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Dario Paccagnan

Publications and source records attributed to Dario Paccagnan.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Black-Box Followers, White-Box Leaders: Partial Zeroth-Order Methods for MPECs

We study mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints, in which a leader knows their own cost function, but lacks a model of the followers' response. Instead, the leader can only query this response at specific points. While this setting precludes the use of gradient-based methods, existing zeroth-order approaches treat the composed objective entirely as a black box, deploying zeroth-order tools across both the leader and follower. Such approaches are inefficient, as they discard information the leader already possesses about their own cost function. In this work we instead propose to deploy zeroth-order tools only where they are truly needed: to handle the unknown, non-smooth followers' response. Specifically, we first propose PZOS, an algorithm that combines exact partial gradients of the leader's cost with zeroth-order Jacobian estimates of the followers' response in a chain-rule-inspired manner, and establish that it achieves a strictly lower variance bound than the black-box baseline. Second, we introduce the partial Goldstein subdifferential, a stationarity notion tailored to this composite structure, and prove convergence of our algorithm to both standard and partial Goldstein stationary points. Finally, we validate our method on two application domains -- toll optimization in routing games and defense-attack investment in security games -- demonstrating consistent improvements over black-box baselines in convergence speed, objective value, and estimator variance, with robust performance even under few queries per iteration.

math.OC

Strategically Robust Aggregative Games

In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete information, limited computation, or bounded rationality, ultimately impacting the aggregate behavior. To tackle this challenge, we follow recent work on strategically robust game theory and postulate that agents seek protection directly against deviations around the emergent behavior, as opposed to explicitly modeling all sources of uncertainty. Specifically, we propose that each agent protects itself against the worst-case aggregate behavior within an optimal-transport-based ambiguity set centered at the emergent aggregate population behavior. This leads to a novel equilibrium concept, called strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium, that enables one to interpolate between standard Wardrop equilibria (no robustness) and security strategies (maximum robustness). In the setting of convex aggregative games, we establish the existence of a pure strategically robust Wardrop equilibrium and provide tractable computational tools for computing it. Through an application in electric vehicle charging, we demonstrate that strategically robust Wardrop equilibria lead to better decisions, protecting agents against the uncertain aggregate behavior of the population. Remarkably, we also observe that strategic robustness can lead to lower equilibrium costs for all agents, uncovering a "coordination-via-robustification" effect.

cs.GT

Symmetry Guarantees Statistic Recovery in Variational Inference

Variational inference (VI) is a central tool in modern machine learning, used to approximate an intractable target density by optimising over a tractable family of distributions. As the variational family cannot typically represent the target exactly, guarantees on the quality of the resulting approximation are crucial for understanding which of its properties VI can faithfully capture. Recent work has identified instances in which symmetries of the target and the variational family enable the recovery of certain statistics, even under model misspecification. However, these guarantees are inherently problem-specific and offer little insight into the fundamental mechanism by which symmetry forces statistic recovery. In this paper, we overcome this limitation by developing a general theory of symmetry-induced statistic recovery in variational inference. First, we characterise when variational minimisers inherit the symmetries of the target and establish conditions under which these pin down identifiable statistics. Second, we unify existing results by showing that previously known statistic recovery guarantees in location-scale families arise as special cases of our theory. Third, we apply our framework to distributions on the sphere to obtain novel guarantees for directional statistics in von Mises-Fisher families. Together, these results provide a modular blueprint for deriving new recovery guarantees for VI in a broad range of symmetry settings.

stat.ML

Pick-to-Learn for Systems and Control: Data-driven Synthesis with State-of-the-art Safety Guarantees

Data-driven methods have become paramount in modern systems and control problems characterized by growing levels of complexity. In safety-critical environments, deploying these methods requires rigorous guarantees, a need that has motivated much recent work at the interface of statistical learning and control. However, many existing approaches achieve this goal at the cost of sacrificing valuable data for testing and calibration, or by constraining the choice of learning algorithm, thus leading to suboptimal performances. In this paper, we describe Pick-to-Learn (P2L) for Systems and Control, a framework that allows any data-driven control method to be equipped with state-of-the-art safety and performance guarantees. P2L enables the use of all available data to jointly synthesize and certify the design, eliminating the need to set aside data for calibration or validation purposes. In presenting a comprehensive version of P2L for systems and control, this paper demonstrates its effectiveness across a range of core problems, including optimal control, reachability analysis, safe synthesis, and robust control. In many of these applications, P2L delivers designs and certificates that outperform commonly employed methods, and shows strong potential for broad applicability in diverse practical settings.

