SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

David M. Pennock

Publications and source records attributed to David M. Pennock.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Decentralized Aggregation of LLM Predictions via Wagering Mechanisms

It is increasingly common to aggregate predictions from multiple LLMs, each with domain expertise or access to private tools and data, to improve collective prediction performance. In decentralized settings, aggregation weights need to be determined without access to models' private information and should remain robust to strategic reporting. We propose a family of advantage-aligned wagering mechanisms for LLM aggregation (WALLA), in which each model reports a prediction and a learned wager, and predictions are aggregated using wagers as weights. WALLA introduces a leave-one-out baseline into the net payout function, yielding three desirable properties: (1) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of prediction under arbitrary belief structure, (2) advantage--wager alignment, where the optimal wager is proportional to the model's expected score advantage, and (3) prediction-agnostic wager optimization, enabling decentralized learning of wager policies without requiring optimal predictions. We further instantiate two mechanism variants that trade off normality and no-arbitrage while maintaining a bounded worst-case deficit for the mechanism. Experiments on question-answering and forecasting benchmarks across heterogeneous models and private-information settings show that WALLA matches centralized aggregation methods in predictive performance, while simultaneously achieving decentralized learning, advantage-aligned aggregation weights, uncertainty awareness, and incentive-compatible prediction.

cs.AI

Efficiency of Constant Log Utility Market Makers

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are used to provide liquidity for combinatorial prediction markets that would otherwise be too thinly traded. They offer both buy and sell prices for any of the doubly exponential many possible securities that the market can offer. The problem of setting those prices is known to be #P-hard for the original and most well-known AMM, the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) market maker [Chen et al., 2008]. We focus on another natural AMM, the Constant Log Utility Market Maker (CLUM). Unlike LMSR, whose worst-case loss bound grows with the number of outcomes, CLUM has constant worst-case loss, allowing the market to add outcomes on the fly and even operate over countably infinite many outcomes, among other features. Simpler versions of CLUM underpin several Decentralized Finance (DeFi) mechanisms including the Uniswap protocol that handles billions of dollars of cryptocurrency trades daily. We first establish the computational complexity of the problem: we prove that pricing securities is #P-hard for CLUM, via a reduction from the model counting 2-SAT problem. In order to make CLUM more practically viable, we propose an approximation algorithm for pricing securities that works with high probability. This algorithm assumes access to an oracle capable of determining the maximum shares purchased of any one outcome and the total number of outcomes that has that maximum amount purchased. We then show that this oracle can be implemented in polynomial time when restricted to interval securities, which are used in designing financial options.

cs.GT

Post-Match Error Mitigation for Deferred Acceptance

Real-life applications of deferred-acceptance (DA) matching algorithms sometimes exhibit errors or changes to the matching inputs that are discovered only after the algorithm has been run and the results are announced to participants. Mitigating the effects of these errors is a different problem than the original match since the decision makers are often constrained by the offers they already sent out. We propose models for this new problem, along with mitigation strategies to go with these models. We explore three different error scenarios: resource reduction, additive errors, and subtractive errors. For each error type, we compute the expected number of students directly harmed, or helped, by the error, the number indirectly harmed or helped, and the number of students with justified envy due to the errors. Error mitigation strategies need to be selected based on the goals of the administrator, which include restoring stability, avoiding direct harm to any participant, and focusing the extra burden on the schools that made the error. We provide empirical simulations of the errors and the mitigation strategies.

cs.GT

ABCinML: Anticipatory Bias Correction in Machine Learning Applications

The idealization of a static machine-learned model, trained once and deployed forever, is not practical. As input distributions change over time, the model will not only lose accuracy, any constraints to reduce bias against a protected class may fail to work as intended. Thus, researchers have begun to explore ways to maintain algorithmic fairness over time. One line of work focuses on dynamic learning: retraining after each batch, and the other on robust learning which tries to make algorithms robust against all possible future changes. Dynamic learning seeks to reduce biases soon after they have occurred and robust learning often yields (overly) conservative models. We propose an anticipatory dynamic learning approach for correcting the algorithm to mitigate bias before it occurs. Specifically, we make use of anticipations regarding the relative distributions of population subgroups (e.g., relative ratios of male and female applicants) in the next cycle to identify the right parameters for an importance weighing fairness approach. Results from experiments over multiple real-world datasets suggest that this approach has promise for anticipatory bias correction.

