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Devendra Shelar

Publications and source records attributed to Devendra Shelar.

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Evaluating Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks via A Modification of Generalized Benders Decomposition Method

This paper presents a computational approach to evaluate the resilience of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) to cyber-physical failures. In our model, we consider an attacker who targets multiple DN components to maximize the loss of the DN operator. We consider two types of operator response: (i) Coordinated emergency response; (ii) Uncoordinated autonomous disconnects, which may lead to cascading failures. To evaluate resilience under response (i), we solve a Bilevel Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program which is computationally challenging due to mixed-integer variables in the inner problem and non-convex constraints. Our solution approach is based on the Generalized Benders Decomposition method, which achieves a reasonable tradeoff between computational time and solution accuracy. Our approach involves modifying the Benders cut based on structural insights on power flow over radial DNs. We evaluate DN resilience under response (ii) by sequentially computing autonomous component disconnects due to operating bound violations resulting from the initial attack and the potential cascading failures. Our approach helps estimate the gain in resilience under response (i), relative to (ii).

math.OC

Stochastic Resource Allocation for Electricity Distribution Network Resilience

In recent years, it has become crucial to improve the resilience of electricity distribution networks (DNs) against storm-induced failures. Microgrids enabled by Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) can significantly help speed up re-energization of loads, particularly in the complete absence of bulk power supply. We describe an integrated approach which considers a pre-storm DER allocation problem under the uncertainty of failure scenarios as well as a post-storm dispatch problem in microgrids during the multi-period repair of the failed components. This problem is computationally challenging because the number of scenarios (resp. binary variables) increases exponentially (resp. quadratically) in the network size. Our overall solution approach for solving the resulting two-stage mixed-integer linear program (MILP) involves implementing the sample average approximation (SAA) method and Benders Decomposition. Additionally, we implement a greedy approach to reduce the computational time requirements of the post-storm repair scheduling and dispatch problem. The optimality of the resulting solution is evaluated on a modified IEEE 36-node network.

eess.SY

Resilience of Electricity Distribution Networks - Part II: Leveraging Microgrids

Advances in microgrids powered by Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) make them an attractive response capability for improving the resilience of electricity distribution networks (DNs). This paper presents an approach to evaluate the value of implementing a timely response using microgrid operations and DER dispatch in the aftermath of a disruption event, involving strategic compromise of multiple DN components. Firstly, we extend the resiliency assessment framework in [1] and develop a sequential (bilevel) model of attacker-operator interactions on a radial DN with one or more microgrids. Particularly, the operator response includes microgrid operations under various islanding configurations (regimes), and single- or multi-master operation of DERs in providing grid-forming services as well as frequency and voltage regulation. Secondly, we introduce a restoration problem in which the operator gradually reconnects the disrupted components over multiple periods to restore the nominal performance of the DN. The first problem, formulated as a bilevel mixed-integer problem, is solved using a Benders decomposition method. The second problem, formulated as a multi-period mixed-integer problem, can be solved using a greedy algorithm. Our results illustrate the benefit of using microgrids in reducing the operator's losses, both immediately after the disruption event and during the restoration process.

math.OC

DER Allocation and Line Repair Scheduling for Storm-induced Failures in Distribution Networks

Electricity distribution networks (DNs) in many regions are increasingly subjected to disruptions caused by tropical storms. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) can act as temporary supply sources to sustain "microgrids" resulting from disruptions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of suitable DER allocation to facilitate more efficient repair operations and faster recovery. First, we estimate the failure probabilities of DN components (lines) using a stochastic model of line failures which parametrically depends on the location-specific storm wind field. Next, we formulate a two-stage stochastic mixed integer program, which models the distribution utility's decision to allocate DERs in the DN (pre-storm stage); and accounts for multi-period decisions on optimal dispatch and line repair scheduling (post-storm stage). A key feature of this formulation is that it jointly optimizes electricity dispatch within the individual microgrids and the line repair schedules to minimize the sum of the cost of DER allocation and cost due to lost load. To illustrate our approach, we use the sample average approximation method to solve our problem for a small-size DN under different storm intensities and DER/crew constraints.

cs.CE

Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution Networks under DER Node Compromises

This article focuses on the security assessment of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) with vulnerable Distributed Energy Resource (DER) nodes. The adversary model is simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic manipulation of generation set-points. The loss to the defender (DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused by the attack. A 3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects false generation set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving this trilevel optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge, the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based on linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes and the set-point manipulations characterizing the optimal attack strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to compute attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal security investment and defender response in pre- and post-attack conditions, respectively.

math.OC