arXiv subjects

Darrell D. E. Long

Publications and source records attributed to Darrell D. E. Long.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Valet: Efficient Data Placement on Modern SSDs

The increasing demand for SSDs coupled with scaling difficulties has left manufacturers scrambling for newer SSD interfaces which promise better performance and durability. While these interfaces reduce the rigidity of traditional abstractions, they require application or system-level changes that can impact the stability, security, and portability of systems. To make matters worse, such changes are rendered futile with the introduction of next-generation interfaces. It is therefore no surprise that such interfaces have seen limited adoption, leaving behind a graveyard of experimental interfaces ranging from open-channel SSDs to stream SSDs. Our solution, Valet, leverages userspace shim layers to add placement hints for application data, delivering up to 2-4x write throughput over filesystems and comparable or better performance than application-specific solutions, with up to 6x lower tail latency. Valet generates dynamic placement hints, remapping application data to modern SSDs with zero modifications to the application, the filesystem, or the kernel. We demonstrate performance, efficiency, and multi-tenancy benefits of Valet across a set of widely-used applications: RocksDB, MongoDB, and CacheLib, presenting a solution that combines the performance of application-specific solutions with wide applicability to log-structured data-intensive applications.

cs.OS↗

arXiv2021

A Multiple Snapshot Attack on Deniable Storage Systems

While disk encryption is suitable for use in most situations where confidentiality of disks is required, stronger guarantees are required in situations where adversaries may employ coercive tactics to gain access to cryptographic keys. Deniable volumes are one such solution in which the security goal is to prevent an adversary from discovering that there is an encrypted volume. Multiple snapshot attacks, where an adversary is able to gain access to two or more images of a disk, have often been proposed in the deniable storage system literature; however, there have been no concrete attacks proposed or carried out. We present the first multiple snapshot attack, and we find that it is applicable to most, if not all, implemented deniable storage systems. Our attack leverages the pattern of consecutive block changes an adversary would have access to with two snapshots, and demonstrate that with high probability it detects moderately sized and large hidden volumes, while maintaining a low false positive rate.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2015

Self-Repairing Disk Arrays

As the prices of magnetic storage continue to decrease, the cost of replacing failed disks becomes increasingly dominated by the cost of the service call itself. We propose to eliminate these calls by building disk arrays that contain enough spare disks to operate without any human intervention during their whole lifetime. To evaluate the feasibility of this approach, we have simulated the behavior of two-dimensional disk arrays with n parity disks and n(n-1)/2 data disks under realistic failure and repair assumptions. Our conclusion is that having n(n+1)/2 spare disks is more than enough to achieve a 99.999 percent probability of not losing data over four years. We observe that the same objectives cannot be reached with RAID level 6 organizations and would require RAID stripes that could tolerate triple disk failures.

cs.DC↗