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Daniel Reuter

Publications and source records attributed to Daniel Reuter.

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DiFR: Inference Verification Despite Nondeterminism

As demand for LLM inference grows, it is becoming increasingly important that providers and their customers can verify that inference processes are performed correctly, without errors or tampering. However, re-running the same inference process twice often leads to different results due to benign numerical noise, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate variation from actual problems. To address this problem, we introduce Token-DiFR (Token-Divergence-From-Reference), a method for verifying inference outputs by comparing generated tokens against predictions made by a trusted reference implementation conditioned on the same random seed. Sampling seed synchronization tightly constrains valid outputs, leaving providers minimal room to deviate from correct inference, which allows output tokens themselves to serve as auditable evidence of correctness at zero additional cost to the provider. Token-DiFR reliably identifies sampling errors, simulated bugs, and model quantization, detecting 4-bit quantization with AUC $>$ 0.999 within 300 output tokens. For applications requiring sample-efficient forward-pass verification, we additionally introduce Activation-DiFR, a scheme that uses random orthogonal projections to compress activations into compact fingerprints for subsequent verification. Activation-DiFR detects 4-bit quantization with AUC $>$ 0.999 using just 2 output tokens, while reducing communication overhead by 25-75% relative to existing methods. We release an open-source integration with vLLM to accelerate practical deployment of verifiable inference.

cs.LG

Verifying LLM Inference to Detect Model Weight Exfiltration

As large AI models become increasingly valuable assets, the risk of model weight exfiltration from inference servers grows accordingly. An attacker controlling an inference server may exfiltrate model weights by hiding them within ordinary model responses, a strategy known as steganography. This work investigates how to verify LLM model inference to defend against such attacks and, more broadly, to detect anomalous or buggy behavior during inference. We formalize model weight exfiltration as a security game, propose a verification framework that can provably mitigate steganographic exfiltration, and specify the trust assumptions associated with our scheme. To enable verification, we characterize valid sources of non-determinism in large language model inference and introduce two practical estimators for them. We evaluate our detection framework on several open-weight models ranging from 3B to 30B parameters. On MOE-Qwen-30B, our detector reduces exfiltratable information to <0.5% with false-positive rate of <0.01%, corresponding to a >200x slowdown for adversaries. Overall, this work further establishes a foundation for defending against model weight exfiltration and demonstrates that strong protection can be achieved with minimal additional cost to inference providers. Our code is made public at: https://github.com/RoyRin/inference_verification_for_model_weight_exfiltration .

cs.CR

Exploring water's no-man's land

The investigation of water's glass transition and a possible liquid-liquid transition within its supercooled state is hampered by its inevitable crystallization in a temperature range, termed "no-man's land". Here we report dielectric-spectroscopy and calorimetry measurements of pure water and various aqueous LiCl solutions, part of the latter being quenched to avoid crystallization. By investigating solutions of relatively low salt content and by covering an exceptionally broad frequency range up to THz, we find strong hints at a crossover in water from a strong to a fragile liquid, characterized by different glass-transition temperatures and different non-Arrhenius temperature dependences of the molecular dynamics.

cond-mat.soft