eess.SY

Strategically Robust Game Theory via Optimal Transport

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation, bounded rationality. While it may be possible to guide the agents' decisions by modeling each source, their joint presence makes this task particularly daunting. Toward this goal, it is natural for agents to seek protection against deviations around the emergent behavior itself, which is ultimately impacted by all the above sources of uncertainty. To do so, we propose that each agent takes decisions in face of the worst-case behavior contained in an ambiguity set of tunable size, centered at the emergent behavior so implicitly defined. This gives rise to a novel equilibrium notion, which we call strategically robust equilibrium. Building on its definition, we show that, when judiciously operationalized via optimal transport, strategically robust equilibria (i) are guaranteed to exist under the same assumptions required for Nash equilibria; (ii) interpolate between Nash and security strategies; (iii) come at no additional computational cost compared to Nash equilibria. Through a variety of experiments, including bi-matrix games, congestion games, and Cournot competition, we show that strategic robustness protects against uncertainty in the opponents' behavior and, surprisingly, often results in higher equilibrium payoffs - an effect we refer to as coordination via robustification.

cs.GT

Integrated Balanced and Staggered Routing in Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand Systems

Autonomous mobility-on-demand (AMoD) systems, centrally coordinated fleets of self-driving vehicles, offer a promising alternative to traditional ride-hailing by improving traffic flow and reducing operating costs. Centralized control in AMoD systems enables two complementary routing strategies: balanced routing, which distributes traffic across alternative routes to ease congestion, and staggered routing, which delays departures to smooth peak demand over time. In this work, we introduce a unified framework that jointly optimizes both route choices and departure times to minimize system travel times. We formulate the problem as an optimization model and show that our congestion model yields an unbiased estimate of travel times derived from a discretized version of Vickrey's bottleneck model. To solve large-scale instances, we develop a custom metaheuristic based on a large neighborhood search framework. We assess our method through a case study on the Manhattan street network using real-world taxi data. In a setting with exclusively centrally controlled AMoD vehicles, our approach reduces total traffic delay by up to 25 percent and mitigates network congestion by up to 35 percent compared to selfish routing. We also consider mixed-traffic settings with both AMoD and conventional vehicles, comparing a welfare-oriented operator that minimizes total system travel time with a profit-oriented one that optimizes only the fleet's travel time. Independent of the operator's objective, the analysis reveals a win-win outcome: across all control levels, both autonomous and non-autonomous traffic benefit from the implementation of balancing and staggering strategies.

math.OC

Convergence and Connectivity: Dynamics of Multi-Agent Q-Learning in Random Networks

Beyond specific settings, many multi-agent learning algorithms fail to converge to an equilibrium solution, instead displaying complex, non-stationary behaviours such as recurrent or chaotic orbits. In fact, recent literature suggests that such complex behaviours are likely to occur when the number of agents increases. In this paper, we study Q-learning dynamics in network polymatrix normal-form games where the network structure is drawn from classical random graph models. In particular, we focus on the Erd\H{o}s-R\'enyi model, which is used to analyze connectivity in distributed systems, and the Stochastic Block model, which generalizes the above by accounting for community structures that naturally arise in multi-agent systems. In each setting, we establish sufficient conditions under which the agents' joint strategies converge to a unique equilibrium. We investigate how this condition depends on the exploration rates, payoff matrices and, crucially, the probabilities of interaction between network agents. We validate our theoretical findings through numerical simulations and demonstrate that convergence can be reliably achieved in many-agent systems, provided interactions in the network are controlled.

cs.MA

WardropNet: Traffic Flow Predictions via Equilibrium-Augmented Learning

When optimizing transportation systems, anticipating traffic flows is a central element. Yet, computing such traffic equilibria remains computationally expensive. Against this background, we introduce a novel combinatorial optimization augmented neural network architecture that allows for fast and accurate traffic flow predictions. We propose WardropNet, a neural network that combines classical layers with a subsequent equilibrium layer: the first ones inform the latter by predicting the parameterization of the equilibrium problem's latency functions. Using supervised learning we minimize the difference between the actual traffic flow and the predicted output. We show how to leverage a Bregman divergence fitting the geometry of the equilibria, which allows for end-to-end learning. WardropNet outperforms pure learning-based approaches in predicting traffic equilibria for realistic and stylized traffic scenarios. On realistic scenarios, WardropNet improves on average for time-invariant predictions by up to 72% and for time-variant predictions by up to 23% over pure learning-based approaches.

cs.LG

Bridging the Gap Between Central and Local Decision-Making: The Efficacy of Collaborative Equilibria in Altruistic Congestion Games

