arXiv subjects

Darshan Chakrabarti

Publications and source records attributed to Darshan Chakrabarti.

11 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings

Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing dynamic mechanisms for welfare is relatively well understood. However, there has been less work on optimizing for other goals (e.g. revenue), and without restrictive assumptions on valuations, it is remarkably challenging to characterize good mechanisms. Instead, we turn to automated mechanism design to find mechanisms with good performance in specific problem instances. In fact, the situation is similar even in static mechanism design. However, in the static case, optimization/machine learning-based automated mechanism design techniques have been successful in finding high-revenue mechanisms in cases beyond the reach of analytical results. We extend the class of affine maximizer mechanisms to MDPs where agents may untruthfully report their rewards. This extension results in a challenging bilevel optimization problem in which the upper problem involves choosing optimal mechanism parameters, and the lower problem involves solving the resulting MDP. Our approach can find truthful dynamic mechanisms that achieve strong performance on goals other than welfare, and can be applied to essentially any problem setting-without restrictions on valuations-for which RL can learn optimal policies.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Implications of Distance over Redistricting Maps: Central and Outlier Maps

In representative democracy, a redistricting map is chosen to partition an electorate into districts which each elects a representative. A valid redistricting map must satisfy a collection of constraints such as being compact, contiguous, and of almost-equal population. However, these constraints are loose enough to enable an enormous ensemble of valid redistricting maps. This enables a partisan legislature to gerrymander by choosing a map which unfairly favors it. In this paper, we introduce an interpretable and tractable distance measure over redistricting maps which does not use election results and study its implications over the ensemble of redistricting maps. Specifically, we define a central map which may be considered "most typical" and give a rigorous justification for it by showing that it mirrors the Kemeny ranking in a scenario where we have a committee voting over a collection of redistricting maps to be drawn. We include running time and sample complexity analysis for our algorithms, including some negative results which hold using any algorithm. We further study outlier detection based on this distance measure and show that our framework can detect some gerrymandered maps. More precisely, we show some maps that are widely considered to be gerrymandered that lie very far away from our central maps in comparison to a large ensemble of valid redistricting maps. Since our distance measure does not rely on election results, this gives a significant advantage in gerrymandering detection which is lacking in all previous methods.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Contested Logistics: A Game-Theoretic Approach

We introduce Contested Logistics Games, a variant of logistics problems that account for the presence of an adversary that can disrupt the movement of goods in selected areas. We model this as a large two-player zero-sum one-shot game played on a graph representation of the physical world, with the optimal logistics plans described by the (possibly randomized) Nash equilibria of this game. Our logistics model is fairly sophisticated, and is able to handle multiple modes of transport and goods, accounting for possible storage of goods in warehouses, as well as Leontief utilities based on demand satisfied. We prove computational hardness results related to equilibrium finding and propose a practical double-oracle solver based on solving a series of best-response mixed-integer linear programs. We experiment on both synthetic and real-world maps, demonstrating that our proposed method scales to reasonably large games. We also demonstrate the importance of explicitly modeling the capabilities of the adversary via ablation studies and comparisons with a naive logistics plan based on heuristics.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Stackelberg POMDP: A Reinforcement Learning Approach for Economic Design

We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the economic system, while the participants (followers) respond strategically. We integrate algorithms for determining followers' response strategies into the leader's learning environment, providing a formulation of the leader's learning problem as a POMDP that we call the Stackelberg POMDP. We prove that the optimal leader's strategy in the Stackelberg game is the optimal policy in our Stackelberg POMDP under a limited set of possible policies, establishing a connection between solving POMDPs and Stackelberg games. We solve our POMDP under a limited set of policy options via the centralized training with decentralized execution framework. For the specific case of followers that are modeled as no-regret learners, we solve an array of increasingly complex settings, including problems of indirect mechanism design where there is turn-taking and limited communication by agents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our training framework through ablation studies. We also give convergence results for no-regret learners to a Bayesian version of a coarse-correlated equilibrium, extending known results to correlated types.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Extensive-Form Game Solving via Blackwell Approachability on Treeplexes

