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Dena Firoozi

Publications and source records attributed to Dena Firoozi.

16 recordsLinked to original sources

A Decomposition Method for LQ Conditional McKean-Vlasov Control Problems with Random Coefficients

We propose a decomposition method for solving a general class of linear-quadratic (LQ) McKean-Vlasov control problems involving conditional expectations and random coefficients, where the system dynamics are driven by two independent Wiener processes. Unlike existing approaches in the literature for these problems, such as the extended stochastic maximum principle and the extended dynamic programming methods, which often involve additional technical complexities and sometimes impose restrictive conditions on control inputs, our approach decomposes the original McKean-Vlasov control problem into two decoupled stochastic optimal control problems, one of which has a constrained admissible control set. These auxiliary problems can be solved using classical methods. We establish an equivalence between the well-posedness and solvability of the auxiliary problems and those of the original problem, and show that the sum of the optimal controls of the auxiliary problems yields the optimal control of the original problem. Moreover, by applying a variational method, we characterize the optimal solution to the McKean-Vlasov control problem via two decoupled sets of (non-McKean-Vlasov) linear forward-backward stochastic differential equations, each corresponding to one of the auxiliary problems. Finally, we show that standard dynamic programming can also be applied to solve the resulting auxiliary problems.

math.OC

Infinite-Dimensional LQ Mean Field Games with Common Noise: Small and Arbitrary Finite Time Horizons

We develop the theory of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games (MFGs) in Hilbert spaces with common noise modeled by an infinite-dimensional Wiener process that affects the dynamics of all agents. In the presence of common noise, the mean-field consistency condition is characterized by a system of coupled forward-backward stochastic evolution equations (FBSEEs) in Hilbert spaces, whereas, in its absence it is represented by coupled forward-backward deterministic evolution equations. We establish the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the coupled linear FBSEEs associated with the LQ MFG framework for small time horizons and prove the $\epsilon$-Nash property of the resulting equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, we establish the well-posedness of these coupled linear FBSEEs for arbitrary finite time horizons. Beyond the specific context of MFGs, our analysis also yields a broader contribution by providing, to the best of our knowledge, the first well-posedness result for a class of infinite-dimensional linear FBSEEs, for which only mild solutions exist, over arbitrary finite time horizons.

math.OC

Simultaneously Solving Infinitely Many LQ Mean Field Games In Hilbert Spaces: The Power of Neural Operators

Traditional mean-field game (MFG) solvers operate on an instance-by-instance basis, which becomes infeasible when many related problems must be solved (e.g., for seeking a robust description of the solution under perturbations of the dynamics or utilities, or in settings involving continuum-parameterized agents.). We overcome this by training neural operators (NOs) to learn the rules-to-equilibrium map from the problem data (``rules'': dynamics and cost functionals) of LQ MFGs defined on separable Hilbert spaces to the corresponding equilibrium strategy. Our main result is a statistical guarantee: an NO trained on a small number of randomly sampled rules reliably solves unseen LQ MFG variants, even in infinite-dimensional settings. The number of NO parameters needed remains controlled under appropriate rule sampling during training. Our guarantee follows from three results: (i) local-Lipschitz estimates for the highly nonlinear rules-to-equilibrium map; (ii) a universal approximation theorem using NOs with a prespecified Lipschitz regularity (unlike traditional NO results where the NO's Lipschitz constant can diverge as the approximation error vanishes); and (iii) new sample-complexity bounds for $L$-Lipschitz learners in infinite dimensions, directly applicable as the Lipschitz constants of our approximating NOs are controlled in (ii).