cs.LG

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. Under $\ell_1$ preferences -- for which a voter's disutility is given by the $\ell_1$ distance between the aggregate division and the division he or she most prefers -- the social welfare-maximizing mechanism, which minimizes the average $\ell_1$ distance between the outcome and each voter's proposal, is incentive compatible (Goel et al. 2016). However, it fails to satisfy the natural fairness notion of proportionality, placing too much weight on majority preferences. Leveraging a connection between market prices and the generalized median rules of Moulin (1980), we introduce the independent markets mechanism, which is both incentive compatible and proportional. We unify the social welfare-maximizing mechanism and the independent markets mechanism by defining a broad class of moving phantom mechanisms that includes both. We show that every moving phantom mechanism is incentive compatible. Finally, we characterize the social welfare-maximizing mechanism as the unique Pareto-optimal mechanism in this class, suggesting an inherent tradeoff between Pareto optimality and proportionality.

cs.GT

Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market

Financial options are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike values and trade options of different strikes independently, even for those written on the same underlying asset. Such independent market design can introduce arbitrage opportunities and lead to the thin market problem. The paper first proposes a mechanism that consolidates and matches orders on standard options related to the same underlying asset, while providing agents the flexibility to specify any custom strike value. The mechanism generalizes the classic double auction, runs in time polynomial to the number of orders, and poses no risk to the exchange, regardless of the value of the underlying asset at expiration. Empirical analysis on real-market options data shows that the mechanism can find new matches for options of different strike prices and reduce bid-ask spreads. Extending standard options written on a single asset, we propose and define a new derivative instrument -- combinatorial financial options that offer contract holders the right to buy or sell any linear combination of multiple underlying assets. We generalize our single-asset mechanism to match options written on different combinations of assets, and prove that optimal clearing of combinatorial financial options is coNP-hard. To facilitate market operations, we propose an algorithm that finds the exact optimal match through iterative constraint generation, and evaluate its performance on synthetically generated combinatorial options markets of different scales. As option prices reveal the market's collective belief of an underlying asset's future value, a combinatorial options market enables the expression of aggregate belief about future correlations among assets.

cs.GT

Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions

We initiate the study of incentive-compatible forecasting competitions in which multiple forecasters make predictions about one or more events and compete for a single prize. We have two objectives: (1) to incentivize forecasters to report truthfully and (2) to award the prize to the most accurate forecaster. Proper scoring rules incentivize truthful reporting if all forecasters are paid according to their scores. However, incentives become distorted if only the best-scoring forecaster wins a prize, since forecasters can often increase their probability of having the highest score by reporting more extreme beliefs. In this paper, we introduce two novel forecasting competition mechanisms. Our first mechanism is incentive compatible and guaranteed to select the most accurate forecaster with probability higher than any other forecaster. Moreover, we show that in the standard single-event, two-forecaster setting and under mild technical conditions, no other incentive-compatible mechanism selects the most accurate forecaster with higher probability. Our second mechanism is incentive compatible when forecasters' beliefs are such that information about one event does not lead to belief updates on other events, and it selects the best forecaster with probability approaching 1 as the number of events grows. Our notion of incentive compatibility is more general than previous definitions of dominant strategy incentive compatibility in that it allows for reports to be correlated with the event outcomes. Moreover, our mechanisms are easy to implement and can be generalized to the related problems of outputting a ranking over forecasters and hiring a forecaster with high accuracy on future events.

cs.GT

Log-time Prediction Markets for Interval Securities

We design a prediction market to recover a complete and fully general probability distribution over a random variable. Traders buy and sell interval securities that pay \$1 if the outcome falls into an interval and \$0 otherwise. Our market takes the form of a central automated market maker and allows traders to express interval endpoints of arbitrary precision. We present two designs in both of which market operations take time logarithmic in the number of intervals (that traders distinguish), providing the first computationally efficient market for a continuous variable. Our first design replicates the popular logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), but operates exponentially faster than a standard LMSR by exploiting its modularity properties to construct a balanced binary tree and decompose computations along the tree nodes. The second design consists of two or more parallel LMSR market makers that mediate submarkets of increasingly fine-grained outcome partitions. This design remains computationally efficient for all operations, including arbitrage removal across submarkets. It adds two additional benefits for the market designer: (1) the ability to express utility for information at various resolutions by assigning different liquidity values, and (2) the ability to guarantee a true constant bounded loss by appropriately decreasing the liquidity in each submarket.

