SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Debasmita Dey

Publications and source records attributed to Debasmita Dey.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

iTRPL: An Intelligent and Trusted RPL Protocol based on Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is the de-facto routing standard in IoT networks. It enables nodes to collaborate and autonomously build ad-hoc networks modeled by tree-like destination-oriented direct acyclic graphs (DODAG). Despite its widespread usage in industry and healthcare domains, RPL is susceptible to insider attacks. Although the state-of-the-art RPL ensures that only authenticated nodes participate in DODAG, such hard security measures are still inadequate to prevent insider threats. This entails a need to integrate soft security mechanisms to support decision-making. This paper proposes iTRPL, an intelligent and behavior-based framework that incorporates trust to segregate honest and malicious nodes within a DODAG. It also leverages multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) to make autonomous decisions concerning the DODAG. The framework enables a parent node to compute the trust for its child and decide if the latter can join the DODAG. It tracks the behavior of the child node, updates the trust, computes the rewards (or penalties), and shares with the root. The root aggregates the rewards/penalties of all nodes, computes the overall return, and decides via its $\epsilon$-Greedy MARL module if the DODAG will be retained or modified for the future. A simulation-based performance evaluation demonstrates that iTRPL learns to make optimal decisions with time.

cs.NI

How Resilient is QUIC to Security and Privacy Attacks?

QUIC has rapidly evolved into a cornerstone transport protocol for secure, low-latency communications, yet its deployment continues to expose critical security and privacy vulnerabilities, particularly during connection establishment phases and via traffic analysis. This paper systematically revisits a comprehensive set of attacks on QUIC and emerging privacy threats. Building upon these observations, we critically analyze recent IETF mitigation efforts, including TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) and MASQUE. We analyze how these mechanisms enhance privacy while introducing new operational risks, particularly under adversarial load. Additionally, we discuss emerging challenges posed by post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) handshakes, including handshake expansion and metadata leakage risks. Our analysis highlights ongoing gaps between theoretical defenses and practical deployments, and proposes new research directions focused on adaptive privacy mechanisms. Building on these insights, we propose future directions to ensure long-term security of QUIC and aim to guide its evolution as a robust, privacy-preserving, and resilient transport foundation for the next-generation Internet.

cs.CR