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Danfeng Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Danfeng Zhang.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Sound Enforcement of Dynamic Release Information Flow Policy-Full Version

Information flow analysis is the de facto method of assessing confidentiality and integrity issues. However, the widespread adoption of information flow analysis in real-world systems is still lacking, partly due to a fundamental gap between theory and practice: the dynamic nature of security concerns in real-world systems goes beyond the scope of existing techniques that assume a static policy (i.e., data secrecy does not change). Recognizing the fundamental gap, a substantial amount of research has studied various aspects of it (e.g., enabling declassification, endorsement, and invocation policies). A recent work takes a step further by formalizing a promising end-to-end policy called dynamic release that unifies prior formalizations by allowing information flow restrictions to downgrade and upgrade in arbitrary ways. However, how to soundly enforce the powerful dynamic release policy is still an open question. In this paper, we present the first type system that enforces dynamic release policy and formally prove its soundness. More specifically, we (1) formalize a core language that enables dynamic release policy, (2) develop a type system that checks dynamic release policy, (3) develop new proof techniques and formally prove that the type system enforces dynamic release policy, and (4) implement a prototype of the type system as an extension to the Rust language, along with case studies on conference reviewing system and Civitas.

cs.PL

DP4SQL: Differentially Private SQL with Flexible Privacy Policies

The plausible deniability model of differential privacy for single-table datasets is well-understood. However, applying differential privacy to relational databases is much trickier: each application needs flexibility in specifying the pieces of information about an entity, spread across multiple relations, that require plausible deniability guarantees. Existing differentially private SQL systems only support rigid privacy policies. Even seemingly small changes, such as specifying that some tables need to protect the existence of records while others only need to protect the record contents, require significant manual effort in updating their privacy accountants and proving their correctness. One example of a challenge is the presence of partially public data. Public columns in a table (e.g., faculty names in a university dataset and partial course enrollment information) can cause some queries to require more noise (compared to fully private data), while others require less noise. This kind of reasoning is not supported in existing systems. Another example is when different parts of records (e.g., demographics, financial data) require different levels of privacy protection. Again, existing differentially private SQL systems need to rewrite their rules for calculating query stability in order to support such a feature. This paper presents DP4SQL, a differentially private SQL system that allows data curators to better customize the plausible deniability requirements for their relational databases. This avoids the drawbacks of the "one-size-fits-all" systems that would either underprotect the data or inject too much noise into query answers.

cs.CR

Characterizing Trust Boundary Vulnerabilities in TEE Containers: An Empirical Study

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalable application deployment on confidential clouds, TEE containers (Tcons) have been introduced as middleware to shield applications from malicious operating systems and orchestration layers while preserving usability. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of Tcons, focusing on three critical layers: OS interfaces, encrypted I/O, and orchestration mechanisms. To enable systematic evaluation, we design TBouncer, an automated analyzer that precisely exercises and benchmarks Tcon isolation boundaries. Our study uncovers fundamental flaws in existing Tcons, leading to exploitable vulnerabilities such as code execution, denial-of-service, and information leakage. In total, we identify six attack vectors, twelve new bugs, and three CVEs. These findings provide new insights into the underestimated attack surface of Tcons and highlight key directions for building more secure and trustworthy container solutions.

cs.CR

Filament: Denning-Style Information Flow Control for Rust

Existing language-based information-flow control (IFC) tools face a fundamental tension: Denning-style systems that track explicit and implicit flows at the variable level typically require compiler modifications, while more coarse-grained approaches, including recent work Cocoon, avoid compiler changes but impose more restrictive programming models. We present Filament, a Denning-style static IFC library for Rust that requires no compiler modifications. Filament addresses three key challenges in building a practical IFC library for Rust. First, it enables fine-grained explicit-flow checking with minimal annotation overhead by leveraging Rust's type inference. Second, it introduces pc_block!, a lightweight construct for enforcing implicit flows via a compile-time program counter label, without requiring compiler support. Third, it provides fcall! and mcall! macros to support seamless and safe interoperability with standard and third-party libraries. Our evaluation shows that Filament incurs negligible compile-time overhead and requires only modest annotations. Moreover, compared to Cocoon, Filament offers a more permissive programming model, reducing the need for frequent escape hatches that bypass security checks.

