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Damian Kurpiewski

Publications and source records attributed to Damian Kurpiewski.

16 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2025

Formal Verification of Probabilistic Multi-Agent Systems for Ballistic Rocket Flight Using Probabilistic Alternating-Time Temporal Logic

This technical report presents a comprehensive formal verification approach for probabilistic agent systems modeling ballistic rocket flight trajectories using Probabilistic Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (PATL). We describe an innovative verification framework specifically designed for analyzing critical safety properties of ballistic rockets engineered to achieve microgravity conditions for scientific experimentation. Our model integrates authentic flight telemetry data encompassing velocity vectors, pitch angles, attitude parameters, and GPS coordinates to construct probabilistic state transition systems that rigorously account for environmental stochasticity, particularly meteorological variability. We formalize mission-critical safety properties through PATL specifications to systematically identify trajectory deviation states where the rocket risks landing in prohibited or hazardous zones. The verification framework facilitates real-time safety monitoring and enables automated intervention mechanisms, including emergency engine disengagement protocols, when predefined safety thresholds are exceeded. Experimental validation demonstrates the practical effectiveness and reliability of our approach in ensuring mission safety while maintaining scientific mission objectives.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2025

Towards Assume-Guarantee Verification of Abilities in Stochastic Multi-Agent Systems

Model checking of strategic abilities is a notoriously hard problem, even more so in the realistic case of agents with imperfect information, acting in a stochastic environment. Assume-guarantee reasoning can be of great help here, providing a way to decompose the complex problem into a small set of easier subproblems. In this paper, we propose several schemes for assume-guarantee verification of probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information. We prove the soundness of the schemes, and discuss their completeness. On the way, we also propose a new variant of (non-probabilistic) alternating-time logic, where the strategic modalities capture "achieving at most $φ$," analogous to Levesque's logic of "only knowing."

cs.MA↗
arXiv2025

Asynchronous Agents with Perfect Recall: Model Reductions, Knowledge-Based Construction, and Model Checking for Coalitional Strategies

Model checking of strategic abilities for agents with memory is a notoriously hard problem, and very few attempts have been made to tackle it. In this paper, we present two important steps towards this goal. First, we take the partial-order reduction scheme that was recently proved to preserve individual and coalitional abilities of memoryless agents, and show that it also works for agents with memory. Secondly, we take the Knowledge-Based Subset Construction, that was recently studied for synchronous concurrent games, and adapt it to preserve abilities of memoryful agents in asynchronous MAS. On the way, we also propose a new execution semantics for strategies in asynchronous MAS, that combines elements of Concurrent Game Structures and Interleaved Interpreted Systems in a natural and intuitive way.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2025

Verification of Multi-Agent Properties in Electronic Voting: A Case Study

Formal verification of multi-agent systems is hard, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, studies that use a single verification technique typically show limited efficiency, and allow to verify only toy examples. Here, we propose some new techniques and combine them with several recently developed ones to see what progress can be achieved for a real-life scenario. Namely, we use fixpoint approximation, domination-based strategy search, partial order reduction, and parallelization to verify heterogeneous scalable models of the Selene e-voting protocol. The experimental results show that the combination allows to verify requirements for much more sophisticated models than previously.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2023

Multi-Valued Verification of Strategic Ability

Some multi-agent scenarios call for the possibility of evaluating specifications in a richer domain of truth values. Examples include runtime monitoring of a temporal property over a growing prefix of an infinite path, inconsistency analysis in distributed databases, and verification methods that use incomplete anytime algorithms, such as bounded model checking. In this paper, we present multi-valued alternating-time temporal logic (mv-ATL*), an expressive logic to specify strategic abilities in multi-agent systems. It is well known that, for branching-time logics, a general method for model-independent translation from multi-valued to two-valued model checking exists. We show that the method cannot be directly extended to mv-ATL*. We also propose two ways of overcoming the problem. Firstly, we identify constraints on formulas for which the model-independent translation can be suitably adapted. Secondly, we present a model-dependent reduction that can be applied to all formulas of mv-ATL*. We show that, in all cases, the complexity of verification increases only linearly when new truth values are added to the evaluation domain. We also consider several examples that show possible applications of mv-ATL* and motivate its use for model checking multi-agent systems.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2023

Pretty Good Strategies and Where to Find Them

Synthesis of bulletproof strategies in imperfect information scenarios is a notoriously hard problem. In this paper, we suggest that it is sometimes a viable alternative to aim at "reasonably good" strategies instead. This makes sense not only when an ideal strategy cannot be found due to the complexity of the problem, but also when no winning strategy exists at all. We propose an algorithm for synthesis of such "pretty good" strategies. The idea is to first generate a surely winning strategy with perfect information, and then iteratively improve it with respect to two criteria of dominance: one based on the amount of conflicting decisions in the strategy, and the other related to the tightness of its outcome set. We focus on reachability goals and evaluate the algorithm experimentally with very promising results.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2023

