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Didier Dubois

Publications and source records attributed to Didier Dubois.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2023

An elementary belief function logic

Non-additive uncertainty theories, typically possibility theory, belief functions and imprecise probabilities share a common feature with modal logic: the duality properties between possibility and necessity measures, belief and plausibility functions as well as between upper and lower probabilities extend the duality between possibility and necessity modalities to the graded environment. It has been shown that the all-or-nothing version of possibility theory can be exactly captured by a minimal epistemic logic (MEL) that uses a very small fragment of the KD modal logic, without resorting to relational semantics. Besides, the case of belief functions has been studied independently, and a belief function logic has been obtained by extending the modal logic S5 to graded modalities using Łukasiewicz logic, albeit using relational semantics. This paper shows that a simpler belief function logic can be devised by adding Łukasiewicz logic on top of MEL. It allows for a more natural semantics in terms of Shafer basic probability assignments.

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arXiv2019

From Shallow to Deep Interactions Between Knowledge Representation, Reasoning and Machine Learning (Kay R. Amel group)

This paper proposes a tentative and original survey of meeting points between Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KRR) and Machine Learning (ML), two areas which have been developing quite separately in the last three decades. Some common concerns are identified and discussed such as the types of used representation, the roles of knowledge and data, the lack or the excess of information, or the need for explanations and causal understanding. Then some methodologies combining reasoning and learning are reviewed (such as inductive logic programming, neuro-symbolic reasoning, formal concept analysis, rule-based representations and ML, uncertainty in ML, or case-based reasoning and analogical reasoning), before discussing examples of synergies between KRR and ML (including topics such as belief functions on regression, EM algorithm versus revision, the semantic description of vector representations, the combination of deep learning with high level inference, knowledge graph completion, declarative frameworks for data mining, or preferences and recommendation). This paper is the first step of a work in progress aiming at a better mutual understanding of research in KRR and ML, and how they could cooperate.

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arXiv2014

On the Qualitative Comparison of Decisions Having Positive and Negative Features

Making a decision is often a matter of listing and comparing positive and negative arguments. In such cases, the evaluation scale for decisions should be considered bipolar, that is, negative and positive values should be explicitly distinguished. That is what is done, for example, in Cumulative Prospect Theory. However, contraryto the latter framework that presupposes genuine numerical assessments, human agents often decide on the basis of an ordinal ranking of the pros and the cons, and by focusing on the most salient arguments. In other terms, the decision process is qualitative as well as bipolar. In this article, based on a bipolar extension of possibility theory, we define and axiomatically characterize several decision rules tailored for the joint handling of positive and negative arguments in an ordinal setting. The simplest rules can be viewed as extensions of the maximin and maximax criteria to the bipolar case, and consequently suffer from poor decisive power. More decisive rules that refine the former are also proposed. These refinements agree both with principles of efficiency and with the spirit of order-of-magnitude reasoning, that prevails in qualitative decision theory. The most refined decision rule uses leximin rankings of the pros and the cons, and the ideas of counting arguments of equal strength and cancelling pros by cons. It is shown to come down to a special case of Cumulative Prospect Theory, and to subsume the Take the Best heuristic studied by cognitive psychologists.

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arXiv2013

Qualitative Possibilistic Mixed-Observable MDPs

Possibilistic and qualitative POMDPs (pi-POMDPs) are counterparts of POMDPs used to model situations where the agent's initial belief or observation probabilities are imprecise due to lack of past experiences or insufficient data collection. However, like probabilistic POMDPs, optimally solving pi-POMDPs is intractable: the finite belief state space exponentially grows with the number of system's states. In this paper, a possibilistic version of Mixed-Observable MDPs is presented to get around this issue: the complexity of solving pi-POMDPs, some state variables of which are fully observable, can be then dramatically reduced. A value iteration algorithm for this new formulation under infinite horizon is next proposed and the optimality of the returned policy (for a specified criterion) is shown assuming the existence of a "stay" action in some goal states. Experimental work finally shows that this possibilistic model outperforms probabilistic POMDPs commonly used in robotics, for a target recognition problem where the agent's observations are imprecise.

