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Davide Bove

Publications and source records attributed to Davide Bove.

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R5Detect: Detecting Control-Flow Attacks from Standard RISC-V Enclaves

Embedded and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices are ubiquitous today, and the uprising of several botnets based on them (e.g., Mirai, Ripple20) raises issues about the security of such devices. Especially low-power devices often lack support for modern system security measures, such as stack integrity, Non-eXecutable bits or strong cryptography. In this work, we present R5Detect, a security monitoring software that detects and prevents control-flow attacks on unmodified RISC-V standard architectures. With a novel combination of different protection techniques, it can run on embedded and low-power IoT devices, which may lack proper security features. R5Detect implements a memory-protected shadow stack to prevent runtime modifications, as well as a heuristics detection based on Hardware Performance Counters to detect control-flow integrity violations. Our results indicate that regular software can be protected against different degrees of control-flow manipulations with an average performance overhead of below 5 %. We implement and evaluate R5Detect on standard low-power RISC-V devices and show that such security features can be effectively used with minimal hardware support.

cs.CR

A Large-Scale Study on the Prevalence and Usage of TEE-based Features on Android

In the realm of mobile security, where OS-based protections have proven insufficient against robust attackers, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have emerged as a hardware-based security technology. Despite the industry's persistence in advancing TEE technology, the impact on end users and developers remains largely unexplored. This study addresses this gap by conducting a large-scale analysis of TEE utilization in Android applications, focusing on the key areas of cryptography, digital rights management, biometric authentication, and secure dialogs. To facilitate our extensive analysis, we introduce Mobsec Analytika, a framework tailored for large-scale app examinations, which we make available to the research community. Through the analysis of 170,550 popular Android apps, our analysis illuminates the implementation of TEE-related features and their contextual usage. Our findings reveal that TEE features are predominantly utilized indirectly through third-party libraries, with only 6.7% of apps directly invoking the APIs. Moreover, the study reveals the underutilization of the recent TEE-based UI feature Protected Confirmation.

cs.CR