arXiv subjects

Dario Bauso

Publications and source records attributed to Dario Bauso.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2013

Distributed $n$-player approachability and consensus in coalitional games

We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that make the grand coalitions stable.

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arXiv2012

Lyapunov stochastic stability and control of robust dynamic coalitional games with transferable utilities

This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the instantaneous allocations subject to budget constraints. Before the game starts, the central planner knows the nature of the process (bounded mean ergodic), the bounded set from which the coalitions' values are sampled, and the long run average coalitions' values. On the other hand, he has no knowledge of the underlying probability function generating the coalitions' values. Our goal is to find allocation rules that use a measure of the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time by re-distributing the budget among the players. The objective is two-fold: i) guaranteeing convergence of the average allocations to the core (or a specific point in the core) of the average game, ii) driving the coalitions' excesses to an a priori given cone. The resulting allocation rules are robust as they guarantee the aforementioned convergence properties despite the uncertain and time-varying nature of the coaltions' values. We highlight three main contributions. First, we design an allocation rule based on full observation of the extra reward so that the average allocation approaches a specific point in the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given direction. Second, we design a new allocation rule based on partial observation on the extra reward so that the average allocation converges to the core of the average game, while the coalitions' excesses converge to an a priori given cone. And third, we establish connections to approachability theory and attainability theory.

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arXiv2011

Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors

We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs. The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining protocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the average game.

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arXiv2010

Mixed integer predictive control and shortest path reformulation

Mixed integer predictive control deals with optimizing integer and real control variables over a receding horizon. The mixed integer nature of controls might be a cause of intractability for instances of larger dimensions. To tackle this little issue, we propose a decomposition method which turns the original $n$-dimensional problem into $n$ indipendent scalar problems of lot sizing form. Each scalar problem is then reformulated as a shortest path one and solved through linear programming over a receding horizon. This last reformulation step mirrors a standard procedure in mixed integer programming. The approximation introduced by the decomposition can be lowered if we operate in accordance with the predictive control technique: i) optimize controls over the horizon ii) apply the first control iii) provide measurement updates of other states and repeat the procedure.

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arXiv2006

Consensus for switched networks with unknown but bounded disturbances

We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with switching topologies. The measure of the neighbors' state is affected by Unknown But Bounded disturbances. Here the main contribution is the formulation and solution of what we call the $ε$-consensus problem, where the states are required to converge in a tube of ray $ε$ asymptotically or in finite time.

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