arXiv subjects

Dennis Dieks

Publications and source records attributed to Dennis Dieks.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2022

Identical Particles in Quantum Mechanics: Against the Received View

According to the Received View identical quantum particles are a previously unknown kind of objects that do not possess individuality. In this Chapter we discuss this view, criticize it, and propose an alternative. According to this alternative view so-called identical quantum particles should in many cases not be seen as objects (particles) at all. However, there are situations in which a particle picture does become applicable. But the particles that emerge in these cases are distinguishable individuals, unlike the particles of the Received View.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2022

Perspectival Quantum Realism

The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a \emph{perspectival quantum realism}. According to this perspectivalism (close to the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics) objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner's friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of \emph{fragmentalism}.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2019

Quantum Reality, Perspectivalism and Covariance

Paul Busch has emphasized on various occasions the importance for physics of going beyond a merely instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. Even if we cannot be sure that any particular realist interpretation describes the world as it actually is, the investigation of possible realist interpretations helps us to develop new physical ideas and better intuitions about the nature of physical objects at the micro level. In this spirit, Paul Busch himself pioneered the concept of ``unsharp quantum reality'', according to which there is an objective non-classical indeterminacy---a lack of sharpness---in the properties of individual quantum systems. We concur with Busch's motivation for investigating realist interpretations of quantum mechanics and with his willingness to move away from classical intuitions. In this article we try to take some further steps on this road. In particular, we pay attention to a number of \textit{prima facie} implausible and counter-intuitive aspects of realist interpretations of unitary quantum mechanics. We shall argue that from a realist viewpoint, quantum contextuality naturally leads to ``perspectivalism'' with respect to properties of spatially extended quantum systems, and that this perspectivalism is important for making relativistic covariance possible.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2019

Identical quantum particles as distinguishable objects

According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the assumption (``factorism'') that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particles system. Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible with the everyday meaning of ``particle'', and also with how this term is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible. Earlier we have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but \emph{emergent}. However, in those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum particles---identical or not---are distinguishable in the same way as classical particles.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2019

Quantum Mechanics and Perspectivalism

Experimental evidene of the last decades has made the status of "collapses of the wave function" even more shaky than it already was on conceptual grounds: interference effects turn out to be detectable even when collapses are typically expected to occur. Non-collapse interpretations should consequently be taken seriously. In this paper we argue that such interpretations suggest a perspectivalism according to which quantum objects are not characterized by monadic properties, but by relations to other systems. Accordingly, physical systems may possess different properties with respect to different "reference systems". We discuss some of the relevant arguments, and argue that perspectivalism both evades recent arguments that single-world interpretations are inconsistent and eliminates the need for a privileged rest frame in the relativistic case.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2018

Time Coordinates and Clocks: Einstein's Struggle

In his Autobiographical Notes, Einstein mentioned that on his road to the final theory of general relativity it was a major difficulty to accustom himself to the idea that coordinates need not possess an immediate physical meaning in terms of lengths and times. This appears strange: that coordinates are conventional markers of events seems an obvious fact, already familiar from pre-relativistic physics. In this paper we explore the background of Einsteins difficulties, going from his 1905 paper on special relativity, through his 1907 and 1911 papers on the consequences of the equivalence principle, to the 1916 review paper on the general theory. As we shall argue, Einstein's problems were intimately connected to his early methodology, in which clarity achieved by concrete physical pictures played an essential role; and to the related fact that on his route to the general theory he focused on special situations that were easily accessible to physical intuition. The details of this background of Einstein's early reasoning have not always been sufficiently appreciated in modern commentaries. As we shall see, this has led to erroneous judgments about the status and validity of some of the early relativistic derivations by Einstein and others, in particular concerning the gravitational redshift.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2018

