arXiv subjects

Datong P. Zhou

Publications and source records attributed to Datong P. Zhou.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2017

Budget-Constrained Multi-Armed Bandits with Multiple Plays

We study the multi-armed bandit problem with multiple plays and a budget constraint for both the stochastic and the adversarial setting. At each round, exactly $K$ out of $N$ possible arms have to be played (with $1\leq K \leq N$). In addition to observing the individual rewards for each arm played, the player also learns a vector of costs which has to be covered with an a-priori defined budget $B$. The game ends when the sum of current costs associated with the played arms exceeds the remaining budget. Firstly, we analyze this setting for the stochastic case, for which we assume each arm to have an underlying cost and reward distribution with support $[c_{\min}, 1]$ and $[0, 1]$, respectively. We derive an Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm which achieves $O(NK^4 \log B)$ regret. Secondly, for the adversarial case in which the entire sequence of rewards and costs is fixed in advance, we derive an upper bound on the regret of order $O(\sqrt{NB\log(N/K)})$ utilizing an extension of the well-known $\texttt{Exp3}$ algorithm. We also provide upper bounds that hold with high probability and a lower bound of order $Ω((1 - K/N)^2 \sqrt{NB/K})$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2017

Estimating Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Residential Demand Response

We evaluate the causal effect of hour-ahead price interventions on the reduction in residential electricity consumption using a data set from a large-scale experiment on 7,000 households in California. By estimating user-level counterfactuals using time-series prediction, we estimate an average treatment effect of ~0.10 kWh (11%) per intervention and household. Next, we leverage causal decision trees to detect treatment effect heterogeneity across users by incorporating census data. These decision trees depart from classification and regression trees, as we intend to estimate a causal effect between treated and control units rather than perform outcome regression. We compare the performance of causal decision trees with a simpler, yet more inaccurate k-means clustering approach that naively detects heterogeneity in the feature space, confirming the superiority of causal decision trees. Lastly, we comment on how our methods to detect heterogeneity can be used for targeting households to improve cost efficiency.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2017

Eliciting Private User Information for Residential Demand Response

Residential Demand Response has emerged as a viable tool to alleviate supply and demand imbalances of electricity, particularly during times when the electric grid is strained due a shortage of supply. Demand Response providers bid reduction capacity into the wholesale electricity market by asking their customers under contract to temporarily reduce their consumption in exchange for a monetary incentive. To contribute to the analysis of consumer behavior in response to such incentives, this paper formulates Demand Response as a Mechanism Design problem, where a Demand Response Provider elicits private information of its rational, profit-maximizing customers who derive positive expected utility by participating in reduction events. By designing an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism to collect users' price elasticities of demand, the Demand Response provider can target the most susceptible users to incentives. We measure reductions by comparing the materialized consumption to the projected consumption, which we model as the "10-in-10"-baseline, the regulatory standard set by the California Independent System Operator. Due to the suboptimal performance of this baseline, we show, using consumption data of residential customers in California, that Demand Response Providers receive payments for "virtual reductions", which exist due to the inaccuracies of the baseline rather than actual reductions. Improving the accuracy of the baseline diminishes the contribution of these virtual reductions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

How Peer Effects Influence Energy Consumption

This paper analyzes the impact of peer effects on electricity consumption of a network of rational, utility-maximizing users. Users derive utility from consuming electricity as well as consuming less energy than their neighbors. However, a disutility is incurred for consuming more than their neighbors. To maximize the profit of the load-serving entity that provides electricity to such users, we develop a two-stage game-theoretic model, where the entity sets the prices in the first stage. In the second stage, consumers decide on their demand in response to the observed price set in the first stage so as to maximize their utility. To this end, we derive theoretical statements under which such peer effects reduce aggregate user consumption. Further, we obtain expressions for the resulting electricity consumption and profit of the load serving entity for the case of perfect price discrimination and a single price under complete information, and approximations under incomplete information. Simulations suggest that exposing only a selected subset of all users to peer effects maximizes the entity's profit.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2017

Hedging Strategies for Load-Serving Entities in Wholesale Electricity Markets

Load-serving entities which procure electricity from the wholesale electricity market to service end-users face significant quantity and price risks due to the volatile nature of electricity demand and quasi-fixed residential tariffs at which electricity is sold. This paper investigates strategies for load serving entities to hedge against such price risks. Specifically, we compute profit-maximizing portfolios of forward contract and call options as a function of the uncertain aggregate user demand. We compare the profit to the case of Demand Response, where users are offered monetary incentives to temporarily reduce their consumption during periods of supply shortages. Using smart meter data of residential customers in California, we simulate optimal portfolios and derive conditions under which Demand Response outperforms call options and forward contracts.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2016

Stability Analysis of Wholesale Electricity Markets under Dynamic Consumption Models and Real-Time Pricing

This paper analyzes stability conditions for wholesale electricity markets under real-time retail pricing and realistic consumption models with memory, which explicitly take into account previous electricity prices and consumption levels. By passing on the current retail price of electricity from supplier to consumer and feeding the observed consumption back to the supplier, a closed-loop dynamical system for electricity prices and consumption arises whose stability is to be investigated. Under mild assumptions on the generation cost of electricity and consumers' backlog disutility functions, we show that, for consumer models with price memory only, market stability is achieved if the ratio between the consumers' marginal backlog disutility and the suppliers' marginal cost of supply remains below a fixed threshold. Further, consumer models with price and consumption memory can result in greater stability regions and faster convergence to the equilibrium compared to models with price memory alone, if consumption deviations from nominal demand are adequately penalized.

eess.SY↗