specific circumstances to a manager. While more informative feedback helps the manager make better decisions, it can also intensify preference conflicts and undermine the credibility of subsequent communication. We characterize the optimal feedback policy. First, full disclosure is either optimal for all prior beliefs or strictly suboptimal for all of them. In particular, it is optimal when preference conflicts are sufficiently small or sufficiently large. Second, when full disclosure is suboptimal, no disclosure is optimal for some priors, while partial disclosure is strictly optimal for some priors if and only if the number of messages in equilibrium communication varies with posterior beliefs. Third, optimal partial disclosure can conclusively identify low-potential employees when high potential is rare, but high-potential employees when it is common.

econ.TH↗

Downsian Competition for the Myerson Value

This paper studies an electoral competition model in which parties maximize legislative power rather than vote shares. Voters are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and vote for the party proposing the closest policy platform. After the election, parties form coalitions through a communication network arising from ideological proximity: two parties are directly linked if their policy distance is at most $d$. A party's objective is its Myerson value in the resulting graph-restricted voting game. I characterize symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in two-, three-, and four-party systems. The two-party case yields convergence to the median. The three-party case admits a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which the two extreme parties are directly linked. In the four-party case, the unique symmetric equilibrium places two parties at $(1-d)/2$ and two parties at $(1+d)/2$. In both three- and four-party systems, more restrictive coalition communication, represented by a smaller $d$, generates a centripetal force, and the median voter theorem holds in the limit despite the multiparty setting.

econ.TH↗