math.OC

Hilbert Space-Valued LQ Mean Field Games: An Infinite-Dimensional Analysis

This paper presents a comprehensive study of linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field games (MFGs) in Hilbert spaces, generalizing the classic LQ MFG theory to scenarios involving $N$ agents with dynamics governed by infinite-dimensional stochastic equations. In this framework, both state and control processes of each agent take values in separable Hilbert spaces. All agents are coupled through the average state of the population which appears in their linear dynamics and quadratic cost functional. Specifically, the dynamics of each agent incorporates an infinite-dimensional noise, namely a $Q$-Wiener process, and an unbounded operator. The diffusion coefficient of each agent is stochastic involving the state, control, and average state processes. We first study the well-posedness of a system of $N$ coupled semilinear infinite-dimensional stochastic evolution equations establishing the foundation of MFGs in Hilbert spaces. We then specialize to $N$-player LQ games described above and study the asymptotic behaviour as the number of agents, $N$, approaches infinity. We develop an infinite-dimensional variant of the Nash Certainty Equivalence principle and characterize a unique Nash equilibrium for the limiting MFG. Finally, we study the connections between the $N$-player game and the limiting MFG, demonstrating that the empirical average state converges to the mean field and that the resulting limiting best-response strategies form an $ε$-Nash equilibrium for the $N$-player game in Hilbert spaces.

math.OC

Ranking Quantilized Mean-Field Games with an Application to Early-Stage Venture Investments

Quantilized mean-field game models involve quantiles of the population's distribution. We study a class of such games with a capacity for ranking games, where the performance of each agent is evaluated based on its terminal state relative to the population's $\alpha$-quantile value, $\alpha \in (0,1)$. This evaluation criterion is designed to select the top $(1-\alpha)\%$ performing agents. We provide two formulations for this competition: a target-based formulation and a threshold-based formulation. In the former and latter formulations, to satisfy the selection condition, each agent aims for its terminal state to be \textit{exactly} equal and \textit{at least} equal to the population's $\alpha$-quantile value, respectively. For the target-based formulation, we obtain an analytic solution and demonstrate the $\epsilon$-Nash property for the asymptotic best-response strategies in the $N$-player game. Specifically, the quantilized mean-field consistency condition is expressed as a set of forward-backward ordinary differential equations, characterizing the $\alpha$-quantile value at equilibrium. For the threshold-based formulation, we obtain a semi-explicit solution and numerically solve the resulting quantilized mean-field consistency condition. Subsequently, we propose a new application in the context of early-stage venture investments, where a venture capital firm financially supports a group of start-up companies engaged in a competition over a finite time horizon, with the goal of selecting a percentage of top-ranking ones to receive the next round of funding at the end of the time horizon. We present the results and interpretations of a set of numerical experiments for both formulations discussed in this context, which illustrate that the target-based formulation closely approximates the threshold-based formulation in the scenarios considered.

math.OC

Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model

This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small banks. Using the mean-field game methodology and convex analysis, best-response trading strategies are derived, leading to an approximate equilibrium for the interbank market. We investigate the influence of the large bank on the market stability by examining individual default probabilities and systemic risk, through the use of Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings reveal that, when the size of the major bank is not excessively large, it can positively contribute to market stability. However, there is also the potential for negative spillover effects in the event of default, leading to an increase in systemic risk. The magnitude of this impact is further influenced by the size and trading rate of the major bank. Overall, this study provides valuable insights into the management of systemic risk in interbank markets.

q-fin.MF

LQG Risk-Sensitive Single-Agent and Major-Minor Mean-Field Game Systems: A Variational Framework

We develop a variational approach to address risk-sensitive optimal control problems with an exponential-of-integral cost functional in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) single-agent setup, offering new insights into such problems. Our analysis leads to the derivation of a nonlinear necessary and sufficient condition of optimality, expressed in terms of martingale processes. Subject to specific conditions, we find an equivalent risk-neutral measure, under which a linear state feedback form can be obtained for the optimal control. It is then shown that the obtained feedback control is consistent with the imposed condition and remains optimal under the original measure. Building upon this development, we (i) propose a variational framework for general LQG risk-sensitive mean-field games (MFGs) and (ii) advance the LQG risk-sensitive MFG theory by incorporating a major agent in the framework. The major agent interacts with a large number of minor agents, and unlike the minor agents, its influence on the system remains significant even with an increasing number of minor agents. We derive the Markovian closed-loop best-response strategies of agents in the limiting case where the number of agents goes to infinity. We establish that the set of obtained best-response strategies yields a Nash equilibrium in the limiting case and an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the finite-player case.

