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Didem Demirag

Publications and source records attributed to Didem Demirag.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Robust Federated Learning via Byzantine Filtering over Encrypted Updates

Federated Learning (FL) aims to train a collaborative model while preserving data privacy. However, the distributed nature of this approach still raises privacy and security issues, such as the exposure of sensitive data due to inference attacks and the influence of Byzantine behaviors on the trained model. In particular, achieving both secure aggregation and Byzantine resilience remains challenging, as existing solutions often address these aspects independently. In this work, we propose to address these challenges through a novel approach that combines homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving aggregation with property-inference-inspired meta-classifiers for Byzantine filtering. First, following the property-inference attacks blueprint, we train a set of filtering meta-classifiers on labeled shadow updates, reproducing a diverse ensemble of Byzantine misbehaviors in FL, including backdoor, gradient-inversion, label-flipping and shuffling attacks. The outputs of these meta-classifiers are then used to cancel the Byzantine encrypted updates by reweighting. Second, we propose an automated method for selecting the optimal kernel and the dimensionality hyperparameters with respect to homomorphic inference, aggregation constraints and efficiency over the CKKS cryptosystem. Finally, we demonstrate through extensive experiments the effectiveness of our approach against Byzantine participants on the FEMNIST, CIFAR10, GTSRB, and acsincome benchmarks. More precisely, our SVM filtering achieves accuracies between $90$% and $94$% for identifying Byzantine updates at the cost of marginal losses in model utility and encrypted inference runtimes ranging from $6$ to $24$ seconds and from $9$ to $26$ seconds for an overall aggregation.

cs.LG

Privacy-Preserving Link Prediction

Consider two data holders, ABC and XYZ, with graph data (e.g., social networks, e-commerce, telecommunication, and bio-informatics). ABC can see that node A is linked to node B, and XYZ can see node B is linked to node C. Node B is the common neighbour of A and C but neither network can discover this fact on their own. In this paper, we provide a two party computation that ABC and XYZ can run to discover the common neighbours in the union of their graph data, however neither party has to reveal their plaintext graph to the other. Based on private set intersection, we implement our solution, provide measurements, and quantify partial leaks of privacy. We also propose a heavyweight solution that leaks zero information based on additively homomorphic encryption.

cs.CR

Tracking the Invisible: Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing to Control the Spread of a Virus

Today, tracking and controlling the spread of a virus is a crucial need for almost all countries. Doing this early would save millions of lives and help countries keep a stable economy. The easiest way to control the spread of a virus is to immediately inform the individuals who recently had close contact with the diagnosed patients. However, to achieve this, a centralized authority (e.g., a health authority) needs detailed location information from both healthy individuals and diagnosed patients. Thus, such an approach, although beneficial to control the spread of a virus, results in serious privacy concerns, and hence privacy-preserving solutions are required to solve this problem. Previous works on this topic either (i) compromise privacy (especially privacy of diagnosed patients) to have better efficiency or (ii) provide unscalable solutions. In this work, we propose a technique based on private set intersection between physical contact histories of individuals (that are recorded using smart phones) and a centralized database (run by a health authority) that keeps the identities of the positive diagnosed patients for the disease. Proposed solution protects the location privacy of both healthy individuals and diagnosed patients and it guarantees that the identities of the diagnosed patients remain hidden from other individuals. Notably, proposed scheme allows individuals to receive warning messages indicating their previous contacts with a positive diagnosed patient. Such warning messages will help them realize the risk and isolate themselves from other people. We make sure that the warning messages are only observed by the corresponding individuals and not by the health authority. We also implement the proposed scheme and show its efficiency and scalability via simulations.

cs.CR

One-Time Programs made Practical

A one-time program (OTP) works as follows: Alice provides Bob with the implementation of some function. Bob can have the function evaluated exclusively on a single input of his choosing. Once executed, the program will fail to evaluate on any other input. State-of-the-art one-time programs have remained theoretical, requiring custom hardware that is cost-ineffective/unavailable, or confined to adhoc/unrealistic assumptions. To bridge this gap, we explore how the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of modern CPUs can realize the OTP functionality. Specifically, we build two flavours of such a system: in the first, the TEE directly enforces the one-timeness of the program; in the second, the program is represented with a garbled circuit and the TEE ensures Bob's input can only be wired into the circuit once, equivalent to a smaller cryptographic primitive called one-time memory. These have different performance profiles: the first is best when Alice's input is small and Bob's is large, and the second for the converse.

cs.CR