arXiv subjects

Dimitrios Stavrakakis

Publications and source records attributed to Dimitrios Stavrakakis.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Policy-Compliant Cloud Storage Systems

Privacy regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) impose strict requirements on how personal data is stored, processed, and audited. While key-value stores (KVS) are widely used in latency-sensitive applications, their simple data model and untrusted cloud deployment environments make GDPR compliance particularly challenging. Existing approaches require invasive code modifications, impose high performance overheads, or overlook the integrity of compliance mechanisms themselves. This paper presents GDPRuler, a trusted middleware system that enables verifiable GDPR compliance for KVS on untrusted clouds without modifying their codebase. GDPRuler deploys a trusted GDPR monitor inside a Confidential Virtual Machine (CVM), which enforces GDPR policies, manages compliance metadata, and maintains tamper-evident audit logs. A declarative policy language translates core GDPR obligations into enforceable runtime rules. To ensure efficiency, GDPRuler encodes metadata compactly within KV records, builds dedicated metadata indexes for GDPR-specific queries, and logs only compliance-relevant events in a space-efficient format. We implement GDPRuler as a transparent proxy for unmodified Redis and RocksDB deployments. Evaluation with YCSB and GDPR-inspired workloads shows that GDPRuler enforces core compliance guarantees with low overheads: GDPRuler achieves ~61% of native KVS throughput with the CVM environment contributing 28%-32% of it, metadata storage overhead remains below 20%, and GDPR queries benefit from 13-182x speedup through metadata indexing. By embedding verifiable policy enforcement into a trusted middleware layer, GDPRuler offers a practical path toward GDPR-compliant KVS on untrusted cloud infrastructures.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Trusted AI Agents in the Cloud

AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly deployed as cloud services that autonomously access sensitive data, invoke external tools, and interact with other agents. However, these agents run within a complex multi-party ecosystem, where untrusted components can lead to data leakage, tampering, or unintended behavior. Existing Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide only per binary protection and offer no guarantees for cross-principal trust, accelerator-level isolation, or supervised agent behavior. We present Omega, a system that enables trusted AI agents by enforcing end-to-end isolation, establishing verifiable trust across all contributing principals, and supervising every external interaction with accountable provenance. Omega builds on Confidential VMs and Confidential GPUs to create a Trusted Agent Platform that hosts many agents within a single CVM using nested isolation. It also provides efficient multi-agent orchestration with cross-principal trust establishment via differential attestation, and a policy specification and enforcement framework that governs data access, tool usage, and inter-agent communication for data protection and regulatory compliance. Implemented on AMD SEV-SNP and NVIDIA H100, Omega fully secures agent state across CVM-GPU, and achieves high performance while enabling high-density, policy-compliant multi-agent deployments at cloud scale.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Confidential Serverless Computing

Although serverless computing offers compelling cost and deployment simplicity advantages, a significant challenge remains in securely managing sensitive data as it flows through the network of ephemeral function executions in serverless computing environments within untrusted clouds. While Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) offer a promising secure execution environment, their integration with serverless architectures currently faces fundamental limitations in key areas: security, performance, and resource efficiency. We present WALLET, a confidential computing system for secure serverless deployments to overcome these limitations. By employing nested confidential execution and a decoupled guest OS within CVMs, WALLET runs each function in a minimal "trustlet", significantly improving security through a reduced Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Furthermore, by leveraging a data-centric I/O architecture built upon a lightweight LibOS, WALLET optimizes network communication to address performance and resource efficiency challenges. Our evaluation shows that compared to CVM-based deployments, WALLET has 4.3x smaller TCB, improves end-to-end latency (15-93%), achieves higher function density (up to 907x), and reduces inter-function communication (up to 27x) and function chaining latency (16.7-30.2x); thus, WALLET offers a practical system for confidential serverless computing.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Cage: Hardware-Accelerated Safe WebAssembly

WebAssembly (WASM) is an immensely versatile and increasingly popular compilation target. It executes applications written in several languages (e.g., C/C++) with near-native performance in various domains (e.g., mobile, edge, cloud). Despite WASM's sandboxing feature, which isolates applications from other instances and the host platform, WASM does not inherently provide any memory safety guarantees for applications written in low-level, unsafe languages. To this end, we propose Cage, a hardware-accelerated toolchain for WASM that supports unmodified applications compiled to WASM and utilizes diverse Arm hardware features aiming to enrich the memory safety properties of WASM. Precisely, Cage leverages Arm's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) to (i) provide spatial and temporal memory safety for heap and stack allocations and (ii) improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism. Cage further employs Arm's Pointer Authentication (PAC) to prevent leaked pointers from being reused by other WASM instances, thus enhancing WASM's security properties. We implement our system based on 64-bit WASM. We provide a WASM compiler and runtime with support for Arm's MTE and PAC. On top of that, Cage's LLVM-based compiler toolchain transforms unmodified applications to provide spatial and temporal memory safety for stack and heap allocations and prevent function pointer reuse. Our evaluation on real hardware shows that Cage incurs minimal runtime (<5.8%) and memory (<3.7%) overheads and can improve the performance of WASM's sandboxing mechanism, achieving a speedup of over 5.1%, while offering efficient memory safety guarantees.

cs.PL↗