cs.PL

AlphaEval: Evaluating Agents in Production

The rapid deployment of AI agents in commercial settings has outpaced the development of evaluation methodologies that reflect production realities. Existing benchmarks measure agent capabilities through retrospectively curated tasks with well-specified requirements and deterministic metrics -- conditions that diverge fundamentally from production environments where requirements contain implicit constraints, inputs are heterogeneous multi-modal documents with information fragmented across sources, tasks demand undeclared domain expertise, outputs are long-horizon professional deliverables, and success is judged by domain experts whose standards evolve over time. We present AlphaEval, a production-grounded benchmark of 94 tasks sourced from seven companies deploying AI agents in their core business, spanning six O*NET (Occupational Information Network) domains. Unlike model-centric benchmarks, AlphaEval evaluates complete agent products -- Claude Code, Codex, etc. -- as commercial systems, capturing performance variations invisible to model-level evaluation. Our evaluation framework covers multiple paradigms (LLM-as-a-Judge, reference-driven metrics, formal verification, rubric-based assessment, automated UI testing, etc.), with individual domains composing multiple paradigms. Beyond the benchmark itself, we contribute a requirement-to-benchmark construction framework -- a systematic methodology that transforms authentic production requirements into executable evaluation tasks in minimal time. This framework standardizes the entire pipeline from requirement to evaluation, providing a reproducible, modular process that any organization can adopt to construct production-grounded benchmarks for their own domains.

cs.CL

Agora: Trust Less and Open More in Verification for Confidential Computing

Binary verification plays a pivotal role in software security, yet building a verification service that is both open and trustworthy poses a formidable challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel binary verification service, AGORA, scrupulously designed to overcome the challenge. At the heart of this approach lies a strategic insight: certain tasks can be delegated to untrusted entities, while the corresponding validators are securely housed within the trusted computing base (TCB). AGORA can validate untrusted assertions generated for versatile policies. Through a novel blockchain-based bounty task manager, it also utilizes crowdsourcing to remove trust in theorem provers. These synergistic techniques successfully ameliorate the TCB size burden associated with two procedures: binary analysis and theorem proving. The design of AGORA allows untrusted parties to participate in these complex processes. Moreover, based on running the optimized TCB within trusted execution environments and recording the verification process on a blockchain, the public can audit the correctness of verification results. By implementing verification workflows for software-based fault isolation policy and side-channel mitigation, our evaluation demonstrates the efficacy of AGORA.

cs.CR

Click Without Compromise: Online Advertising Measurement via Per User Differential Privacy

Online advertising is a cornerstone of the Internet ecosystem, with advertising measurement playing a crucial role in optimizing efficiency. Ad measurement entails attributing desired behaviors, such as purchases, to ad exposures across various platforms, necessitating the collection of user activities across these platforms. As this practice faces increasing restrictions due to rising privacy concerns, safeguarding user privacy in this context is imperative. Our work is the first to formulate the real-world challenge of advertising measurement systems with real-time reporting of streaming data in advertising campaigns. We introduce AdsBPC, a novel user-level differential privacy protection scheme for online advertising measurement results. This approach optimizes global noise power and results in a non-identically distributed noise distribution that preserves differential privacy while enhancing measurement accuracy. Through experiments on both real-world advertising campaigns and synthetic datasets, AdsBPC achieves a 33% to 95% increase in accuracy over existing streaming DP mechanisms applied to advertising measurement. This highlights our method's effectiveness in achieving superior accuracy alongside a formal privacy guarantee, thereby advancing the state-of-the-art in privacy-preserving advertising measurement.

cs.CR

A Floating-Point Secure Implementation of the Report Noisy Max with Gap Mechanism

The Noisy Max mechanism and its variations are fundamental private selection algorithms that are used to select items from a set of candidates (such as the most common diseases in a population), while controlling the privacy leakage in the underlying data. A recently proposed extension, Noisy Top-k with Gap, provides numerical information about how much better the selected items are compared to the non-selected items (e.g., how much more common are the selected diseases). This extra information comes at no privacy cost but crucially relies on infinite precision for the privacy guarantees. In this paper, we provide a finite-precision secure implementation of this algorithm that takes advantage of integer arithmetic.