math.OC

Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games with Common Noise: A Theoretical Study with Applications to Interbank Markets

In this paper, we address linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) risk-sensitive mean field games (MFGs) with common noise. In this framework agents are exposed to a common noise and aim to minimize an exponential cost functional that reflects their risk sensitivity. We leverage the convex analysis method to derive the optimal strategies of agents in the limit as the number of agents goes to infinity. These strategies yield a Nash equilibrium for the limiting model. The model is then applied to interbank markets, focusing on optimizing lending and borrowing activities to assess systemic and individual bank risks when reserves drop below a critical threshold. We employ Fokker-Planck equations and the first hitting time method to formulate the overall probability of a bank or market default. We observe that the risk-averse behavior of agents reduces the probability of individual defaults and systemic risk, enhancing the resilience of the financial system. Adopting a similar approach based on stochastic Fokker-Planck equations, we further expand our analysis to investigate the conditional probabilities of individual default under specific trajectories of the common market shock.

math.OC

LQG Mean Field Games with a Major Agent: Nash Certainty Equivalence versus Probabilistic Approach

Mean field game (MFG) systems consisting of a major agent and a large number of minor agents were introduced in (Huang, 2010) in an LQG setup. The Nash certainty equivalence was used to obtain a Markovian closed-loop Nash equilibrium for the limiting system when the number of minor agents tends to infinity. In the past years several approaches to major--minor mean field game problems have been developed, principally (i) the Nash certainty equivalence and analytic approach, (ii) master equations, (iii) asymptotic solvability, and (iv) the probabilistic approach. For the LQG case, the recent work (Huang, 2021) establishes the equivalency of the Markovian closed-loop Nash equilibrium obtained via (i) with those obtained via (ii) and (iii). In this work, we demonstrate that the Markovian closed-loop Nash equilibrium of (i) is equivalent to that of (iv) for the LQG case. These two studies answer the long-standing questions about the consistency of the solutions to major-minor LQG MFG systems derived using different approaches.

math.OC

Principal agent mean field games in REC markets

Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field canonically considers a single agent, the situation where multiple agents, or even an infinite amount of agents are contracted by a principal are growing in prominence and pose interesting and realistic problems. Here, agents form a Nash equilibrium among themselves, and a Stackelberg equilibrium between themselves as a collective and the principal. We apply this framework to the problem of implementing Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) markets, where the principal requires regulated firms (power generators) to pay a non-compliance penalty which is inversely proportional to the amount of RECs they have. RECs can be obtained by generating electricity from clean sources or purchasing on the market. The agents react to this penalty and optimize their behaviours to navigate the system at minimum cost. In the agents' model we incorporate market clearing as well as agent heterogeneity. For a given market design, we find the Nash equilibrium among agents using techniques from mean field games. We then use techniques from extended McKean-Vlasov control problems to solve the principal (regulators) problem, who aim to choose the penalty function in such a way that balances environmental and revenue impacts optimally. We find through these techniques that the optimal penalty function is linear in the agents' state, suggesting the optimal emissions regulation market is more akin to a tax or rebate, regardless of the principal's utility function.

q-fin.MF

Exploratory LQG Mean Field Games with Entropy Regularization

We study a general class of entropy-regularized multi-variate LQG mean field games (MFGs) in continuous time with $K$ distinct sub-population of agents. We extend the notion of actions to action distributions (exploratory actions), and explicitly derive the optimal action distributions for individual agents in the limiting MFG. We demonstrate that the optimal set of action distributions yields an $ε$-Nash equilibrium for the finite-population entropy-regularized MFG. Furthermore, we compare the resulting solutions with those of classical LQG MFGs and establish the equivalence of their existence.

math.OC

A Mean-Field Game Approach to Equilibrium Pricing in Solar Renewable Energy Certificate Markets