cs.GT

Beating Greedy For Approximating Reserve Prices in Multi-Unit VCG Auctions

We study the problem of finding personalized reserve prices for unit-demand buyers in multi-unit eager VCG auctions with correlated buyers. The input to this problem is a dataset of submitted bids of $n$ buyers in a set of auctions. The goal is to find a vector of reserve prices, one for each buyer, that maximizes the total revenue across all auctions. Roughgarden and Wang (2016) showed that this problem is APX-hard but admits a greedy $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation algorithm. Later, Derakhshan, Golrezai, and Paes Leme (2019) gave an LP-based algorithm achieving a $0.68$-approximation for the (important) special case of the problem with a single-item, thereby beating greedy. We show in this paper that the algorithm of Derakhshan et al. in fact does not beat greedy for the general multi-item problem. This raises the question of whether or not the general problem admits a better-than-$\frac{1}{2}$ approximation. In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative and provide a polynomial-time algorithm with a significantly better approximation-factor of $0.63$. Our solution is based on a novel linear programming formulation, for which we propose two different rounding schemes. We prove that the best of these two and the no-reserve case (all-zero vector) is a $0.63$-approximation.

cs.GT

No-Regret and Incentive-Compatible Online Learning

We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold. First, we want the learning algorithm to be no-regret with respect to the best fixed expert in hindsight. Second, we want incentive compatibility, a guarantee that each expert's best strategy is to report his true beliefs about the realization of each event. To achieve this goal, we build on the literature on wagering mechanisms, a type of multi-agent scoring rule. We provide algorithms that achieve no regret and incentive compatibility for myopic experts for both the full and partial information settings. In experiments on datasets from FiveThirtyEight, our algorithms have regret comparable to classic no-regret algorithms, which are not incentive-compatible. Finally, we identify an incentive-compatible algorithm for forward-looking strategic agents that exhibits diminishing regret in practice.

cs.LG

Crowdsourced Outcome Determination in Prediction Markets

A prediction market is a useful means of aggregating information about a future event. To function, the market needs a trusted entity who will verify the true outcome in the end. Motivated by the recent introduction of decentralized prediction markets, we introduce a mechanism that allows for the outcome to be determined by the votes of a group of arbiters who may themselves hold stakes in the market. Despite the potential conflict of interest, we derive conditions under which we can incentivize arbiters to vote truthfully by using funds raised from market fees to implement a peer prediction mechanism. Finally, we investigate what parameter values could be used in a real-world implementation of our mechanism.

cs.AI

The Possibilities and Limitations of Private Prediction Markets

We consider the design of private prediction markets, financial markets designed to elicit predictions about uncertain events without revealing too much information about market participants' actions or beliefs. Our goal is to design market mechanisms in which participants' trades or wagers influence the market's behavior in a way that leads to accurate predictions, yet no single participant has too much influence over what others are able to observe. We study the possibilities and limitations of such mechanisms using tools from differential privacy. We begin by designing a private one-shot wagering mechanism in which bettors specify a belief about the likelihood of a future event and a corresponding monetary wager. Wagers are redistributed among bettors in a way that more highly rewards those with accurate predictions. We provide a class of wagering mechanisms that are guaranteed to satisfy truthfulness, budget balance in expectation, and other desirable properties while additionally guaranteeing epsilon-joint differential privacy in the bettors' reported beliefs, and analyze the trade-off between the achievable level of privacy and the sensitivity of a bettor's payment to her own report. We then ask whether it is possible to obtain privacy in dynamic prediction markets, focusing our attention on the popular cost-function framework in which securities with payments linked to future events are bought and sold by an automated market maker. We show that under general conditions, it is impossible for such a market maker to simultaneously achieve bounded worst-case loss and epsilon-differential privacy without allowing the privacy guarantee to degrade extremely quickly as the number of trades grows, making such markets impractical in settings in which privacy is valued. We conclude by suggesting several avenues for potentially circumventing this lower bound.

