Fragments of Some Subintuitionistic Logics
In this article we determine the implicational fragments of most of the known subintuitionistic logics.
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arXiv subjects
Dick de Jongh
Publications and source records attributed to Dick de Jongh.
NNIL-formulas revisited: universal models and finite model property
NNIL-formulas, introduced by Visser in 1983-1984 in a study of $Σ_1$-subsitutions in Heyting Arithmetic, are intuitionistic propositional formulas that does not allow nesting of implication to the left. The first results about these formulas were obtained in a paper of 1995 by Visser et al. In particular, it was shown that NNIL-formulas are exactly the formulas preserved under taking submodels of Kripke models. Recently Bezhanishvili and de Jongh observed that NNIL-formulas are also reflected by color-preserving monotonic maps of Kripke models. In the present paper, we first show how this observation leads to the conclusion that NNIL-formulas are preserved by arbitrary substructures not necessarily satisfying the topo-subframe condition. Then we apply it to construct universal models for NNIL. It follows from the properties of these universal models that NNIL-formulas are also exactly the formulas that are reflected by color-preserving monotonic maps. By using the method developed in constructing the universal models, we give a new direct proof that the logics axiomatized by NNIL-axioms have the finite model property.
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Interpretability in PRA
In this paper from 2009 we study IL(PRA), the interpretability logic of PRA. As PRA is neither an essentially reflexive theory nor finitely axiomatizable, the two known arithmetical completeness results do not apply to PRA: IL(PRA) is not ILM or ILP. IL(PRA) does of course contain all the principles known to be part of IL(All), the interpretability logic of the principles common to all reasonable arithmetical theories. In this paper, we take two arithmetical properties of PRA and see what their consequences in the modal logic IL(PRA) are. These properties are reflected in the so-called Beklemishev Principle B, and Zambella's Principle Z, neither of which is a part of IL(All). Both principles and their interrelation are submitted to a modal study. In particular, we prove a frame condition for B. Moreover, we prove that Z follows from a restricted form of B. Finally, we give an overview of the known relationships of IL(PRA) to important other interpetability principles.
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A Study of Subminimal Logics of Negation and their Modal Companions
We study propositional logical systems arising from the language of Johansson's minimal logic and obtained by weakening the requirements for the negation operator. We present their semantics as a variant of neighbourhood semantics. We use duality and completeness results to show that there are uncountably many subminimal logics. We also give model-theoretic and algebraic definitions of filtration for minimal logic and show that they are dual to each other. These constructions ensure that the propositional minimal logic has the finite model property. Finally, we define and investigate bi-modal companions with non-normal modal operators for some relevant subminimal systems, and give infinite axiomatizations for these bi-modal companions.
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Duality and universal models for the meet-implication fragment of IPC
In this paper we investigate the fragment of intuitionistic logic which only uses conjunction (meet) and implication, using finite duality for distributive lattices and universal models. We give a description of the finitely generated universal models of this fragment and give a complete characterization of the up-sets of Kripke models of intuitionistic logic which can be defined by meet-implication-formulas. We use these results to derive a new version of subframe formulas for intuitionistic logic and to show that the uniform interpolants of meet-implication-formulas are not necessarily uniform interpolants in the full intuitionistic logic.
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Characterization of Strongly Equivalent Logic Programs in Intermediate Logics
The non-classical, nonmonotonic inference relation associated with the answer set semantics for logic programs gives rise to a relationship of 'strong equivalence' between logical programs that can be verified in 3-valued Goedel logic, G3, the strongest non-classical intermediate propositional logic (Lifschitz, Pearce and Valverde, 2001). In this paper we will show that KC (the logic obtained by adding axiom ~A v ~~A to intuitionistic logic), is the weakest intermediate logic for which strongly equivalent logic programs, in a language allowing negations, are logically equivalent.
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