arXiv subjects

David Africa

Publications and source records attributed to David Africa.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Stress-testing Alignment Midtraining

When aligning frontier models through post-training techniques, it is not possible to directly demonstrate all of the behaviours we want a model to exhibit in all possible deployment environments; our model must generalise outside of the post-training distribution. One proposed solution is alignment midtraining (AMT), which continues pretraining on large volumes of alignment-relevant documents to encourage generalisation in later stages of training. Despite the prominence of AMT as an alignment approach, there is limited public evidence for its effectiveness. To resolve this, we identify several assumptions around midtraining and evaluate them across scale: up to 110 billion-parameter models and 1 billion midtraining tokens. For instance, we study a scenario where post-training data is ambiguous between two possible motivations. We find that midtraining can steer the model's motivation in simple versions of this setting. However, the presence of a tiny fraction of finetuning data which suggests a competing motivation erases the effects of AMT. We also study scenarios in which we want an AI to follow a number of rules, but only demonstrate a subset of them. We find that demonstrations must be present either in midtraining or post-training datasets for these rules to be robustly learned. Based on these and other findings, we do not believe that there is sufficient public evidence for us to confidently state that midtraining can address the core difficulties inherent in aligning powerful AI systems.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Can AI agents conduct open-ended AI research? Early evidence from two case studies

Forecasts of explosive AI progress hinge on AI agents automating AI research. But evidence on whether agents can carry out open-ended AI research is thin. Current evaluations either test agents on narrow, verifiable tasks, which excludes open-ended research, or submit AI-generated papers to blind peer review, which is overstretched, stochastic, and suffers from poor review quality. We introduce a third way to measure progress towards AI R\&D automation. An agent takes on the central, open-ended research question of a high-quality unpublished paper, and the paper's original authors grade its output. We call these shadow evaluations. We ran shadow evaluations on two unpublished NeurIPS 2026 submissions, giving frontier agents six days and thousands of dollars of compute. The agents completed all of the engineering without human help, yet could not make substantial progress towards answering the research questions. As a result, both papers were unambiguously rejected by the authors. We identify five recurring failure modes: poor judgment about the bar for publishable research, uncreative responses to shortcomings in the research design, ineffective backtracking from dead ends, poor resource awareness, and instruction drift. A robustness check with a second model and scaffold reproduced these failures. We release the expert reviews, survey responses, agent repositories, and logs. Our results provide early evidence that today's agents can do the engineering of AI research, but struggle with critical parts of the research lifecycle.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

When Role-playing, Do Models Believe What They Say?

Language models can state that "the Earth orbits the Sun" and, when role-playing Aristotle, assert the opposite. Recent work argues that persona adoption is fundamental to how language models behave, with models selecting the most appropriate persona for a given context. Does such role-playing merely change the model's outputs, or does it also affect what the model internally represents as truthful? We study this question using the role-play of characters whose beliefs differ from the modern consensus, and induce personas with a number of different methods: prompting, in-context learning (ICL), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and Open Character Training (OCT), and Emergent Misalignment (EM). We measure belief internalization across these approaches with truth probes and with behavioral tests, finding a broad spectrum of belief internalization. Prompting, ICL, and SFT change what the model says with little representational change. EM creates a large, broad shift in the model's truth representation, and OCT a smaller shift that is clearest on the larger model. Understanding when training changes a model's worldview rather than merely its behavior may become increasingly important as AI systems are entrusted with greater autonomy and influence.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

"Did you lie?" Evaluating Lie Detectors across Model Scale and Belief-Verified Model Organisms

Robust lie detectors for language models could enable powerful techniques for auditing, monitoring, and post-hoc investigation of model behaviour, but evaluating them requires testbeds where models verifiably believe the opposite of what they say. We show that existing trained model organisms often fail this requirement, leaving prior positive and negative detection results difficult to interpret. We address this with 13 reasoning model organisms whose hidden beliefs are verified in chain-of-thought and shown to generalise to held-out tasks, alongside Varied Deception, a prompted-lying testbed covering a broad range of lie-inducing motivations. On these testbeds we evaluate four detectors: a chain-of-thought judge, a logprob classifier, and two activation probes, including Did-You-Lie (DYL), a new method for training follow-up probes. On prompted lying, across 31 open-weight models spanning 2B to 1T parameters, all four detectors show positive scaling with model capability. However, every activation- and logprob-based detector drops sharply on our trained model organisms, with DYL retaining the most signal; only the chain-of-thought judge remains strong, with 0.82 balanced accuracy, partly as an artefact of our verification process favouring CoT-readable beliefs. Current lie detectors therefore cannot support high-confidence claims about model beliefs, and we suggest research directions that may address some of their current limitations. We release our datasets, model organisms, and trained detectors.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoring

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, \textbf{decision-theoretic view of steganography}. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised $\mathcal{V}$-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the \textbf{steganographic gap} -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Alignment Pretraining: AI Discourse Causes Self-Fulfilling (Mis)alignment

Pretraining corpora contain extensive discourse about AI systems, yet the causal influence of this discourse on downstream alignment remains poorly understood. If prevailing descriptions of AI behaviour are predominantly negative, LLMs may internalise corresponding behavioural priors, giving rise to self-fulfilling misalignment. This paper provides the first controlled study of this hypothesis by pretraining 6.9B-parameter LLMs with varying amounts of (mis)alignment discourse. We find that discussion of AI contributes to misalignment. Upsampling synthetic training documents about AI misalignment leads to a notable increase in misaligned behaviour. Conversely, upsampling documents about aligned behaviour reduces misalignment scores from 45% to 9%. We consider this evidence of self-fulfilling alignment. These effects are dampened, but persist through post-training. Our findings establish the study of how pretraining data shapes alignment priors, or alignment pretraining, as a complement to post-training. We recommend practitioners consider pretraining for alignment alongside capabilities. We share our models, data, and evaluations at AlignmentPretraining.ai.

cs.CL↗