cs.CR

ResidualPlanner+: a scalable matrix mechanism for marginals and beyond

Noisy marginals are a common form of confidentiality protecting data release and are useful for many downstream tasks such as contingency table analysis, construction of Bayesian networks, and even synthetic data generation. Privacy mechanisms that provide unbiased noisy answers to linear queries (such as marginals) are known as matrix mechanisms. We propose ResidualPlanner and ResidualPlanner+, two highly scalable matrix mechanisms. ResidualPlanner is both optimal and scalable for answering marginal queries with Gaussian noise, while ResidualPlanner+ provides support for more general workloads, such as combinations of marginals and range queries or prefix-sum queries. ResidualPlanner can optimize for many loss functions that can be written as a convex function of marginal variances (prior work was restricted to just one predefined objective function). ResidualPlanner can optimize the accuracy of marginals in large scale settings in seconds, even when the previous state of the art (HDMM) runs out of memory. It even runs on datasets with 100 attributes in a couple of minutes. Furthermore, ResidualPlanner can efficiently compute variance/covariance values for each marginal (prior methods quickly run out of memory, even for relatively small datasets). ResidualPlanner+ provides support for more complex workloads that combine marginal and range/prefix-sum queries (e.g., a marginal on race, a range query on age, and a combined race/age tabulation that answers age range queries for each race). It even supports custom user-defined workloads on different attributes. With this added flexibility, ResidualPlanner+ is not necessarily optimal, however it is still extremely scalable and outperforms the prior state-of-the-art (HDMM) on prefix-sum queries both in terms of accuracy and speed.

cs.DB

Answering Private Linear Queries Adaptively using the Common Mechanism

When analyzing confidential data through a privacy filter, a data scientist often needs to decide which queries will best support their intended analysis. For example, an analyst may wish to study noisy two-way marginals in a dataset produced by a mechanism M1. But, if the data are relatively sparse, the analyst may choose to examine noisy one-way marginals, produced by a mechanism M2 instead. Since the choice of whether to use M1 or M2 is data-dependent, a typical differentially private workflow is to first split the privacy loss budget rho into two parts: rho1 and rho2, then use the first part rho1 to determine which mechanism to use, and the remainder rho2 to obtain noisy answers from the chosen mechanism. In a sense, the first step seems wasteful because it takes away part of the privacy loss budget that could have been used to make the query answers more accurate. In this paper, we consider the question of whether the choice between M1 and M2 can be performed without wasting any privacy loss budget. For linear queries, we propose a method for decomposing M1 and M2 into three parts: (1) a mechanism M* that captures their shared information, (2) a mechanism M1' that captures information that is specific to M1, (3) a mechanism M2' that captures information that is specific to M2. Running M* and M1' together is completely equivalent to running M1 (both in terms of query answer accuracy and total privacy cost rho). Similarly, running M* and M2' together is completely equivalent to running M2. Since M* will be used no matter what, the analyst can use its output to decide whether to subsequently run M1'(thus recreating the analysis supported by M1) or M2'(recreating the analysis supported by M2), without wasting privacy loss budget.

cs.CR

Reconstruction Attacks on Aggressive Relaxations of Differential Privacy

Differential privacy is a widely accepted formal privacy definition that allows aggregate information about a dataset to be released while controlling privacy leakage for individuals whose records appear in the data. Due to the unavoidable tension between privacy and utility, there have been many works trying to relax the requirements of differential privacy to achieve greater utility. One class of relaxation, which is starting to gain support outside the privacy community is embodied by the definitions of individual differential privacy (IDP) and bootstrap differential privacy (BDP). The original version of differential privacy defines a set of neighboring database pairs and achieves its privacy guarantees by requiring that each pair of neighbors should be nearly indistinguishable to an attacker. The privacy definitions we study, however, aggressively reduce the set of neighboring pairs that are protected. Both IDP and BDP define a measure of "privacy loss" that satisfies formal privacy properties such as postprocessing invariance and composition, and achieve dramatically better utility than the traditional variants of differential privacy. However, there is a significant downside - we show that they allow a significant portion of the dataset to be reconstructed using algorithms that have arbitrarily low privacy loss under their privacy accounting rules. We demonstrate these attacks using the preferred mechanisms of these privacy definitions. In particular, we design a set of queries that, when protected by these mechanisms with high noise settings (i.e., with claims of very low privacy loss), yield more precise information about the dataset than if they were not protected at all.

