arXiv subjects

Danny Blom

Publications and source records attributed to Danny Blom.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2022

Rejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms

Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) form an innovative approach to increasing the donor pool through allowing the participation of renal patients together with a willing but incompatible donor. The aim of a KEP is to identify groups of incompatible donor-recipient pairs that could exchange donors leading to feasible transplants. As the size of a kidney exchange grows, a larger proportion of participants can be transplanted. Collaboration between multiple transplant centers, by merging their separate kidney exchange pools is thus desirable. As each transplant center has its own interest to provide the best care to its own patients, collaboration requires balancing individual and common objectives. We consider a class of algorithmic mechanisms for multi-center kidney exchange programs we call rejection-proof mechanisms. Such mechanisms propose solutions with the property that no player wishes to unilaterally deviate. We provide a mechanism optimizing social value under this restriction, though the underlying optimization problem is Sigma-2-p-Hard. We also describe a computationally easier but sub-optimal alternative. Experiments show that rejection-proofness can be achieved at limited cost compared to optimal solutions for regular kidney exchange. Computationally, we provide algorithms to compute optimal rejection-proof solutions for small and medium instance sizes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Cutting Plane Approaches for the Robust Kidney Exchange Problem

Renal patients which have a willing but incompatible donor can decide to participate in a kidney exchange program (KEP). The goal of a KEP is to identify sets of such incompatible pairs that can exchange donors, leading to compatible transplants for each recipient. There is significant uncertainty involved in this process, as planned transplants may be canceled for a plethora of reasons. It is therefore crucial to take into account failures while planning exchanges. In this paper, we consider a robust variant of this problem with recourse studied in the literature that takes into account vertex failures, i.e., withdrawing donors and/or recipients. This problem belongs to the class of defender-attacker-defender (DAD) models. We propose a cutting plane method for solving the attacker-defender subproblem based on two commonly used mixed-integer programming formulations for kidney exchange. Our results imply a running time improvement of one order of magnitude compared to the state-of-the-art. Moreover, our cutting plane methods can solve a large number of previously unsolved instances. Furthermore, we propose a new practical policy for recourse in KEPs and show that the robust optimization problem concerning this policy is tractable for small to mid-size KEPs in practice.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Filling a theatre in times of corona

In this paper, we introduce an optimization problem posed by the Music Building Eindhoven (MBE) to deal with the economical consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for theatre halls. We propose a model for maximizing the number of guests in a theatre hall that respects social distancing rules, and is based on trapezoid packings. Computational results show that up to 40% of the normal capacity can be used for a single show setting, and up to 70% in case artists opt for two consecutive performances per evening.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

The Stackelberg Kidney Exchange Problem is $\Sigma_2^p$-complete

We introduce the Stackelberg kidney exchange problem. In this problem, an agent (e.g. a hospital or a national organization) has control over a number of incompatible patient-donor pairs whose patients are in need of a transplant. The agent has the opportunity to join a collaborative effort which aims to increase the maximum total number of transplants that can be realized. However, the individual agent is only interested in maximizing the number of transplants within the set of patients under its control. Then, the question becomes which patients to submit to the collaborative effort. We show that, whenever we allow exchanges involving at most a fixed number $K \ge 3$ pairs, answering this question is $\Sigma_2^p$-complete. However, when we restrict ourselves to pairwise exchanges only, the problem becomes solvable in polynomial time

cs.GT↗