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Demosthenis Teneketzis

Publications and source records attributed to Demosthenis Teneketzis.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2024

Information Compression in Dynamic Games

One of the reasons why stochastic dynamic games with an underlying dynamic system are challenging is since strategic players have access to enormous amount of information which leads to the use of extremely complex strategies at equilibrium. One approach to resolve this challenge is to simplify players' strategies by identifying appropriate compression of information maps so that the players can make decisions solely based on the compressed version of information, called the information state. For finite dynamic games with asymmetric information, inspired by the notion of information state for single-agent control problems, we propose two notions of information states, namely mutually sufficient information (MSI) and unilaterally sufficient information (USI). Both these information states are obtained with information compression maps independent of the strategy profile. We show that Bayes-Nash Equilibria (BNE) and Sequential Equilibria (SE) exist when all players use MSI-based strategies. We prove that when all players employ USI-based strategies the resulting sets of BNE and SE payoff profiles are the same as the sets of BNE and SE payoff profiles resulting when all players use full information-based strategies. We prove that when all players use USI-based strategies the resulting set of weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (wPBE) payoff profiles can be a proper subset of all wPBE payoff profiles. We identify MSI and USI in specific models of dynamic games in the literature. We end by presenting an open problem: Do there exist strategy-dependent information compression maps that guarantee the existence of at least one equilibrium or maintain all equilibria that exist under perfect recall? We show, by a counterexample, that a well-known strategy-dependent information compression map used in the literature does not possess any of the properties of MSI or USI.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

An Approach to Stochastic Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information and Hidden Actions

We consider in discrete time, a general class of sequential stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information with the following features. The underlying system has Markovian dynamics controlled by the agents' joint actions. Each agent's instantaneous utility depends on the current system state and the agents' joint actions. At each time instant each agent makes a private noisy observation of the current system state and the agents' actions in the previous time instant. In addition, at each time instant all agents have a common noisy observation of the current system state and their actions in the previous time instant. Each agent's actions are part of his private information. The objective is to determine Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategy profiles that are based on a compressed version of the agents' information and can be sequentially computed; such BNE strategy profiles may not always exist. We present an approach/methodology that achieves the above-stated objective, along with an instance of a game where BNE strategy profiles with the above-mentioned characteristics exist. We show that the methodology also works for the case where the agents have no common observations.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2021

Dynamic Games among Teams with Delayed Intra-Team Information Sharing

We analyze a class of stochastic dynamic games among teams with asymmetric information, where members of a team share their observations internally with a delay of $d$. Each team is associated with a controlled Markov Chain, whose dynamics are coupled through the players' actions. These games exhibit challenges in both theory and practice due to the presence of signaling and the increasing domain of information over time. We develop a general approach to characterize a subset of Nash Equilibria where the agents can use a compressed version of their information, instead of the full information, to choose their actions. We identify two subclasses of strategies: Sufficient Private Information Based (SPIB) strategies, which only compress private information, and Compressed Information Based (CIB) strategies, which compress both common and private information. We show that while SPIB-strategy-based equilibria always exist, the same is not true for CIB-strategy-based equilibria. We develop a backward inductive sequential procedure, whose solution (if it exists) provides a CIB strategy-based equilibrium. We identify some instances where we can guarantee the existence of a solution to the above procedure. Our results highlight the tension among compression of information, existence of (compression based) equilibria, and backward inductive sequential computation of such equilibria in stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2020

Dynamic Information Design: A Simple Problem on Optimal Sequential Information Disclosure

We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that has two states, one "good" and one "bad" absorbing state, and has to decide how to sequentially disclose information to the detector. The detector's only information consists of the messages she receives from the principal. The detector's objective is to detect as accurately as possible the time of the jump from the good to the bad state. The principal's objective is to delay the detector as much as possible from detective the jump to the bad state. For this setting, we determine the optimal strategies of the principal and the detector. The detector's optimal strategy is described by time-varying thresholds on her posterior belief of the good state. We prove that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the detector before a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true state afterwards. We present an algorithm that determines both the optimal time threshold and the optimal mixed strategy that could be employed by the principal. We show, through numerical experiments, that this optimal sequential mechanism significantly outperforms any other information disclosure strategy presented in literature.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2018

A Unified Approach to Dynamic Decision Problems with Asymmetric Information - Part I: Non-Strategic Agents