Von Neumann's Impossibility Proof: Mathematics in the Service of Rhetorics

According to what has become a standard history of quantum mechanics, in 1932 von Neumann persuaded the physics community that hidden variables are impossible as a matter of principle, after which leading proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation put the situation to good use by arguing that the completeness of quantum mechanics was undeniable. This state of affairs lasted, so the story continues, until Bell in 1966 exposed von Neumann's proof as obviously wrong. The realization that von Neumann's proof was fallacious then rehabilitated hidden variables and made serious foundational research possible again. It is often added in recent accounts that von Neumann's error had been spotted almost immediately by Grete Hermann, but that her discovery was of no effect due to the dominant Copenhagen Zeitgeist. We shall attempt to tell a story that is more historically accurate and less ideologically charged. Most importantly, von Neumann never claimed to have shown the impossibility of hidden variables tout court, but argued that hidden-variable theories must possess a structure that deviates fundamentally from that of quantum mechanics. Both Hermann and Bell appear to have missed this point, moreover, both raised unjustified technical objections to the proof. Von Neumann's argument was basically that hidden-variables schemes must violate the "quantum principle" that physical quantities are to be represented by operators in a Hilbert space. As a consequence, hidden-variables schemes, though possible in principle, necessarily exhibit a certain kind of contextuality.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2017

Is Time Travel Too Strange to Be Possible? Determinism and Indeterminism on Closed Timelike Curves

Notoriously, the Einstein equations of general relativity have solutions in which closed timelike curves (CTCs) occur. On these curves time loops back onto itself, which has exotic consequences. However, in order to make time travel stories consistent constraints have to be satisfied, which prevents seemingly ordinary and plausible processes from occurring. This, and several other "unphysical" features, have motivated many authors to exclude solutions with CTCs from consideration, e.g. by conjecturing a chronology protection law. In this contribution we shall investigate the nature of one particular class of exotic consequences of CTCs, namely those involving unexpected cases of indeterminism or determinism. Indeterminism arises even against the backdrop of the usual deterministic physical theories when CTCs do not cross spacelike hypersurfaces outside of a limited CTC-region (such hypersurfaces fail to be Cauchy surfaces). By contrast, a certain kind of determinism appears to arise when an indeterministic theory is applied on a CTC: things cannot be different from what they already were. We shall argue that on further consideration both this indeterminism and determinism on CTCs turn out to possess analogues in other, familiar areas of physics. CTC-indeterminism is close to the epistemological indeterminism we know from statistical physics, while the "fixedness" typical of CTC-determinism is pervasive in physics. CTC-determinism and CTC-indeterminism therefore do not provide incontrovertible grounds for rejecting CTCs as conceptually inadmissible.

gr-qc↗

arXiv2015

Emergence in Holographic Scenarios for Gravity

'Holographic' relations between theories have become an important theme in quantum gravity research. These relations entail that a theory without gravity is equivalent to a gravitational theory with an extra spatial dimension. The idea of holography was first proposed in 1993 by Gerard 't Hooft on the basis of his studies of evaporating black holes. Soon afterwards the holographic 'AdS/CFT' duality was introduced, which since has been intensively studied in the string theory community and beyond. Recently, Erik Verlinde has proposed that even Newton's law of gravitation can be related holographically to the `thermodynamics of information' on screens. We discuss these scenarios, with special attention to the status of the holographic relation in them and to the question of whether they make gravity and spacetime emergent. We conclude that only Verlinde's scheme straightfowardly instantiates emergence. However, assuming a non-standard interpretation of AdS/CFT may create room for the emergence of spacetime and gravity there as well.

hep-th↗

arXiv2014

The Logic of Identity: Distinguishability and Indistinguishability in Classical and Quantum Physics

The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a quantum connection stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2013

Reichenbach's Transcendental Probability

The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the Neo-Kantian justification for the application of probabilistic concepts in physics that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career, notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this Kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with Reichenbach's later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach's thought: typical features of his early Kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2012

Is There a Unique Physical Entropy? Micro versus Macro

Entropy in thermodynamics is an extensive quantity, whereas standard methods in statistical mechanics give rise to a non-extensive expression for the entropy. This discrepancy is often seen as a sign that basic formulas of statistical mechanics should be revised, either on the basis of quantum mechanics or on the basis of general and fundamental considerations about the (in)distinguishability of particles. In this article we argue against this response. We show that both the extensive thermodynamic and the non-extensive statistical entropy are perfectly alright within their own fields of application. Changes in the statistical formulas that remove the discrepancy must be seen as motivated by pragmatic reasons (conventions) rather than as justified by basic arguments about particle statistics.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2011