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arXiv2013

Updating with Belief Functions, Ordinal Conditioning Functions and Possibility Measures

This paper discusses how a measure of uncertainty representing a state of knowledge can be updated when a new information, which may be pervaded with uncertainty, becomes available. This problem is considered in various framework, namely: Shafer's evidence theory, Zadeh's possibility theory, Spohn's theory of epistemic states. In the two first cases, analogues of Jeffrey's rule of conditioning are introduced and discussed. The relations between Spohn's model and possibility theory are emphasized and Spohn's updating rule is contrasted with the Jeffrey-like rule of conditioning in possibility theory. Recent results by Shenoy on the combination of ordinal conditional functions are reinterpreted in the language of possibility theory. It is shown that Shenoy's combination rule has a well-known possibilistic counterpart.

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arXiv2013

Automated Reasoning Using Possibilistic Logic: Semantics, Belief Revision and Variable Certainty Weights

In this paper an approach to automated deduction under uncertainty,based on possibilistic logic, is proposed ; for that purpose we deal with clauses weighted by a degree which is a lower bound of a necessity or a possibility measure, according to the nature of the uncertainty. Two resolution rules are used for coping with the different situations, and the refutation method can be generalized. Besides the lower bounds are allowed to be functions of variables involved in the clause, which gives hypothetical reasoning capabilities. The relation between our approach and the idea of minimizing abnormality is briefly discussed. In case where only lower bounds of necessity measures are involved, a semantics is proposed, in which the completeness of the extended resolution principle is proved. Moreover deduction from a partially inconsistent knowledge base can be managed in this approach and displays some form of non-monotonicity.

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arXiv2013

Constraint Propagation with Imprecise Conditional Probabilities

An approach to reasoning with default rules where the proportion of exceptions, or more generally the probability of encountering an exception, can be at least roughly assessed is presented. It is based on local uncertainty propagation rules which provide the best bracketing of a conditional probability of interest from the knowledge of the bracketing of some other conditional probabilities. A procedure that uses two such propagation rules repeatedly is proposed in order to estimate any simple conditional probability of interest from the available knowledge. The iterative procedure, that does not require independence assumptions, looks promising with respect to the linear programming method. Improved bounds for conditional probabilities are given when independence assumptions hold.

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arXiv2013

A Logic of Graded Possibility and Certainty Coping with Partial Inconsistency

A semantics is given to possibilistic logic, a logic that handles weighted classical logic formulae, and where weights are interpreted as lower bounds on degrees of certainty or possibility, in the sense of Zadeh's possibility theory. The proposed semantics is based on fuzzy sets of interpretations. It is tolerant to partial inconsistency. Satisfiability is extended from interpretations to fuzzy sets of interpretations, each fuzzy set representing a possibility distribution describing what is known about the state of the world. A possibilistic knowledge base is then viewed as a set of possibility distributions that satisfy it. The refutation method of automated deduction in possibilistic logic, based on previously introduced generalized resolution principle is proved to be sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics, including the case of partial inconsistency.

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arXiv2013

A Symbolic Approach to Reasoning with Linguistic Quantifiers

This paper investigates the possibility of performing automated reasoning in probabilistic logic when probabilities are expressed by means of linguistic quantifiers. Each linguistic term is expressed as a prescribed interval of proportions. Then instead of propagating numbers, qualitative terms are propagated in accordance with the numerical interpretation of these terms. The quantified syllogism, modelling the chaining of probabilistic rules, is studied in this context. It is shown that a qualitative counterpart of this syllogism makes sense, and is relatively independent of the threshold defining the linguistically meaningful intervals, provided that these threshold values remain in accordance with the intuition. The inference power is less than that of a full-fledged probabilistic con-quaint propagation device but better corresponds to what could be thought of as commonsense probabilistic reasoning.