We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other agents. Nevertheless, the agents' strategy choices and beliefs are interdependent over times, a phenomenon known as signaling. We introduce the notions of private information that effectively compresses the agents' information in a mutually consistent manner. Based on the notions of sufficient information, we propose an information state for each agent that is sufficient for decision making purposes. We present instances of dynamic multi-agent decision problems where we can determine an information state with a time-invariant domain for each agent. Furthermore, we present a generalization of the policy-independence property of belief in Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) to dynamic multi-agent decision problems. Within the context of dynamic teams with asymmetric information, the proposed set of information states leads to a sequential decomposition that decouples the interdependence between the agents' strategies and beliefs over time, and enables us to formulate a dynamic program to determine a globally optimal policy via backward induction.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2018

A Unified Approach to Dynamic Decision Problems with Asymmetric Information - Part II: Strategic Agents

We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be used to effectively compress the agents' information in a mutually consistent manner that is sufficient for decision-making purposes. We present instances of dynamic games with asymmetric information where we can characterize a time-invariant information state for each agent. Based on the notion of sufficient information, we define a class of equilibria for dynamic games called Sufficient Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SIB-PBE). Utilizing the notion of SIB-PBE, we provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information over time; this decomposition leads to a dynamic program that determines SIB-PBE of dynamic games. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which we can guarantee the existence of SIB-PBE.

cs.MA↗
arXiv2018

A Taxation Policy for Maximizing Social Welfare in Networks: A General Framework

We present a simple tatonnement process based on a decomposition method which is simple to implement and achieves the maximal social welfare, under the assumption that the utility function of each [price-taking] individual will be his own private information and need not be known by the designer. At each iteration, very little information needs to be exchanged among the individuals in order to achieve the optimal allocation. Furthermore, the given tatonnement process is always balanced at equilibrium and off equilibrium.

math.OC↗
arXiv2017

Dynamic Market Mechanisms for Wind Energy

We investigate the problem of market mechanism design for wind energy. We consider a dynamic two-step model with one strategic seller with wind generation and one buyer, who trade energy through a mechanism determined by a designer. The seller has private information about his technology and wind condition, which he learns dynamically over time. We consider (static) forward and real-time mechanisms that take place at time T=1 and T=2, respectively. We also propose a dynamic mechanism that provides a coupling between the outcomes of the forward and real-time markets. We show that the dynamic mechanism outperforms the forward and real-time mechanisms for a general objective of the designer. Therefore, we demonstrate the advantage of adopting dynamic market mechanisms over static market mechanisms for wind energy. The dynamic mechanism reveals information about wind generation in advance, and also provides flexibility for incorporation of new information arriving over time. We discuss how our results generalize to environments with many strategic sellers. We also study two variants of the dynamic mechanism that guarantee no penalty risk for the seller, and/or monitor the wind condition. We illustrate our results with a numerical example.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2016

A Decentralized Mechanism for Computing Competitive Equilibria in Deregulated Electricity Markets

With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants: generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

math.OC↗
arXiv2015

Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and Sequential Decomposition

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the system over time. Because of the presence of asymmetric information, each agent needs to form beliefs about other agents' private information. Therefore, the specification of the agents' beliefs along with their strategies is necessary to study the dynamic game. We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. A PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system. In a PBE, every agent's strategy should be a best response under the belief system, and the belief system depends on agents' strategy profile when there is signaling among agents. Therefore, the circular dependence between strategy profile and belief system makes it difficult to compute PBE. Using the common information among agents, we introduce a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. Such decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE. We illustrate the sequential decomposition with an example of a multiple access broadcast game. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2015

A Common Information-Based Multiple Access Protocol Achieving Full Throughput and Linear Delay

We consider a multiple access communication system where multiple users share a common collision channel. Each user observes its local traffic and the feedback from the channel. At each time instant the feedback from the channel is one of three messages: no transmission, successful transmission, collision. The objective is to design a transmission protocol that coordinates the users' transmissions and achieves high throughput and low delay. We present a decentralized Common Information-Based Multiple Access (CIMA) protocol that has the following features: (i) it achieves the full throughput region of the collision channel; (ii) it results in a delay that is linear in the number of users, and is significantly lower than that of CSMA protocols; (iii) it avoids collisions without channel sensing.

cs.NI↗
arXiv2014

Electricity Pooling Markets with Strategic Producers Possessing Asymmetric Information II: Inelastic Demand

