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Daniel Balasubramanian

Publications and source records attributed to Daniel Balasubramanian.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

BlueSTAR: Tiered Agentic Architecture for Autonomous Cyber Defense

Cyber attacks are increasingly automated, narrowing the time available for human analysts to detect, reason about, and respond to intrusions. Large language models (LLMs) offer a promising foundation for autonomous cyber defense because they can correlate heterogeneous evidence and reason about previously unseen threats. However, directly applying LLMs to operational security telemetry is impractical: raw logs arrive faster than current models can process them, individual events are often ambiguous, and unconstrained LLM actions can introduce significant operational risk. We present BlueSTAR, a tiered agentic architecture for autonomous cyber defense in enterprise IT/OT networks. BlueSTAR first transforms high-volume security telemetry into compact indicators of compromise. We further introduce a resilience metric that jointly captures attacker reach, impact on mission-critical assets, and disruption caused by defensive actions. We evaluate BlueSTAR on two live enterprise IT/OT cyber ranges using seven attack chains based on real-world intrusion techniques. Across attack chains, BlueSTAR retains the fast containment of deterministic response for known threats while successfully defending against attacks requiring contextual and cross-cycle reasoning, including credential theft, repeated compromise, concurrent attackers, and attacks against physical processes.

cs.CR

Learning Red Agent Policy from Observations for Neurosymbolic Autonomous Cyber Agents

With sophisticated cyber-attacks becoming increasingly prevalent, modern networks require intelligent autonomous cyber-defense agents trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL). These agents employ neurosymbolic approaches such as behavior trees with learning-enabled components (LECs) to learn, reason, adapt, and implement security rules while maintaining critical operations. However, these autonomous networks are partially observable systems, i.e., the cyber-attacker's (red agent's) actions are not observable, making it difficult for the defender to predict red actions, learn red policies, or assess the attacker's intrusion levels. To address this, we propose a Policy Learning Technique using imitation learning to learn policies for partially observable RL agents with discrete states and discrete actions. We apply this technique in an autonomous cyber environment to predict red agent's actions from network observations and defender actions. Integrated with a neurosymbolic cyber-defense agent, our method effectively handles different red policies and achieves high prediction accuracy across diverse simulated scenarios.

cs.CR

Cyber security of OT networks: A tutorial, survey of attacks and overview of current state of defense tools, protocols, & challenges

The convergence of Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) under Industry~4.0 has widened the cyber-attack surface of critical infrastructure across manufacturing, energy, transportation, water, and healthcare. This survey synthesizes OT/IT cybersecurity along four axes. First, we taxonomize \emph{attack vectors} that traverse the IT--OT boundary, separating IT-side initial access (phishing, exploits, supply-chain compromise, exposed remote access) from OT-side propagation and impact (insecure protocols, weak authentication, firmware tampering, control-logic manipulation). Second, we review \emph{defensive technologies} -- signature-based intrusion detection, AI/ML anomaly detection, Zero Trust Architecture, blockchain-based event logging, digital twins, and OT-aware Security Operations Centers -- and identify remaining \emph{gaps}: OT-specific patch management, dataset scarcity for ML, IoMT segmentation, and the absence of consistent resilience metrics. Third, we compile a cross-validated \emph{historical record} of 69 high-impact incidents spanning 2010--2025, from Stuxnet to Jaguar Land Rover, and quantify their \emph{commercial effects} sector by sector using figures sourced from SEC filings, government post-incident reviews, and primary regulatory disclosures. Fourth, we map the \emph{regulatory landscape}: NIST Cybersecurity Framework2.0 and SP~800-82~Rev.~3, IEC~62443, the EU NIS2 Directive, DORA, the Cyber Resilience Act, NERC~CIP, and healthcare-specific regimes (IEC-80001-1, FDA, NIST-SP-1800-8). A sectoral deep-dive on healthcare illustrates the IT--OT convergence threat model under high-consequence conditions. The result is a single, source-traceable reference on where OT/IT cybersecurity stands, what the historical record costs defenders who lag, and where investment yields the highest marginal return on resilience.

cs.CR

A Human Study of Cognitive Biases in Web Application Security

Cybersecurity training has become a crucial part of computer science education and industrial onboarding. Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions have emerged as a valuable, gamified approach for developing and refining the skills of cybersecurity and software engineering professionals. However, while CTFs provide a controlled environment for tackling real world challenges, the participants' decision making and problem solving processes remain under explored. Recognizing that psychology may play a role in a cyber attacker's behavior, we investigate how cognitive biases could be used to improve CTF education and security. In this paper, we present an approach to control cognitive biases, specifically Satisfaction of Search and Loss Aversion, to influence and potentially hinder attackers' effectiveness against web application vulnerabilities in a CTF style challenge. We employ a rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis through a controlled human study of CTF tasks. CTF exercises are widely used in cybersecurity education and research to simulate real world attack scenarios and help participants develop critical skills by solving security challenges in controlled environments. In our study, participants interact with a web application containing deliberately embedded vulnerabilities while being subjected to tasks designed to trigger cognitive biases. Our study reveals that many participants exhibit the Satisfaction of Search bias and that this bias has a significant effect on their success. On average, participants found 25% fewer flags compared to those who did not exhibit this bias. Our findings provide valuable insights into how cognitive biases can be strategically employed to enhance cybersecurity outcomes, education, and measurements through the lens of CTF challenges.

cs.CR

Syntheto: A Surface Language for APT and ACL2

Syntheto is a surface language for carrying out formally verified program synthesis by transformational refinement in ACL2 using the APT toolkit. Syntheto aims at providing more familiarity and automation, in order to make this technology more widely usable. Syntheto is a strongly statically typed functional language that includes both executable and non-executable constructs, including facilities to state and prove theorems and facilities to apply proof-generating transformations. Syntheto is integrated into an IDE with a notebook-style, interactive interface that translates Syntheto to ACL2 definitions and APT transformation invocations, and back-translates the prover's results to Syntheto; the bidirectional translation happens behind the scenes, with the user interacting solely with Syntheto.

cs.SE

Distributed and Managed: Research Challenges and Opportunities of the Next Generation Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems increasingly rely on distributed computing platforms where sensing, computing, actuation, and communication resources are shared by a multitude of applications. Such `cyber-physical cloud computing platforms' present novel challenges because the system is built from mobile embedded devices, is inherently distributed, and typically suffers from highly fluctuating connectivity among the modules. Architecting software for these systems raises many challenges not present in traditional cloud computing. Effective management of constrained resources and application isolation without adversely affecting performance are necessary. Autonomous fault management and real-time performance requirements must be met in a verifiable manner. It is also both critical and challenging to support multiple end-users whose diverse software applications have changing demands for computational and communication resources, while operating on different levels and in separate domains of security. The solution presented in this paper is based on a layered architecture consisting of a novel operating system, a middleware layer, and component-structured applications. The component model facilitates the construction of software applications from modular and reusable components that are deployed in the distributed system and interact only through well-defined mechanisms. The complexity of creating applications and performing system integration is mitigated through the use of a domain-specific model-driven development process that relies on a domain-specific modeling language and its accompanying graphical modeling tools, software generators for synthesizing infrastructure code, and the extensive use of model-based analysis for verification and validation.

cs.DC