Solar Renewable Energy Certificate (SREC) markets are a market-based system that incentivizes solar energy generation. A regulatory body imposes a lower bound on the amount of energy each regulated firm must generate via solar means, providing them with a tradeable certificate for each MWh generated. Firms seek to navigate the market optimally by modulating their SREC generation and trading rates. As such, the SREC market can be viewed as a stochastic game, where agents interact through the SREC price. We study this stochastic game by solving the mean-field game (MFG) limit with sub-populations of heterogeneous agents. Market participants optimize costs accounting for trading frictions, cost of generation, non-linear non-compliance costs, and generation uncertainty. Moreover, we endogenize SREC price through market clearing. We characterize firms' optimal controls as the solution of McKean-Vlasov (MV) FBSDEs and determine the equilibrium SREC price. We establish the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this MV-FBSDE, and prove that the MFG strategies form an $ε$-Nash equilibrium for the finite player game. Finally, we develop a numerical scheme for solving the MV-FBSDEs and conduct a simulation study.

q-fin.MF

Convex Analysis for LQG Systems with Applications to Major Minor LQG Mean-Field Game Systems

We develop a convex analysis approach for solving LQG optimal control problems and apply it to major-minor (MM) LQG mean-field game (MFG) systems. The approach retrieves the best response strategies for the major agent and all minor agents that attain an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium. An important and distinctive advantage to this approach is that unlike the classical approach in the literature, we are able to avoid imposing assumptions on the evolution of the mean-field. In particular, this provides a tool for dealing with complex and non-standard systems.

eess.SY

$\epsilon$-Nash Equilibria for Major Minor LQG Mean Field Games with Partial Observations of All Agents

The partially observed major minor LQG and nonlinear mean field game (PO MM LQG MFG) systems where it is assumed the major agent's state is partially observed by each minor agent, and the major agent completely observes its own state have been analysed in the literature. In this paper, PO MM LQG MFG problems with general information patterns are studied where (i) the major agent has partial observations of its own state, and (ii) each minor agent has partial observations of its own state and the major agent's state. The assumption of partial observations by all agents leads to a new situation involving the recursive estimation by each minor agent of the major agent's estimate of its own state. For a general case of indefinite LQG MFG systems, the existence of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibria together with the individual agents' control laws yielding the equilibria are established via the Separation Principle.

math.OC

A Class of Hybrid LQG Mean Field Games with State-Invariant Switching and Stopping Strategies

A novel framework is presented that combines Mean Field Game (MFG) theory and Hybrid Optimal Control (HOC) theory to obtain a unique $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for a non-cooperative game with switching and stopping times. We consider the case where there exists one major agent with a significant influence on the system together with a large number of minor agents constituting two subpopulations, each agent with individually asymptotically negligible effect on the whole system. Each agent has stochastic linear dynamics with quadratic costs, and the agents are coupled in their dynamics and costs by the average state of minor agents (i.e. the empirical mean field). It is shown that for a class of Hybrid LQG MFGs, the optimal switching and stopping times are state-invariant and only depend on the dynamical parameters of each agent. Accordingly, a hybrid systems formulation of the game is presented via the indexing by discrete events: (i) the switching of the major agent between alternative dynamics or (ii) the termination of the agents' trajectories in one or both of the subpopulations of minor agents. Optimal switchings and stopping time strategies together with best response control actions for, respectively, the major agent and all minor agents are established with respect to their individual cost criteria by an application of Hybrid LQG MFG theory.

eess.SY

Mean Field Game Systems with Common Noise and Markovian Latent Processes

In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii) systemic risk induced through inter-bank lending/borrowing. Moreover, agents' actions often affect the environment, and some agent's may be small while others large. Hence sub-population of agents may act as minor agents, while another class may act as major agents. To capture the essence of such problems, here, we introduce a general class of non-cooperative heterogeneous stochastic games with one major agent and a large population of minor agents where agents interact with an observed common process impacted by the mean field. A latent Markov chain and a latent Wiener process (common noise) modulate the common process, and agents cannot observe them. We use filtering techniques coupled with a convex analysis approach to (i) solve the mean field game limit of the problem, (ii) demonstrate that the best response strategies generate an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for finite populations, and (iii) obtain explicit characterisations of the best response strategies.

math.OC