cs.GT

Budget Constraints in Prediction Markets

We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to impact the market price. As a concrete application of our characterization, we give sufficient conditions for a property we call budget additivity: two traders with budgets B and B' and the same beliefs would have a combined impact equal to a single trader with budget B+B'. That way, even if a single trader cannot move the market much, a crowd of like-minded traders can have the same desired effect. When the set of payoff vectors associated with outcomes, with coordinates corresponding to securities, is affinely independent, we obtain that a generalization of the heavily-used logarithmic market scoring rule is budget additive, but the quadratic market scoring rule is not. Our results may be used both descriptively, to understand if a particular market maker is affected by budget constraints or not, and prescriptively, as a recipe to construct markets.

cs.GT

Toward a Market Model for Bayesian Inference

We present a methodology for representing probabilistic relationships in a general-equilibrium economic model. Specifically, we define a precise mapping from a Bayesian network with binary nodes to a market price system where consumers and producers trade in uncertain propositions. We demonstrate the correspondence between the equilibrium prices of goods in this economy and the probabilities represented by the Bayesian network. A computational market model such as this may provide a useful framework for investigations of belief aggregation, distributed probabilistic inference, resource allocation under uncertainty, and other problems of decentralized uncertainty.

cs.GT

Representing Aggregate Belief through the Competitive Equilibrium of a Securities Market

We consider the problem of belief aggregation: given a group of individual agents with probabilistic beliefs over a set of uncertain events, formulate a sensible consensus or aggregate probability distribution over these events. Researchers have proposed many aggregation methods, although on the question of which is best the general consensus is that there is no consensus. We develop a market-based approach to this problem, where agents bet on uncertain events by buying or selling securities contingent on their outcomes. Each agent acts in the market so as to maximize expected utility at given securities prices, limited in its activity only by its own risk aversion. The equilibrium prices of goods in this market represent aggregate beliefs. For agents with constant risk aversion, we demonstrate that the aggregate probability exhibits several desirable properties, and is related to independently motivated techniques. We argue that the market-based approach provides a plausible mechanism for belief aggregation in multiagent systems, as it directly addresses self-motivated agent incentives for participation and for truthfulness, and can provide a decision-theoretic foundation for the "expert weights" often employed in centralized pooling techniques.

cs.AI

Logarithmic Time Parallel Bayesian Inference

I present a parallel algorithm for exact probabilistic inference in Bayesian networks. For polytree networks with n variables, the worst-case time complexity is O(log n) on a CREW PRAM (concurrent-read, exclusive-write parallel random-access machine) with n processors, for any constant number of evidence variables. For arbitrary networks, the time complexity is O(r^{3w}*log n) for n processors, or O(w*log n) for r^{3w}*n processors, where r is the maximum range of any variable, and w is the induced width (the maximum clique size), after moralizing and triangulating the network.

cs.AI

Graphical Representations of Consensus Belief

Graphical models based on conditional independence support concise encodings of the subjective belief of a single agent. A natural question is whether the consensus belief of a group of agents can be represented with equal parsimony. We prove, under relatively mild assumptions, that even if everyone agrees on a common graph topology, no method of combining beliefs can maintain that structure. Even weaker conditions rule out local aggregation within conditional probability tables. On a more positive note, we show that if probabilities are combined with the logarithmic opinion pool (LogOP), then commonly held Markov independencies are maintained. This suggests a straightforward procedure for constructing a consensus Markov network. We describe an algorithm for computing the LogOP with time complexity comparable to that of exact Bayesian inference.

cs.AI

Collaborative Filtering by Personality Diagnosis: A Hybrid Memory- and Model-Based Approach

The growth of Internet commerce has stimulated the use of collaborative filtering (CF) algorithms as recommender systems. Such systems leverage knowledge about the known preferences of multiple users to recommend items of interest to other users. CF methods have been harnessed to make recommendations about such items as web pages, movies, books, and toys. Researchers have proposed and evaluated many approaches for generating recommendations. We describe and evaluate a new method called emph{personality diagnosis (PD)}. Given a user's preferences for some items, we compute the probability that he or she is of the same "personality type" as other users, and, in turn, the probability that he or she will like new items. PD retains some of the advantages of traditional similarity-weighting techniques in that all data is brought to bear on each prediction and new data can be added easily and incrementally. Additionally, PD has a meaningful probabilistic interpretation, which may be leveraged to justify, explain, and augment results. We report empirical results on the EachMovie database of movie ratings, and on user profile data collected from the CiteSeer digital library of Computer Science research papers. The probabilistic framework naturally supports a variety of descriptive measurements - in particular, we consider the applicability of a value of information (VOI) computation.

cs.IR