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Daniil Trefilov

Publications and source records attributed to Daniil Trefilov.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Pulsed laser attack at 1061 nm potentially compromises quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution systems offer cryptographic security, provided that all their components are thoroughly characterised. However, certain components might be vulnerable to a laser-damage attack, particularly when attacked at previously untested laser parameters. Here, we show that exposing 1550-nm fiber-optic isolators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed illumination with 1.16 W average power permanently degrades their isolation at 1550 nm, while their forward transparency is less affected. One experimental sample was exposed to 17-mW average power picosecond attacking pulses that temporarily reduced its isolation below the specified guaranteed minimum value. This indicates a potential security threat in these attacking laser regimes that need to be addressed by improving security analysis for various light-injection attacks.

quant-ph

Intensity correlations in decoy-state BB84 quantum key distribution systems

The decoy-state method is a prominent approach to enhance the performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems that operate with weak coherent laser sources. Due to the limited transmissivity of single photons in optical fiber, current experimental decoy-state QKD setups increase their secret key rate by raising the repetition rate of the transmitter. However, this usually leads to correlations between subsequent optical pulses. This phenomenon leaks information about the encoding settings, including the intensities of the generated signals, which invalidates a basic premise of decoy-state QKD. Here we characterize intensity correlations between the emitted optical pulses in two industrial prototypes of decoy-state BB84 QKD systems and show that they significantly reduce the asymptotic key rate. In contrast to what has been conjectured, we experimentally confirm that the impact of higher-order correlations on the intensity of the generated signals can be much higher than that of nearest-neighbour correlations.

quant-ph

Robustness of fiber-optic attenuators to 1061-nm sub-nanosecond pulsed laser radiation in quantum key distribution systems

The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems relies on the physical integrity of their components. While laser-damage attacks (LDAs) using high-power continuous-wave (cw) lasers have been well studied, the threat posed by pulsed lasers at alternative wavelengths remains underestimated. Here, we experimentally investigated the stability of four types of fiber-optic attenuators under exposure to sub-picosecond pulses at 1061 nm with average power reaching 1 W. Mechanical variable attenuators with blocking elements and fixed air-gap attenuators show resistance to this attack. MEMS-based variable attenuators exhibit increased attenuation or irreversible damage that causes a permanent reduction in attenuation of approximately 3.8 dB. For fixed attenuators with an absorption element, we demonstrate that initial pulsed irradiation significantly lowers the optical damage threshold of the components compared to direct cw attacks. The attenuation reduction achieved is up to 7 dB at a 1 W cw laser at 1550 nm. These results highlight the possibility of establishing a hidden side-channel for eavesdropping attacks and underscore the insufficiency of existing countermeasures against sophisticated LDA scenarios.

quant-ph

Preparing a commercial quantum key distribution system for certification against implementation loopholes

A commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) system needs to be formally certified to enable its wide deployment. The certification should include the system's robustness against known implementation loopholes and attacks that exploit them. Here we ready a fiber-optic QKD system for this procedure. The system has a prepare-and-measure scheme with decoy-state BB84 protocol, polarisation encoding, qubit source rate of 312.5 MHz, and is manufactured by QRate. We detail its hardware and post-processing. We analyse the hardware for known implementation loopholes, search for possible new loopholes, and discuss countermeasures. We then amend the system design to address the highest-risk loopholes identified. We also work out technical requirements on the certification lab and outline its possible structure.

quant-ph