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arXiv2013

A fuzzy relation-based extension of Reggia's relational model for diagnosis handling uncertain and incomplete information

Relational models for diagnosis are based on a direct description of the association between disorders and manifestations. This type of model has been specially used and developed by Reggia and his co-workers in the late eighties as a basic starting point for approaching diagnosis problems. The paper proposes a new relational model which includes Reggia's model as a particular case and which allows for a more expressive representation of the observations and of the manifestations associated with disorders. The model distinguishes, i) between manifestations which are certainly absent and those which are not (yet) observed, and ii) between manifestations which cannot be caused by a given disorder and manifestations for which we do not know if they can or cannot be caused by this disorder. This new model, which can handle uncertainty in a non-probabilistic way, is based on possibility theory and so-called twofold fuzzy sets, previously introduced by the authors.

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arXiv2013

Argumentative inference in uncertain and inconsistent knowledge bases

This paper presents and discusses several methods for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases. A so-called argumentative-consequence relation taking into account the existence of consistent arguments in favor of a conclusion and the absence of consistent arguments in favor of its contrary, is particularly investigated. Flat knowledge bases, i.e. without any priority between their elements, as well as prioritized ones where some elements are considered as more strongly entrenched than others are studied under different consequence relations. Lastly a paraconsistent-like treatment of prioritized knowledge bases is proposed, where both the level of entrenchment and the level of paraconsistency attached to a formula are propagated. The priority levels are handled in the framework of possibility theory.

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arXiv2013

An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning

An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.

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arXiv2013

Practical Model-Based Diagnosis with Qualitative Possibilistic Uncertainty

An approach to fault isolation that exploits vastly incomplete models is presented. It relies on separate descriptions of each component behavior, together with the links between them, which enables focusing of the reasoning to the relevant part of the system. As normal observations do not need explanation, the behavior of the components is limited to anomaly propagation. Diagnostic solutions are disorders (fault modes or abnormal signatures) that are consistent with the observations, as well as abductive explanations. An ordinal representation of uncertainty based on possibility theory provides a simple exception-tolerant description of the component behaviors. We can for instance distinguish between effects that are more or less certainly present (or absent) and effects that are more or less certainly present (or absent) when a given anomaly is present. A realistic example illustrates the benefits of this approach.

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arXiv2013

Numerical Representations of Acceptance

Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the idea of acceptance, what we call acceptance functions. Due to the monotonicity property of confidence measures, the acceptance of a proposition entails the acceptance of any of its logical consequences. In agreement with the idea that a belief set (in the sense of Gardenfors) must be closed under logical consequence, it is also required that the separate acceptance o two propositions entail the acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and possibility) measures agree with this view of acceptance while probability and belief functions generally do not. General properties of acceptance functions are estabilished. The motivation behind this work is the investigation of a setting for belief revision more general than the one proposed by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson, in connection with the notion of conditioning.

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arXiv2013

Coping with the Limitations of Rational Inference in the Framework of Possibility Theory

Possibility theory offers a framework where both Lehmann's "preferential inference" and the more productive (but less cautious) "rational closure inference" can be represented. However, there are situations where the second inference does not provide expected results either because it cannot produce them, or even provide counter-intuitive conclusions. This state of facts is not due to the principle of selecting a unique ordering of interpretations (which can be encoded by one possibility distribution), but rather to the absence of constraints expressing pieces of knowledge we have implicitly in mind. It is advocated in this paper that constraints induced by independence information can help finding the right ordering of interpretations. In particular, independence constraints can be systematically assumed with respect to formulas composed of literals which do not appear in the conditional knowledge base, or for default rules with respect to situations which are "normal" according to the other default rules in the base. The notion of independence which is used can be easily expressed in the qualitative setting of possibility theory. Moreover, when a counter-intuitive plausible conclusion of a set of defaults, is in its rational closure, but not in its preferential closure, it is always possible to repair the set of defaults so as to produce the desired conclusion.

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arXiv2013

Belief Revision with Uncertain Inputs in the Possibilistic Setting

This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain inputs in the framework of possibility theory. Revision can be based on two possible definitions of the conditioning operation, one based on min operator which requires a purely ordinal scale only, and another based on product, for which a richer structure is needed, and which is a particular case of Dempster's rule of conditioning. Besides, revision under uncertain inputs can be understood in two different ways depending on whether the input is viewed, or not, as a constraint to enforce. Moreover, it is shown that M.A. Williams' transmutations, originally defined in the setting of Spohn's functions, can be captured in this framework, as well as Boutilier's natural revision.

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