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Dario Maddaloni

Publications and source records attributed to Dario Maddaloni.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Adaptive LLM-Driven Honeypots vs. LLM-Driven Attackers: Does Narrative Coherence Improve Deception?

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable honeypots to generate responses and deceptive artefacts on demand, yet existing approaches evaluate generated content one reply at a time and leave open whether artefacts that jointly describe a coherent event retain an attacker better than unrelated ones. This question becomes pressing as autonomous LLM-driven offensive agents emerge as realistic adversaries. This paper proposes narrative deception, a reactive strategy in which the defender maps each observed attacker command to a MITRE ATT&CK technique, selects a compatible scenario from a curated catalogue based on MITRE Engage, and deploys mutually referential artefacts (files, processes, services, and logs) on an emulated Ubuntu host while the intrusion is under way. An LLM-powered defender and an autonomous LLM attacker interact through a real SSH session, and the attacker's termination policy distinguishes abandonment due to suspected deception from abandonment due to loss of interest. A campaign of 1,150 sessions compares four conditions of increasing sophistication (Static, Same-TTP, Multi-TTP, and Chain) across four open-weight attacker models, four defender models, and three attacker skill levels. Engagement increases significantly at every step. With the same artefact budget per reaction, coherent scenarios raise the median session length of advanced attackers from 40 to 165 commands and reduce their abandonment from 86% to 52%. The effect grows with attacker skill, holds across all sixteen model pairs, and comes at comparable inference cost. Nearly all sessions ended through loss of interest rather than detection, which suggests that deception should sustain meaningful findings, not only emulator fidelity.

cs.CR↗

How To Save Fees in Bitcoin Smart Contracts: a Simple Optimistic Off-chain Protocol

We consider the execution of smart contracts on Bitcoin. There, every contract step corresponds to appending to the blockchain a new transaction that spends the output representing the old contract state, creating a new one for the updated state. This standard procedure requires the contract participants to pay transaction fees for every execution step. In this paper, we introduce a protocol that moves most of the execution of a Bitcoin contract off-chain. When all participants follow this protocol, they are able to save on transaction fees, drastically reducing them. By contrast, whenever adversaries try to disrupt the off-chain execution, any honest participant is still able to enforce the correct contract behaviour, by continuing its execution on-chain.

cs.CR↗