MsATL: a Tool for SAT-Based ATL Satisfiability Checking

We present MsATL: the first tool for deciding the satisfiability of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) with imperfect information. MsATL combines SAT Modulo Monotonic Theories solvers with existing ATL model checkers: MCMAS and STV. The tool can deal with various semantics of ATL, including perfect and imperfect information, and can handle additional practical requirements. MsATL can be applied for synthesis of games that conform to a given specification, with the synthesised game often being minimal.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2023

Assume-Guarantee Verification of Strategic Ability

Model checking of strategic abilities is a notoriously hard problem, even more so in the realistic case of agents with imperfect information. Assume-guarantee reasoning can be of great help here, providing a way to decompose the complex problem into a small set of exponentially easier subproblems. In this paper, we propose two schemes for assume-guarantee verification of alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information. We prove the soundness of both schemes, and discuss their completeness. We illustrate the method by examples based on known benchmarks, and show experimental results that demonstrate the practical benefits of the approach.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2023

Towards Assume-Guarantee Verification of Strategic Ability

Formal verification of strategic abilities is a hard problem. We propose to use the methodology of assume-guarantee reasoning in order to facilitate model checking of alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and imperfect recall.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2023

Towards Modelling and Verification of Social Explainable AI

Social Explainable AI (SAI) is a new direction in artificial intelligence that emphasises decentralisation, transparency, social context, and focus on the human users. SAI research is still at an early stage. Consequently, it concentrates on delivering the intended functionalities, but largely ignores the possibility of unwelcome behaviours due to malicious or erroneous activity. We propose that, in order to capture the breadth of relevant aspects, one can use models and logics of strategic ability, that have been developed in multi-agent systems. Using the STV model checker, we take the first step towards the formal modelling and verification of SAI environments, in particular of their resistance to various types of attacks by compromised AI modules.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2023

Model Checkers Are Cool: How to Model Check Voting Protocols in Uppaal

The design and implementation of an e-voting system is a challenging task. Formal analysis can be of great help here. In particular, it can lead to a better understanding of how the voting system works, and what requirements on the system are relevant. In this paper, we propose that the state-of-art model checker Uppaal provides a good environment for modelling and preliminary verification of voting protocols. To illustrate this, we present an Uppaal model of Prêt à Voter, together with some natural extensions. We also show how to verify a variant of receipt-freeness, despite the severe limitations of the property specification language in the model checker.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2023

Natural Strategic Abilities in Voting Protocols

Security properties are often focused on the technological side of the system. One implicitly assumes that the users will behave in the right way to preserve the property at hand. In real life, this cannot be taken for granted. In particular, security mechanisms that are difficult and costly to use are often ignored by the users, and do not really defend the system against possible attacks. Here, we propose a graded notion of security based on the complexity of the user's strategic behavior. More precisely, we suggest that the level to which a security property $φ$ is satisfied can be defined in terms of (a) the complexity of the strategy that the voter needs to execute to make $φ$ true, and (b) the resources that the user must employ on the way. The simpler and cheaper to obtain $φ$, the higher the degree of security. We demonstrate how the idea works in a case study based on an electronic voting scenario. To this end, we model the vVote implementation of the \Pret voting protocol for coercion-resistant and voter-verifiable elections. Then, we identify "natural" strategies for the voter to obtain receipt-freeness, and measure the voter's effort that they require. We also look at how hard it is for the coercer to compromise the election through a randomization attack.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2017

Fixpoint Approximation of Strategic Abilities under Imperfect Information

Model checking of strategic ability under imperfect information is known to be hard. The complexity results range from NP-completeness to undecidability, depending on the precise setup of the problem. No less importantly, fixpoint equivalences do not generally hold for imperfect information strategies, which seriously hampers incremental synthesis of winning strategies. In this paper, we propose translations of ATLir formulae that provide lower and upper bounds for their truth values, and are cheaper to verify than the original specifications. That is, if the expression is verified as true then the corresponding formula of ATLir should also hold in the given model. We begin by showing where the straightforward approach does not work. Then, we propose how it can be modified to obtain guaranteed lower bounds. To this end, we alter the next-step operator in such a way that traversing one's indistinguishability relation is seen as atomic activity. Most interestingly, the lower approximation is provided by a fixpoint expression that uses a nonstandard variant of the next-step ability operator. We show the correctness of the translations, establish their computational complexity, and validate the approach by experiments with a scalable scenario of Bridge play.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2016

Approximating Strategic Abilities under Imperfect Information: a Naive Approach

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) allows to specify requirements on abilities that different agents should (or should not) possess in a multi-agent system. However, model checking ATL specifications in realistic systems is computationally hard. In particular, if the agents have imperfect information about the global state of the system, the complexity ranges from Delta2P to undecidable, depending on the syntactic and semantic details. The problem is also hard in practice, as evidenced by several recent attempts to tackle it. On the other hand, model checking of alternating epistemic mu-calculus can have a distinctly lower computational complexity. In this work, we look at the idea of approximating the former problem by the verification of its "naive" translations to the latter. In other words, we look at what happens when one uses the (incorrect) fixpoint algorithm to verify formulae of ATL with imperfect information.

cs.MA↗