In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new class of regret-minimization algorithms that are stepsize-invariant, in the same sense as the Regret Matching and Regret Matching$^+$ algorithms for the simplex. Our modular framework can be combined with any existing regret minimizer over cones to compute a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum EFGs with perfect recall, through the self-play framework. Leveraging predictive online mirror descent, we introduce Predictive Treeplex Blackwell$^+$ (PTB$^+$), and show a $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ convergence rate to Nash equilibrium in self-play. We then show how to stabilize PTB$^+$ with a stepsize, resulting in an algorithm with a state-of-the-art $O(1/T)$ convergence rate. We provide an extensive set of experiments to compare our framework with several algorithmic benchmarks, including CFR$^+$ and its predictive variant, and we highlight interesting connections between practical performance and the stepsize-dependence or stepsize-invariance properties of classical algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Efficient Learning in Polyhedral Games via Best Response Oracles

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle. We show how to achieve constant regret in zero-sum games and $O(T^{1/4})$ regret in general-sum games while using only $O(\log t)$ best-response queries at a given iteration $t$, thus improving over the best prior result, which required $O(T)$ queries per iteration. Moreover, our framework yields the first last-iterate convergence guarantees for self-play with best-response oracles in zero-sum games. This convergence occurs at a linear rate, though with a condition-number dependence. We go on to show a $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ best-iterate convergence rate without such a dependence. Our results build on linear-rate convergence results for variants of the Frank-Wolfe (FW) algorithm for strongly convex and smooth minimization problems over polyhedral domains. These FW results depend on a condition number of the polytope, known as facial distance. In order to enable application to settings such as EFGs, we show two broad new results: 1) the facial distance for polytopes in standard form is at least $γ/\sqrt{k}$ where $γ$ is the minimum value of a nonzero coordinate of a vertex of the polytope and $k\leq n$ is the number of tight inequality constraints in the optimal face, and 2) the facial distance for polytopes of the form $\mathbf{A}\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{b},\mathbf{C}\boldsymbol{x}\leq\boldsymbol{d}, \boldsymbol{x}\geq \mathbf{0}$ where $\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathbb{R}^n$, $\mathbf{C}\geq\boldsymbol{0}$ is a nonzero integral matrix, and $\boldsymbol{d}\geq \boldsymbol{0}$, is at least $1/(\|\mathbf{C}\|_\infty\sqrt{n})$. This yields the first such results for several problems such as sequence-form polytopes, flow polytopes, and matching polytopes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Block-Coordinate Methods and Restarting for Solving Extensive-Form Games

Coordinate descent methods are popular in machine learning and optimization for their simple sparse updates and excellent practical performance. In the context of large-scale sequential game solving, these same properties would be attractive, but until now no such methods were known, because the strategy spaces do not satisfy the typical separable block structure exploited by such methods. We present the first cyclic coordinate-descent-like method for the polytope of sequence-form strategies, which form the strategy spaces for the players in an extensive-form game (EFG). Our method exploits the recursive structure of the proximal update induced by what are known as dilated regularizers, in order to allow for a pseudo block-wise update. We show that our method enjoys a $O(1/T)$ convergence rate to a two-player zero-sum Nash equilibrium, while avoiding the worst-case polynomial scaling with the number of blocks common to cyclic methods. We empirically show that our algorithm usually performs better than other state-of-the-art first-order methods (i.e., mirror prox), and occasionally can even beat CFR$^+$, a state-of-the-art algorithm for numerical equilibrium computation in zero-sum EFGs. We then introduce a restarting heuristic for EFG solving. We show empirically that restarting can lead to speedups, sometimes huge, both for our cyclic method, as well as for existing methods such as mirror prox and predictive CFR$^+$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Optimal Local Bayesian Differential Privacy over Markov Chains