The Gibbs Paradox and the Distinguishability of Identical Particles

Identical classical particles are distinguishable. This distinguishability affects the number of ways W a macrostate can be realized on the micro-level, and from the relation S = k ln W leads to a non-extensive expression for the entropy. This result is usually considered incorrect because of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency that identical particles are fundamentally indistinguishable after all; and even that quantum mechanics is indispensable for making sense of this. In contrast, we argue that the classical statistics of distinguishable particles and the resulting non-extensive entropy function are perfectly acceptable from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. The inconsistency with thermodynamics can be removed by taking into account that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not completely identical to the thermodynamical one. We observe that even identical quantum particles are in some cases distinguishable, and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs paradox.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2010

The Gibbs Paradox Revisited

The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2010

How Classical Particles Emerge From the Quantum World

The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that \emph{quantum particles} of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state--in clear conflict with what we know about classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles \emph{emerge}, as new entities that do not correspond to the "particle indices" defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to \emph{particles}, as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether the discussions about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided from the very start.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2010

Space, Time and Coordinates in a Rotating World

The peculiarities of rotating frames of reference played an important role in the genesis of general relativity. Considering them, Einstein became convinced that coordinates have a different status in the general theory of relativity than in the special theory. This line of thinking was confused, however. To clarify the situation we investigate the relation between coordinates and the results of space-time measurements in rotating reference frames. We argue that the difference between rotating systems (or accelerating systems in general) and inertial systems does not lie in a different status of the coordinates (which are conventional in all cases), but rather in different global chronogeometric properties of the various reference frames. In the course of our discussion we comment on a number of related issues, such as the question of whether a consideration of the behavior of rods and clocks is indispensable for the foundation of kinematics, the influence of acceleration on the behavior of measuring devices, the conventionality of simultaneity, and the Ehrenfest paradox.

physics.class-ph↗

arXiv2007

Complementarity in the Bohr-Einstein Photon Box

The photon box thought experiment can be considered a forerunner of the EPR-experiment: by performing suitable measurements on the box it is possible to ``prepare'' the photon, long after it has escaped, in either of two complementary states. Consistency requires that the corresponding box measurements be complementary as well. At first sight it seems, however, that these measurements can be jointly performed with arbitrary precision: they pertain to different systems (the center of mass of the box and an internal clock, respectively). But this is deceptive. As we show by explicit calculation, although the relevant quantities are simultaneously measurable, they develop non-vanishing commutators when calculated back to the time of escape of the photon. This justifies Bohr's qualitative arguments in a precise way; and it illustrates how the details of the dynamics conspire to guarantee the requirements of complementarity. In addition, our calculations exhibit a ``fine structure'' in the distribution of the uncertainties over the complementary quantities: depending on \textit{when} the box measurement is performed, the resulting quantum description of the photon differs. This brings us close to the argumentation of the later EPR thought experiment.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2007

Complementarity in the Einstein-Bohr Photon Box

The photon box thought experiment can be considered a forerunner of the EPR-experiment: by performing suitable measurements on the box it is possible to ``prepare'' the photon, long after it has escaped, in either of two complementary states. Consistency requires that the corresponding box measurements be complementary as well. At first sight it seems, however, that these measurements can be jointly performed with arbitrary precision: they pertain to different systems (the center of mass of the box and an internal clock, respectively). But this is deceptive. As we show by explicit calculation, although the relevant quantities are simultaneously measurable, they develop non-vanishing commutators when calculated back to the time of escape of the photon. This justifies Bohr's qualitative arguments in a precise way; and it illustrates how the details of the dynamics conspire to guarantee the requirements of complementarity. In addition, our calculations exhibit a ``fine structure'' in the distribution of the uncertainties over the complementary quantities: depending on when the box measurement is performed, the resulting quantum description of the photon differs. This brings us close to the argumentation of the later EPR thought experiment.

quant-ph↗