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Dalton C. Conley

Publications and source records attributed to Dalton C. Conley.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Popularity Feedback Constrains Innovation in Cultural Markets

Real-world creative processes ranging from art to science rely on social feedback-loops between selection and creation. Yet, the effects of popularity feedback on collective creativity remain poorly understood. We investigate how popularity ratings influence cultural dynamics in a large-scale online experiment where participants ($N = 1\,008$) iteratively \textit{select} images from evolving markets and \textit{produce} their own modifications. Results show that exposing the popularity of images reduces cultural diversity and slows innovation, delaying aesthetic improvements. Popularity feedback is associated with changes to both selection and creative stages. During selection, popularity information triggers cumulative advantage, with participants preferentially building upon popular images, reducing diversity. During creation, participants make less disruptive changes, and are more likely to expand existing visual patterns. Feedback loops in cultural markets thus not only shape selection, but also, directly or indirectly, the form and direction of cultural innovation.

cs.SI

Reasoning within and between collective action problems

Understanding cooperation in social systems is challenging because the ever-changing rules that govern societies interact with individual actions, resulting in intricate collective outcomes. In virtual-world experiments, we allowed people to make changes in the systems that they are making decisions within and investigated how they weigh the influence of different rules in decision-making. When choosing between worlds differing in more than one rule, a naive heuristics model predicted participants decisions as well, and in some cases better, than game earnings (utility) or by the subjective quality of single rules. In contrast, when a subset of engaged participants made instantaneous (within-world) decisions, their behavior aligned very closely with objective utility and not with the heuristics model. Findings suggest that, whereas choices between rules may deviate from rational benchmarks, the frequency of real time cooperation decisions to provide feedback can be a reliable indicator of the objective utility of these rules.

q-bio.NC