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Damien Berriaud

Publications and source records attributed to Damien Berriaud.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

Spreads Don't Price a Rival Market Maker's Information

When one market maker becomes better informed, do its competitors widen their bid-ask spreads? Adverse-selection reasoning suggests that they should, because the better-informed maker avoids toxic order flow and leaves more of it to the others, and the closest model of competition with an informed dealer predicts more conservative quotes by the uninformed dealers. We study this question in a stochastic quoting game in which one maker receives a private signal of varying precision about a persistent state that drives order flow. Strategies are learned with independent reinforcement learning, which we benchmark against an exact dynamic-programming solution of the single-agent case. In none of the configurations we examine does the average spread of the uninformed makers increase with the rival's precision. Where competition for order flow is weak, the slope of their spread in precision is statistically equivalent to zero within half an action tick; where competition is strong, their spread tightens. The informed maker's own spread tightens markedly in every configuration and serves as a positive control. These results hold with two, three and four makers, across an eightfold variation in the depth of the background liquidity, with a background quote that reprices after toxic fills, and under price-time priority. Our measurements point to a competitive trade-off. In the model the total toxicity of the flow does not depend on any maker's information. A better-informed maker avoids more of it, and where this leaves more toxic flow to its competitors, it also quotes more tightly, so that a wider quote would cost them more order flow than it would save in adverse selection. The uninformed makers adjust the skew of their quotes and their inventory instead, and the rival's information changes the distribution of profits across makers while quoted spreads remain nearly unchanged.

cs.GT↗

Trembling toward Duverger: Convergence and Cycles in Synchronous Plurality Dynamics

Duverger's law states that plurality elections tend to concentrate support on two candidates. Pivotal-voter models typically derive this from aggregate uncertainty about votes, so that two-candidate competition emerges in the limit of large electorates. We instead propose a model for a fixed, finite population. A poll reveals the current support counts, and each voter best responds under trembling-hand beliefs, assuming that every other voter may deviate with a small probability. Starting from truthful votes, we show that a single update typically suffices for the dynamics to converge to a stable profile in which every voter supports her preferred candidate among the two poll leaders. For any number of candidates and any full-support tremble belief, a four-vote lead of the runner-up over all lower candidates suffices; for three candidates, a lead of two suffices. As a consequence, under random preferences, Duverger's law emerges after one update with probability $1-\mathcal O(N^{-1/2})$. While these results may suggest that the dynamics always settle, convergence can fail. Mild period-two cycles already arise, with a few voters swapping ballots around an otherwise stable profile. We show that substantially richer behavior is possible, even with three candidates. Period-three cycles arise with six voters changing their ballots, and no such cycle can involve fewer than four. Cycles can also alternate the plurality winner. Moreover, larger electorates support ever longer cycles: for every odd $\ell\geq3$, truthful voting can lead to a cycle whose vote counts repeat every $\ell$ rounds and whose full ballot profile repeats every $2\ell$ rounds.

cs.GT↗

Breaking the Illusion of Artificial Consensus: Clone-Robust Weighting in Arbitrary Metric Spaces

Social media, pseudonymous identities and generative AI have made online platforms highly vulnerable to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior: by generating large numbers of similar posts, influence campaigns create an illusion of widespread support, exploiting the tendency of users and algorithms alike to mistake frequency for consensus. Clone-robust weighting functions address this problem by assigning influence in a way that is insensitive to near-duplication, as measured by a metric, while remaining symmetric, continuous and local. While prior constructions were restricted to Euclidean spaces, we present a computationally efficient framework for arbitrary metric spaces, based on neighborhood graphs and graph weighting functions satisfying a simple locality condition. As a consequence, the visibility an attacker gains from near-duplicates is bounded independently of their number. We further argue that, in democratically sensitive settings such as news feeds, such guarantees must come with explainability, and introduce sharing coefficients that quantify how influence is transferred between elements of prior volumetric constructions. In the graph setting, we show that sharing measures based on the deletion of vertices or edges are incompatible with locality, and instead define sharing through the addition of clones. Finally, we characterize the resulting interpretability properties and construct clone-robust graph weighting functions satisfying them.

cs.GT↗

Clone-Robust Weights in Metric Spaces: Handling Redundancy Bias for Benchmark Aggregation

We are given a set of elements in a metric space. The distribution of the elements is arbitrary, possibly adversarial. Can we weigh the elements in a way that is resistant to such (adversarial) manipulations? This problem arises in various contexts. For instance, the elements could represent data points, requiring robust domain adaptation. Alternatively, they might represent tasks to be aggregated into a benchmark; or questions about personal political opinions in voting advice applications. This article introduces a theoretical framework for dealing with such problems. We propose clone-proof weighting functions as a solution concept. These functions distribute importance across elements of a set such that similar objects (``clones'') share (some of) their weights, thus avoiding a potential bias introduced by their multiplicity. Our framework extends the maximum uncertainty principle to accommodate general metric spaces and includes a set of axioms -- symmetry, continuity, and clone-proofness -- that guide the construction of weighting functions. Finally, we address the existence of weighting functions satisfying our axioms in the significant case of Euclidean spaces and propose a general method for their construction.

cs.LG↗

To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions

Recent years have seen a surge of artificial currency-based mechanisms in contexts where monetary instruments are deemed unfair or inappropriate, e.g., in allocating food donations to food banks, course seats to students, and, more recently, even for traffic congestion management. Yet the applicability of these mechanisms remains limited in repeated auction settings, as it is challenging for users to learn how to bid an artificial currency that has no value outside the auctions. Indeed, users must jointly learn the value of the currency in addition to how to spend it optimally. Moreover, in the prominent class of karma mechanisms, in which artificial karma payments are redistributed to users at each time step, users do not only spend karma to obtain public resources but also gain karma for yielding them. For this novel class of karma auctions, we propose an adaptive karma pacing strategy that learns to bid optimally, and show that this strategy a) is asymptotically optimal for a single user bidding against competing bids drawn from a stationary distribution; b) leads to convergent learning dynamics when all users adopt it; and c) constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium as the number of users grows. Our results require a novel analysis in comparison to adaptive pacing strategies in monetary auctions, since we depart from the classical assumption that the currency has known value outside the auctions, and consider that the currency is both spent and gained through the redistribution of payments.

cs.GT↗

Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangements

A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an agent's utility is the sum of their preference values towards their (at most two) direct neighbors. An arrangement is envy-free if no agent strictly prefers someone else's seat, and it is stable if no two agents strictly prefer each other's seats. Recently, it was shown that for both paths and cycles it is NP-hard to decide whether an envy-free arrangement exists, even for symmetric binary preferences. In contrast, we show that, if agents come from a bounded number of classes, the problem is solvable in polynomial time for arbitrarily-valued possibly asymmetric preferences, including outputting an arrangement if possible. We also give simpler proofs of the previous hardness results if preferences are allowed to be asymmetric. For stability, it is known that deciding the existence of stable arrangements is NP-hard for both topologies, but only if sufficiently-many numerical values are allowed. As it turns out, even constructing unstable instances can be challenging in certain cases, e.g., binary values. We completely characterize the existence of stable arrangements based on the number of distinct values in the preference matrix and the number of agent classes. We also ask the same question for non-negative values and give an almost-complete characterization, the most interesting outstanding case being that of paths with two-valued non-negative preferences, for which we experimentally find that stable arrangements always exist and prove it under the additional constraint that agents can only swap seats when sitting at most two positions away. We moreover give a polynomial algorithm for determining a stable arrangement assuming a bounded number of classes.

cs.GT↗