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level objective--altruistic behavior--would improve efficiency, but recent works have shown that altruism can lead to more significant inefficiency than selfishness in congestion games. In this work, we study to what extent the localness of decision-making causes inefficiency by considering collaborative decision-making paradigms that exist between centralized and distributed in altruistic congestion games. In altruistic congestion games with convex latency functions, the system cost is a super-modular function over the player's joint actions, and the Nash equilibria of the game are local optima in the neighborhood of unilateral deviations. When agents can collaborate, we can exploit the common-interest structure to consider equilibria with stronger local optimality guarantees in the system objective, e.g., if groups of k agents can collaboratively minimize the system cost, the system equilibria are the local optima over k-lateral deviations. Our main contributions are in constructing tractable linear programs that provide bounds on the price of anarchy of collaborative equilibria in altruistic congestion games. Our findings bridge the gap between the known efficiency guarantees of centralized and distributed decision-making paradigms while also providing insights into the benefit of inter-agent collaboration in multi-agent systems.

cs.GT

Staggered Routing in Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand Systems

In autonomous mobility-on-demand systems, effectively managing vehicle flows to mitigate induced congestion and ensure efficient operations is imperative for system performance and positive customer experience. Against this background, we study the potential of staggered routing, i.e., purposely delaying trip departures from a system perspective, in order to reduce congestion and ensure efficient operations while still meeting customer time windows. We formalize the underlying planning problem and show how to efficiently model it as a mixed integer linear program. Moreover, we present a matheuristic that allows us to efficiently solve large-scale real-world instances both in an offline full-information setting and its online rolling horizon counterpart. We conduct a numerical study for Manhattan, New York City, focusing on low- and highly-congested scenarios. Our results show that in low-congestion scenarios, staggering trip departures allows mitigating, on average, 94% of the induced congestion in a full information setting. In a rolling horizon setting, our algorithm allows us to reduce 90% of the induced congestion. In high-congestion scenarios, we observe an average reduction of 66% as the full information bound and an average reduction of 56% in our online setting. Surprisingly, we show that these reductions can be reached by shifting trip departures by a maximum of six minutes in both the low and high-congestion scenarios.

math.OC

Fair Interventions in Weighted Congestion Games

In this work we study the power and limitations of fair interventions in weighted congestion games. Specifically, we focus on interventions that aim at improving the equilibrium quality (price of anarchy) and are fair in a suitably defined sense. Within this setting, we provide three key contributions. First, we show that no fair intervention can reduce the price of anarchy below a given factor depending solely on the class of latencies considered. Interestingly, this lower bound is unconditional, i.e., it applies regardless of how much computation interventions are allowed to use. Second, we design a taxation mechanism that is fair and achieves a price of anarchy matching this unconditional lower bound, all the while being polynomial-time computable. Third, we show that no intervention (fair or not) can achieve a better approximation if polynomial computability is required. We do so by proving that the minimum social cost is NP-hard to minimize below a factor identical to the one previously introduced. In doing so, our work shows that the algorithm proposed by Makarychev and Sviridenko (Journal of the ACM, 2018) to tackle optimization problems with a "diseconomy of scale" is optimal, and provide a novel way to derandomize its solution via equilibrium computation.

cs.GT

Collaborative Decision-Making and the k-Strong Price of Anarchy in Common Interest Games

The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making paradigms that exist somewhere between centralized and distributed control. In this work, we seek to understand the benefits and costs of increased collaborative communication in multi-agent systems. We specifically study this in the context of common interest games in which groups of up to k agents can coordinate their actions in maximizing the common objective function. The equilibria that emerge in these systems are the k-strong Nash equilibria of the common interest game; studying the properties of these states can provide relevant insights into the efficacy of inter-agent collaboration. Our contributions come threefold: 1) provide bounds on how well k-strong Nash equilibria approximate the optimal system welfare, formalized by the k-strong price of anarchy, 2) study the run-time and transient performance of collaborative agent-based dynamics, and 3) consider the task of redesigning objectives for groups of agents which improve system performance. We study these three facets generally as well as in the context of resource allocation problems, in which we provide tractable linear programs that give tight bounds on the k-strong price of anarchy.

cs.GT

Collaborative Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems: Quantifying the Strong Price of Anarchy for Resource Allocation Games

The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or agents) are enabled to communicate and collaborate on their actions with one another to attain better system behavior. By limiting the amount of communication, these algorithms exist somewhere between centralized and fully distributed approaches. To understand the possible benefits of this inter-agent collaboration, we model a multi-agent system as a common-interest game in which groups of agents can collaborate on their actions to jointly increase the system welfare. We specifically consider $k$-strong Nash equilibria as the emergent behavior of these systems and address how well these states approximate the system optimal, formalized by the $k$-strong price of anarchy ratio. Our main contributions are in generating tight bounds on the $k$-strong price of anarchy in finite resource allocation games as the solution to a tractable linear program. By varying $k$ --the maximum size of a collaborative coalition--we observe exactly how much performance is gained from inter-agent collaboration. To investigate further opportunities for improvement, we generate upper bounds on the maximum attainable $k$-strong price of anarchy when the agents' utility function can be designed.