cs.CR

Demystifying Arch-hints for Model Extraction: An Attack in Unified Memory System

The deep neural network (DNN) models are deemed confidential due to their unique value in expensive training efforts, privacy-sensitive training data, and proprietary network characteristics. Consequently, the model value raises incentive for adversary to steal the model for profits, such as the representative model extraction attack. Emerging attack can leverage timing-sensitive architecture-level events (i.e., Arch-hints) disclosed in hardware platforms to extract DNN model layer information accurately. In this paper, we take the first step to uncover the root cause of such Arch-hints and summarize the principles to identify them. We then apply these principles to emerging Unified Memory (UM) management system and identify three new Arch-hints caused by UM's unique data movement patterns. We then develop a new extraction attack, UMProbe. We also create the first DNN benchmark suite in UM and utilize the benchmark suite to evaluate UMProbe. Our evaluation shows that UMProbe can extract the layer sequence with an accuracy of 95% for almost all victim test models, which thus calls for more attention to the DNN security in UM system.

cs.CR

Exact Privacy Analysis of the Gaussian Sparse Histogram Mechanism

Sparse histogram methods can be useful for returning differentially private counts of items in large or infinite histograms, large group-by queries, and more generally, releasing a set of statistics with sufficient item counts. We consider the Gaussian version of the sparse histogram mechanism and study the exact $ε,δ$ differential privacy guarantees satisfied by this mechanism. We compare these exact $ε,δ$ parameters to the simpler overestimates used in prior work to quantify the impact of their looser privacy bounds.

cs.CR

Towards a General-Purpose Dynamic Information Flow Policy

Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable. Prior works alleviate the limitation to some extent, but even for a veteran in information flow security, understanding the subtleties in the syntax and semantics of each policy is challenging, largely due to very different policy specification languages, and more fundamentally, semantic requirements of each policy. We take a top-down approach and present a novel information flow policy, called Dynamic Release, which allows information flow restrictions to downgrade and upgrade in arbitrary ways. Dynamic Release is formalized on a novel framework that, for the first time, allows us to compare and contrast various dynamic policies in the literature. We show that Dynamic Release generalizes declassification, erasure, delegation and revocation. Moreover, it is the only dynamic policy that is both applicable and correct on a benchmark of tests with dynamic policy.

cs.CR

DPGen: Automated Program Synthesis for Differential Privacy

Differential privacy has become a de facto standard for releasing data in a privacy-preserving way. Creating a differentially private algorithm is a process that often starts with a noise-free (non-private) algorithm. The designer then decides where to add noise, and how much of it to add. This can be a non-trivial process -- if not done carefully, the algorithm might either violate differential privacy or have low utility. In this paper, we present DPGen, a program synthesizer that takes in non-private code (without any noise) and automatically synthesizes its differentially private version (with carefully calibrated noise). Under the hood, DPGen uses novel algorithms to automatically generate a sketch program with candidate locations for noise, and then optimize privacy proof and noise scales simultaneously on the sketch program. Moreover, DPGen can synthesize sophisticated mechanisms that adaptively process queries until a specified privacy budget is exhausted. When evaluated on standard benchmarks, DPGen is able to generate differentially private mechanisms that optimize simple utility functions within 120 seconds. It is also powerful enough to synthesize adaptive privacy mechanisms.

cs.CR

Understanding TEE Containers, Easy to Use? Hard to Trust

As an emerging technique for confidential computing, trusted execution environment (TEE) receives a lot of attention. To better develop, deploy, and run secure applications on a TEE platform such as Intel's SGX, both academic and industrial teams have devoted much effort to developing reliable and convenient TEE containers. In this paper, we studied the isolation strategies of 15 existing TEE containers to protect secure applications from potentially malicious operating systems (OS) or untrusted applications, using a semi-automatic approach combining a feedback-guided analyzer with manual code review. Our analysis reveals the isolation protection each of these TEE containers enforces, and their security weaknesses. We observe that none of the existing TEE containers can fulfill the goal they set, due to various pitfalls in their design and implementation. We report the lessons learnt from our study for guiding the development of more secure containers, and further discuss the trend of TEE container designs. We also release our analyzer that helps evaluate the container middleware both from the enclave and from the kernel.

cs.CR

Optimizing Fitness-For-Use of Differentially Private Linear Queries

In practice, differentially private data releases are designed to support a variety of applications. A data release is fit for use if it meets target accuracy requirements for each application. In this paper, we consider the problem of answering linear queries under differential privacy subject to per-query accuracy constraints. Existing practical frameworks like the matrix mechanism do not provide such fine-grained control (they optimize total error, which allows some query answers to be more accurate than necessary, at the expense of other queries that become no longer useful). Thus, we design a fitness-for-use strategy that adds privacy-preserving Gaussian noise to query answers. The covariance structure of the noise is optimized to meet the fine-grained accuracy requirements while minimizing the cost to privacy.

cs.DB