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David O. Zisselman

Publications and source records attributed to David O. Zisselman.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Numbers Extensions

Over the course of the last 50 years, many questions in the field of computability were left surprisingly unanswered. One example is the question of $P$ vs $NP\cap co-NP$. It could be phrased in loose terms as "If a person has the ability to verify a proof and a disproof to a problem, does this person know a solution to that problem?". When talking about people, one can of course see that the question depends on the knowledge the specific person has on this problem. Our main goal will be to extend this observation to formal models of set theory $ZFC$: given a model $M$ and a specific problem $L$ in $NP\cap co-NP$, we can show that the problem $L$ is in $P$ if we have "knowledge" of $L$. In this paper, we'll define the concept of knowledge and elaborate why it agrees with the intuitive concept of knowledge. Next we will construct a model in which we have knowledge on many functions. From the existence of that model, we will deduce that in any model with a worldly cardinal we have knowledge on a broad class of functions. As a result, we show that if we assume a worldly cardinal exists, then the statement "a given definable language which is provably in $NP\cap co-NP$ is also in $P$" is provable. Assuming a worldly cardinal, we show by a simple use of these theorems that one can factor numbers in poly-logarithmic time. This article won't solve the $P$ vs $NP\cap co-NP$ question, but its main result brings us one step closer to deciding that question.

math.LO↗

A proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorems using Chaitin's incompleteness theorem

Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems are corner stones of modern mathematics. In this article we present a new proof of these theorems for ZFC and theories containing ZFC, using Chaitin's incompleteness theorem and a very basic numbers extension. As opposed to the usual proofs, these proofs don't use any fixed-point theorem and rely solely on sets structure. Unlike in the original proof, the statements which can be shown to be unprovable by our technique exceed by far one specific statement constructed from the axiom set. Our goal is to draw attention to the technique of number extensions, which we believe can be used to prove more theorems regarding the provability and unprovability of different assertions regarding natural numbers.

math.LO↗