In the literature of data privacy, differential privacy is the most popular model. An algorithm is differentially private if its outputs with and without any individual's data are indistinguishable. In this paper, we focus on data generated from a Markov chain and argue that Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) offers more meaningful guarantees in this context. Our main theoretical contribution is providing a mechanism for achieving BDP when data is drawn from a binary Markov chain. We improve on the state-of-the-art BDP mechanism and show that our mechanism provides the optimal noise-privacy tradeoffs for any local mechanism up to negligible factors. We also briefly discuss a non-local mechanism which adds correlated noise. Lastly, we perform experiments on synthetic data that detail when DP is insufficient, and experiments on real data to show that our privacy guarantees are robust to underlying distributions that are not simple Markov chains.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

A New Notion of Individually Fair Clustering: $α$-Equitable $k$-Center

Clustering is a fundamental problem in unsupervised machine learning, and fair variants of it have recently received significant attention due to its societal implications. In this work we introduce a novel definition of individual fairness for clustering problems. Specifically, in our model, each point $j$ has a set of other points $\mathcal{S}_j$ that it perceives as similar to itself, and it feels that it is fairly treated if the quality of service it receives in the solution is $α$-close (in a multiplicative sense, for a given $α\geq 1$) to that of the points in $\mathcal{S}_j$. We begin our study by answering questions regarding the structure of the problem, namely for what values of $α$ the problem is well-defined, and what the behavior of the \emph{Price of Fairness (PoF)} for it is. For the well-defined region of $α$, we provide efficient and easily-implementable approximation algorithms for the $k$-center objective, which in certain cases enjoy bounded-PoF guarantees. We finally complement our analysis by an extensive suite of experiments that validates the effectiveness of our theoretical results.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Fairness, Semi-Supervised Learning, and More: A General Framework for Clustering with Stochastic Pairwise Constraints

Metric clustering is fundamental in areas ranging from Combinatorial Optimization and Data Mining, to Machine Learning and Operations Research. However, in a variety of situations we may have additional requirements or knowledge, distinct from the underlying metric, regarding which pairs of points should be clustered together. To capture and analyze such scenarios, we introduce a novel family of \emph{stochastic pairwise constraints}, which we incorporate into several essential clustering objectives (radius/median/means). Moreover, we demonstrate that these constraints can succinctly model an intriguing collection of applications, including among others \emph{Individual Fairness} in clustering and \emph{Must-link} constraints in semi-supervised learning. Our main result consists of a general framework that yields approximation algorithms with provable guarantees for important clustering objectives, while at the same time producing solutions that respect the stochastic pairwise constraints. Furthermore, for certain objectives we devise improved results in the case of Must-link constraints, which are also the best possible from a theoretical perspective. Finally, we present experimental evidence that validates the effectiveness of our algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

A Pairwise Fair and Community-preserving Approach to k-Center Clustering

Clustering is a foundational problem in machine learning with numerous applications. As machine learning increases in ubiquity as a backend for automated systems, concerns about fairness arise. Much of the current literature on fairness deals with discrimination against protected classes in supervised learning (group fairness). We define a different notion of fair clustering wherein the probability that two points (or a community of points) become separated is bounded by an increasing function of their pairwise distance (or community diameter). We capture the situation where data points represent people who gain some benefit from being clustered together. Unfairness arises when certain points are deterministically separated, either arbitrarily or by someone who intends to harm them as in the case of gerrymandering election districts. In response, we formally define two new types of fairness in the clustering setting, pairwise fairness and community preservation. To explore the practicality of our fairness goals, we devise an approach for extending existing $k$-center algorithms to satisfy these fairness constraints. Analysis of this approach proves that reasonable approximations can be achieved while maintaining fairness. In experiments, we compare the effectiveness of our approach to classical $k$-center algorithms/heuristics and explore the tradeoff between optimal clustering and fairness.

cs.LG↗