cs.GT

The Cost of Informing Decision-Makers in Multi-Agent Maximum Coverage Problems with Random Resource Values

The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this work, we find that this is not necessarily the case. In multi-agent maximum coverage problems, we find that even when agents' objectives are aligned with the global welfare, informing agents about the realization of the resource's random values can reduce equilibrium performance by a factor of 1/2. This affirms an important aspect of designing distributed systems: information need be shared carefully. We further this understanding by providing lower and upper bounds on the ratio of system welfare when information is (fully or partially) revealed and when it is not, termed the value-of-informing. We then identify a trade-off that emerges when optimizing the performance of the best-case and worst-case equilibrium.

cs.GT

Model-free False Data Injection Attack in Networked Control Systems: A Feedback Optimization Approach

Security issues have gathered growing interest within the control systems community, as physical components and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this context, recent literature has studied increasingly sophisticated \emph{false data injection} attacks, with the aim to design mitigative measures that improve the systems' security. Notably, data-driven attack strategies -- whereby the system dynamics is oblivious to the adversary -- have received increasing attention. However, many of the existing works on the topic rely on the implicit assumption of linear system dynamics, significantly limiting their scope. Contrary to that, in this work we design and analyze \emph{truly} model-free false data injection attack that applies to general linear and nonlinear systems. More specifically, we aim at designing an injected signal that steers the output of the system toward a (maliciously chosen) trajectory. We do so by designing a zeroth-order feedback optimization policy and jointly use probing signals for real-time measurements. We then characterize the quality of the proposed model-free attack through its optimality gap, which is affected by the dimensions of the attack signal, the number of iterations performed, and the convergence rate of the system. Finally, we extend the proposed attack scheme to the systems with internal noise. Extensive simulations show the effectiveness of the proposed attack scheme.

math.OC

Online Traffic Routing: Deterministic Limits and Data-driven Enhancements

Over the past decade, GPS enabled traffic applications, such as Google Maps and Waze, have become ubiquitous and have had a significant influence on billions of daily commuters' travel patterns. A consequence of the online route suggestions of such applications, e.g., via greedy routing, has often been an increase in traffic congestion since the induced travel patterns may be far from the system optimum. Spurred by the widespread impact of traffic applications on travel patterns, this work studies online traffic routing in the context of capacity-constrained parallel road networks and analyzes this problem from two perspectives. First, we perform a worst-case analysis to identify the limits of deterministic online routing and show that the ratio between the total travel cost of the online solution of any deterministic algorithm and that of the optimal offline solution is unbounded, even in simple settings. This result motivates us to move beyond worst-case analysis. Here, we consider algorithms that exploit knowledge of past problem instances and show how to design data-driven algorithms whose performance can be quantified and formally generalized to unseen future instances. We present numerical experiments based on an application case for the San Francisco Bay Area to evaluate the performance of our approach. Our results show that the data-driven algorithms we develop outperform commonly used greedy online-routing algorithms.

math.OC

The Unintended Consequences of Minimizing the Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games

This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing either the worst- or best-case performance (i.e., Price of Anarchy (PoA) or Price of Stability (PoS)), we investigate whether optimizing for the PoA has consequences on the PoS. Perhaps surprisingly, our results reveal a fundamental trade-off between the two performance metrics. Our main result demonstrates that the taxation rule that optimizes the PoA inherits a matching PoS, implying that the best outcome is no better than the worst outcome under such a design choice. We then study this trade-off in terms of the Pareto frontier between the PoA and PoS. Our results also establish that any taxes with PoS equal to 1 incur a much higher PoA, and that, in several well-studied cases, the untaxed setting lies strictly above the Pareto frontier.

cs.GT

In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation

In this work, we consider the problem of minimising the social cost in atomic congestion games. For this problem, we provide tight computational lower bounds along with taxation mechanisms yielding polynomial time algorithms with optimal approximation. Perhaps surprisingly, our results show that indirect interventions, in the form of efficiently computed taxation mechanisms, yield the same performance achievable by the best polynomial time algorithm, even when the latter has full control over the agents' actions. It follows that no other tractable approach geared at incentivizing desirable system behavior can improve upon this result, regardless of whether it is based on taxations, coordination mechanisms, information provision, or any other principle. In short: Judiciously chosen taxes achieve optimal approximation. Three technical contributions underpin this conclusion. First, we show that computing the minimum social cost is NP-hard to approximate within a given factor depending solely on the admissible resource costs. Second, we design a tractable taxation mechanism whose efficiency (price of anarchy) matches this hardness factor, and thus is worst-case optimal. As these results extend to coarse correlated equilibria, any no-regret algorithm inherits the same performances, allowing us to devise polynomial time algorithms with optimal approximation.

cs.GT