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented by a non-strategic agent. Inelasticity of demand is a main difficulty in electricity markets which can potentially result in market failure and high prices. We consider demand to be inelastic. We propose a market mechanism that has the following features. (F1) It is individually rational. (F2) It is budget balanced. (F3) It is price efficient, that is, at equilibrium the price of electricity is equal to the marginal cost of production. (F4) The energy production profile corresponding to every non-zero Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution of the corresponding centralized problem where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the producers' and consumers' utilities. We identify some open problems associated with our approach to electricity pooling markets.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2014

A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Security

An analytical approach for a dynamic cyber-security problem that captures progressive attacks to a computer network is presented. We formulate the dynamic security problem from the defender's point of view as a supervisory control problem with imperfect information, modeling the computer network's operation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of policies, an optimal policy for the defender. We study and interpret the behavior of this optimal policy as we vary certain parameters of the supervisory control problem.

eess.SY↗
arXiv2014

Signaling for Decentralized Routing in a Queueing Network

A discrete-time decentralized routing problem in a service system consisting of two service stations and two controllers is investigated. Each controller is affiliated with one station. Each station has an infinite size buffer. Exogenous customer arrivals at each station occur with rate $\lambda$. Service times at each station have rate $\mu$. At any time, a controller can route one of the customers waiting in its own station to the other station. Each controller knows perfectly the queue length in its own station and observes the exogenous arrivals to its own station as well as the arrivals of customers sent from the other station. At the beginning, each controller has a probability mass function (PMF) on the number of customers in the other station. These PMFs are common knowledge between the two controllers. At each time a holding cost is incurred at each station due to the customers waiting at that station. The objective is to determine routing policies for the two controllers that minimize either the total expected holding cost over a finite horizon or the average cost per unit time over an infinite horizon. In this problem there is implicit communication between the two controllers; whenever a controller decides to send or not to send a customer from its own station to the other station it communicates information about its queue length to the other station. This implicit communication through control actions is referred to as signaling in decentralized control. Signaling results in complex communication and decision problems. In spite of the complexity of signaling involved, it is shown that an optimal signaling strategy is described by a threshold policy which depends on the common information between the two controllers; this threshold policy is explicitly determined.

eess.SY↗
arXiv2014

Signaling in sensor networks for sequential detection

Sequential detection problems in sensor networks are considered. The true state of nature/true hypothesis is modeled as a binary random variable $H$ with known prior distribution. There are $N$ sensors making noisy observations about the hypothesis; $\mathcal{N} =\{1,2,\ldots,N\}$ denotes the set of sensors. Sensor $i$ can receive messages from a subset $\mathcal{P}^i \subset \mathcal{N}$ of sensors and send a message to a subset $\mathcal{C}^i \subset \mathcal{N}$. Each sensor is faced with a stopping problem. At each time $t$, based on the observations it has taken so far and the messages it may have received, sensor $i$ can decide to stop and communicate a binary decision to the sensors in $\mathcal{C}^i$, or it can continue taking observations and receiving messages. After sensor $i$'s binary decision has been sent, it becomes inactive. Sensors incur operational costs (cost of taking observations, communication costs etc.) while they are active. In addition, the system incurs a terminal cost that depends on the true hypothesis $H$, the sensors' binary decisions and their stopping times. The objective is to determine decision strategies for all sensors to minimize the total expected cost.

eess.SY↗
arXiv2014

Optimal Energy Procurement from a Strategic Seller with Private Renewable and Conventional Generation

We consider a mechanism design problem for energy procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller, and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and renewable (random) plants, and has multi-dimensional private information which determines her production cost. The objective is to maximize the buyer's utility under the constraint that the seller voluntarily participates in the energy procurement process. We show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing) that the buyer offers to the seller, and the seller chooses one based on her private information.

math.OC↗
arXiv2014

Electricity Pooling Markets with Strategic Producers Possessing Asymmetric Information I: Elastic Demand

In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented by a non-strategic agent. We consider demand to be elastic. We propose a market mechanism that has the following features. (F1) It is individually rational. (F2) It is budget balanced. (F3) It is price efficient, that is, at equilibrium the price of electricity is equal to the marginal cost of production. (F4) The energy production profile corresponding to every non-zero Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism is a solution of the corresponding centralized problem where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the producers' and consumers' utilities. We identify some open problems associated with our approach to electricity pooling markets.

cs.GT↗