arXiv subjects

Daniel Coscia

Publications and source records attributed to Daniel Coscia.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Generalizable IoT Traffic Representations for Cross-Network Device Identification

Machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in classifying network traffic and identifying Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, enabling operators to discover and manage IoT assets at scale. However, many existing approaches rely on end-to-end supervised pipelines or task-specific fine-tuning, resulting in traffic representations that are tightly coupled to labeled datasets and deployment environments, which can limit generalizability. In this paper, we study the problem of learning generalizable traffic representations for IoT device identification. We design compact encoder architectures that learn per-flow embeddings from unlabeled IoT traffic and evaluate them using a frozen-encoder protocol with a simple supervised classifier. Our specific contributions are threefold. (1) We develop unsupervised encoder--decoder models that learn compact traffic representations from unlabeled IoT network flows and assess their quality through reconstruction-based analysis. (2) We show that these learned representations can be used effectively for IoT device-type classification using simple, lightweight classifiers trained on frozen embeddings. (3) We provide a systematic benchmarking study against the state-of-the-art pretrained traffic encoders, showing that larger models do not necessarily yield more robust representations for IoT traffic. Using more than 18 million real IoT traffic flows collected across multiple years and deployment environments, we learn traffic representations from unlabeled data and evaluate device-type classification on disjoint labeled subsets, achieving macro F1-scores exceeding 0.9 for device-type classification and demonstrating robustness under cross-environment deployment.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Enhancing Malware Fingerprinting through Analysis of Evasive Techniques

As malware detection evolves, attackers adopt sophisticated evasion tactics. Traditional file-level fingerprinting, such as cryptographic and fuzzy hashes, is often overlooked as a target for evasion. Malware variants exploit minor binary modifications to bypass detection, as seen in Microsoft's discovery of GoldMax variations (2020-2021). However, no large-scale empirical studies have assessed the limitations of traditional fingerprinting methods on real-world malware samples or explored improvements. This paper fills this gap by addressing three key questions: (a) How prevalent are file variants in malware samples? Analyzing 4 million Windows Portable Executable (PE) files, 21 million sections, and 48 million resources, we find up to 80% deep structural similarities, including common APIs and executable sections. (b) What evasion techniques are used? We identify resilient fingerprints (clusters of malware variants with high similarity) validated via VirusTotal. Our analysis reveals non-functional mutations, such as altered section numbers, virtual sizes, and section names, as primary evasion tactics. We also classify two key section types: malicious sections (high entropy >5) and camouflage sections (entropy = 0). (c) How can fingerprinting be improved? We propose two novel approaches that enhance detection, improving identification rates from 20% (traditional methods) to over 50% using our refined fingerprinting techniques. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing methods and propose new strategies to strengthen malware fingerprinting against evolving threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Use of Cryptography in Malware Obfuscation

Malware authors often use cryptographic tools such as XOR encryption and block ciphers like AES to obfuscate part of the malware to evade detection. Use of cryptography may give the impression that these obfuscation techniques have some provable guarantees of success. In this paper, we take a closer look at the use of cryptographic tools to obfuscate malware. We first find that most techniques are easy to defeat (in principle), since the decryption algorithm and the key is shipped within the program. In order to clearly define an obfuscation technique's potential to evade detection we propose a principled definition of malware obfuscation, and then categorize instances of malware obfuscation that use cryptographic tools into those which evade detection and those which are detectable. We find that schemes that are hard to de-obfuscate necessarily rely on a construct based on environmental keying. We also show that cryptographic notions of obfuscation, e.g., indistinghuishability and virtual black box obfuscation, may not guarantee evasion detection under our model. However, they can be used in conjunction with environmental keying to produce hard to de-obfuscate version of programs.

cs.CR↗