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David Ubilava

Publications and source records attributed to David Ubilava.

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Climate, Crops, and Postharvest Conflict

I present new evidence of the effects of climate shocks on conflict. Focusing on political violence in Africa, I find that El Ni\~no Southern Oscillation (ENSO) shocks during the crop-growing season affect harvest-related conflict in croplands exposed to this climate phenomenon. Specifically, a 1{\deg}C warming of sea surface temperature in the tropical Pacific Ocean, a proxy for a moderate-strength El Ni\~no event, reduces political violence in exposed locations with crop agriculture, relative to other areas, by approximately three percent, during the early postharvest season. This effect attenuates toward zero as the crop year progresses. This effect can be five times as large after a strong El Ni\~no event, such as that of 1997 or 2015, in highly exposed croplands, such as parts of Southern Africa and the Sahel. Conversely, a La Ni\~na event, which is a counterpart of an El Ni\~no event, has the opposite effect and thus increases conflict in the exposed croplands during the early postharvest season. Because ENSO events can be predicted at least several months in advance, these findings can contribute to creating a platform for early warnings of changes in political violence in predominantly agrarian societies.

econ.GN

Agricultural Roots of Social Conflict in Southeast Asia

We examine whether harvest-time transitory shifts in employment and income lead to changes in political violence and social unrest in rice-producing croplands of Southeast Asia. Using monthly data from 2010 to 2023 on over 86,000 incidents covering 376 one-degree cells across eight Southeast Asian countries, we estimate a general increase in political violence and a decrease in social unrest in croplands with rice production during the harvest season relative to the rest of the crop year. In a finding that is least sensitive to alternative model specifications and data subsetting, we estimate a nine percent increase in violence against civilians in locations with considerable rice production compared to other parts of the region during the harvest season, relative to the rest of the year. We show that the harvest-time changes in conflict are most evident in rural cells with rainfed agriculture. Using location-specific annual variation in growing season rainfall, we then show that the harvest-time increase in violence against civilians occurs in presumably good harvest years, whereas increase in battles between actors of political violence follows growing seasons with scarce rainfall. The harvest-time decrease in social unrest, protests in particular, occurs after presumably bad harvest years. These findings contribute to research on the agroclimatic and economic roots of conflict and offer insights to policymakers by suggesting the spatiotemporal concentration of conflict as well as diverging effects by forms of conflict at harvest time in the rice-producing regions of Southeast Asia.

econ.GN

Agricultural Windfalls and the Seasonality of Political Violence in Africa

When the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997-2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year-on-year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest-time spike in violence by militias in a one-degree cell where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly ten percent increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups--the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest-related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.

econ.GN