arXiv subjects

David Gringras

Publications and source records attributed to David Gringras.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Frontier Lag: A Bibliometric Audit of Capability Misrepresentation in Academic AI Evaluation

Readers of applied-domain LLM capability evaluations want to know what AI systems can currently do. That literature answers a related, but consequentially different, question: what older, cheaper, less-elicited models could do months or years earlier (a 2026 paper evaluating GPT-3.5 or GPT-4 zero-shot, say, against a frontier of reasoning-capable, tool-using systems like GPT-5.5 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7), often reported with sparse configuration details and abstracted upward into claims about "AI" that propagate through citations, media, and policy. We measure the 'publication elicitation gap' (the gap between these answers) in a pre-registered audit of 112,303 LLM-keyword-matched candidate records (2022-01 to 2026-04; 18,574 admissible, 4,766 full-paper texts retrievable), comparing tested models to the contemporaneous frontier on the Epoch AI Capabilities Index (ECI), reproduced under Arena Elo and Artificial Analysis. The median paper evaluates a model +10.85 ECI (~1.4x the distance between Claude Sonnet 3.7 and Claude Opus 4.5) behind the contemporaneous frontier at evaluation time (H1); an exploratory rational-lag baseline (H8) decomposes this into ~25% peer-review latency, ~75% excess lag. The gap is widening at +5.53 ECI/year (H2; 95% CI [+5.03, +5.83]). Meanwhile, only 3.2% of abstracts (21.2% of full-texts) disclose reasoning-mode status on reasoning-capable models (H4) and 52.5% (95% CI [48.2, 56.9]) state conclusions at the level of "AI" rather than the evaluated model(s), rising at OR = 1.23/year. Proposed remedies include API-access subsidies and editorial enforcement of reporting frameworks mandating configuration-surface disclosure (model snapshot, reasoning mode/effort, tool access, scaffolding, prompting, etc.); VERSIO-AI is a 13-item checklist (Core 3 desk-reject) extending existing frameworks at the elicitation surface, with per-DOI analysis at frontierlag.org.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

IatroBench: Pre-Registered Evidence of Iatrogenic Harm from AI Safety Measures

A heavily safety-trained model will hand a physician the full, patient-followable benzodiazepine taper and refuse it to the patient who needs it, over identical clinical facts; the knowledge is present either way. IatroBench measures that asymmetry across sixty pre-registered clinical scenarios and six frontier models (3,600 responses), scoring each on two axes, commission harm (what a response gets wrong) and omission harm (what it withholds), through a physician-authored structured evaluation validated by a second physician (weighted kappa 0.571, within-1 agreement 96%). Holding clinical content fixed and varying only whether the asker presents as patient or physician yields what we call identity-contingent withholding: all five testable models give the physician more (a decoupling gap of +0.38, p = 0.003; a 13.1-point fall in layperson hit rates on safety-colliding actions, p < 0.0001; no change on the rest), and the gap runs widest in the most heavily safety-trained model, Opus (+0.65). The trigger is the absence of any professional or epistemic signal rather than a credential, since a lawyer or an informed layperson recovers what the patient is refused. A commission-only benchmark would score three mechanisms alike. Opus suppresses what physician framing proves it knows; Llama 4 is incompetent in either framing; GPT-5.2's filter strips 33.2% of its physician responses and none of the lay ones. The evaluation layer inherits the blindness of the training layer; a standard LLM judge scores zero omission harm on 81.5% of the responses our pipeline flags harmful (kappa 0.066), so the instrument built to detect the failure reproduces it. The scenarios are engineered for collision; their rates describe that design and say nothing about ordinary prevalence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Safety Under Scaffolding: How Evaluation Conditions Shape Measured Safety

A safety score earned on a benchmark need not predict how the same model behaves once it is wrapped in an agentic scaffold the benchmark never tested. We ran six frontier models through four deployment configurations (direct API, ReAct, multi-agent critic, map-reduce delegation): N = 62,808 blinded, pre-registered, equivalence-tested evaluations across four safety benchmarks (BBQ, TruthfulQA, XSTest/OR-Bench, sycophancy), plus three supporting analyses. ReAct and multi-agent scaffolds stay within a pre-registered +/-2 pp equivalence margin; map-reduce delegation degrades measured safety (NNH = 14), though that loss is largely a measurement artifact: on identical items, multiple-choice versus open-ended phrasing shifts the measured safety rate by 5-20 pp, and decomposition silently strips the multiple-choice options. Roughly 40-89% of the per-model map-reduce loss is this format conversion rather than reasoning disruption, and an option-preserving variant recovers most of it. Pooled effects also mask sharp model-by-scaffold heterogeneity: under map-reduce, on identical items, Opus loses 16.8 pp while Llama 4 gains 18.8 pp. Structurally, scaffold architecture explains only 0.4% of outcome variance (benchmark choice explains 45x more), and the generalizability coefficient is G = 0.000 (bootstrap 95% CI [0.000, 0.752]). An interval that wide is enough on its own to undermine the utility of any single composite safety number as a deployment criterion. These are the "easy cases"; consequential properties like scheming and CBRN uplift have no obvious reason to be less format- or scaffold-sensitive. Code, data, and prompts are released as ScaffoldSafety.

cs.AI↗