arXiv subjects

Dmitrijs Trizna

Publications and source records attributed to Dmitrijs Trizna.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

HoF-Bench: Rediscovering Real AI-Discovered CVEs Without Frontier Models

LLM-based analyzers have begun finding real vulnerabilities in mature open-source projects: AISLE's analyzer is credited with more than 280 CVEs across 78 projects, including OpenSSL, curl, and GnuTLS. We introduce HoF-Bench (named after AISLE's public Hall of Fame), a benchmark built from 95 of these public AI-discovered CVEs across eight repositories pinned at vulnerable commits. Analyzers receive source and target-file scope but not CVE identifiers, descriptions, fixes, or expected mechanisms; a detector-blinded frontier-model judge credits only findings that identify the same code path, root cause, attack condition, and impact. A deliberately minimal LLM-based analyzer rediscovers up to 65 of the 95 CVEs (68%) under this strict protocol. No frontier model performs detection anywhere in the study. The ten detector backbones are five open-weight models (21B--284B total parameters, 3--13B active) and five proprietary small or "flash"-tier models. All of them run in the fixed scaffold with four repeated passes, an optional generated-context stage, and a replayable multi-round triage stage (7,600 model--CVE pass records). Difficulty is strongly structured by language; the CVEs missed by every model concentrate in C infrastructure code. HoF-Bench provides a compact test bed for comparing vulnerability scanners, their reliability across repeated runs, and the candidate volume they create. The dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/aisleinc/HoF-Bench.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

EXE-Bench: Ranking the Tradeoffs of AI-based Windows Malware Detectors for Real-World Usability

Due to the lack of systematic evaluations, we are not yet able to determine which AI-based Windows malware detector to deploy in production, since existing evaluations (i) differ in terms of data used for both training and testing; (ii) do not consider temporal analysis to showcase whether models withstand the passage of time; (iii) avoid security evaluations with adversarial attacks that could highlight their brittleness against content-injection attacks; and (iv) neglect the computational requirements for deployment, risking slow inference on endpoints. For these reasons, we develop EXE-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark of AI-based Windows malware detectors. EXE-Bench assesses performance, temporal and adversarial robustness, and computational overhead, aggregating them into a single score for direct and fair model comparison. Through EXE-Bench, we highlight how evaluations conducted only after deployment are suboptimal and unable to provide a complete picture of their performance. In particular, through our analysis, we remark how much domain knowledge instilled through feature engineering is still extremely useful in this domain, resisting both time and adversarial attacks, in stark contrast with most of the deep networks that only excel right after deployment.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Quality-Assured Fuzz Harness Generation via the Four Principles Framework

Fuzz testing is the dominant technique for finding memory-safety vulnerabilities in C/C++ software, yet its effectiveness hinges on the quality of fuzz harnesses -- the programs that bridge fuzzers and library APIs. A growing body of tools now automate harness generation, but none systematically ensures the correctness of produced harnesses: logic errors, API misuse, and lifecycle violations go undetected at the source level. As LLM-driven generation scales harness creation, uncontrolled quality turns scale into a liability. We present QuartetFuzz, an autonomous harness-generation system that systematically improves correctness throughout the generation process. At its core is the Four Principles framework -- Logic Correctness (P1), API Protocol Compliance (P2), Security Boundary Respect (P3), and Entry Point Adequacy (P4) -- the first source-level definition of harness correctness with mathematical specifications and implementable checks. We operationalize these principles in an autonomous LLM agent that produces harnesses satisfying P1-P4 through a generate-check-fix loop before any fuzzing begins. Deployed on 23 open-source projects spanning C/C++, Java, and JavaScript, the system submits 42 bug reports, of which 29 are fixed or confirmed upstream (including 3 CVEs) and only 2 are rejected (4.8% FP rate). During generation, the built-in P1/P2 checks automatically intercepted 58 harness-induced crashes that would otherwise have been false positives. Applied as a quality auditor to 586 existing production harnesses across 70 projects, the system identifies 53 violations (45 confirmed, 35 fixed). We release a dataset of 100 labeled harnesses for reproducible evaluation. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/OwenSanzas/QuartetFuzz

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

SLIFER: Investigating Performance and Robustness of Malware Detection Pipelines

As a result of decades of research, Windows malware detection is approached through a plethora of techniques. However, there is an ongoing mismatch between academia -- which pursues an optimal performances in terms of detection rate and low false alarms -- and the requirements of real-world scenarios. In particular, academia focuses on combining static and dynamic analysis within a single or ensemble of models, falling into several pitfalls like (i) firing dynamic analysis without considering the computational burden it requires; (ii) discarding impossible-to-analyze samples; and (iii) analyzing robustness against adversarial attacks without considering that malware detectors are complemented with more non-machine-learning components. Thus, in this paper we bridge these gaps, by investigating the properties of malware detectors built with multiple and different types of analysis. To do so, we develop SLIFER, a Windows malware detection pipeline sequentially leveraging both static and dynamic analysis, interrupting computations as soon as one module triggers an alarm, requiring dynamic analysis only when needed. Contrary to the state of the art, we investigate how to deal with samples that impede analyzes, showing how much they impact performances, concluding that it is better to flag them as legitimate to not drastically increase false alarms. Lastly, we perform a robustness evaluation of SLIFER. Counter-intuitively, the injection of new content is either blocked more by signatures than dynamic analysis, due to byte artifacts created by the attack, or it is able to avoid detection from signatures, as they rely on constraints on file size disrupted by attacks. As far as we know, we are the first to investigate the properties of sequential malware detectors, shedding light on their behavior in real production environment.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Updating Windows Malware Detectors: Balancing Robustness and Regression against Adversarial EXEmples

Adversarial EXEmples are carefully-perturbed programs tailored to evade machine learning Windows malware detectors, with an ongoing effort to develop robust models able to address detection effectiveness. However, even if robust models can prevent the majority of EXEmples, to maintain predictive power over time, models are fine-tuned to newer threats, leading either to partial updates or time-consuming retraining from scratch. Thus, even if the robustness against adversarial EXEmples is higher, the new models might suffer a regression in performance by misclassifying threats that were previously correctly detected. For these reasons, we study the trade-off between accuracy and regression when updating Windows malware detectors by proposing EXE-scanner, a plugin that can be chained to existing detectors to promptly stop EXEmples without causing regression. We empirically show that previously proposed hardening techniques suffer a regression of accuracy when updating non-robust models, exacerbating the gap when considering low false positives regimes and temporal drifts affecting data. Also, through EXE-scanner we gain evidence on the detectability of adversarial EXEmples, showcasing the presence of artifacts left inside while creating them. Due to its design, EXE-scanner can be chained to any classifier to obtain the best performance without the need for costly retraining. To foster reproducibility, we openly release the source code, along with the dataset of adversarial EXEmples based on state-of-the-art perturbation algorithms.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Robust Synthetic Data-Driven Detection of Living-Off-the-Land Reverse Shells

Living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques pose a significant challenge to security operations, exploiting legitimate tools to execute malicious commands that evade traditional detection methods. To address this, we present a robust augmentation framework for cyber defense systems as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions, enabling the detection of LOTL attacks such as reverse shells through machine learning. Leveraging real-world threat intelligence and adversarial training, our framework synthesizes diverse malicious datasets while preserving the variability of legitimate activity, ensuring high accuracy and low false-positive rates. We validate our approach through extensive experiments on enterprise-scale datasets, achieving a 90\% improvement in detection rates over non-augmented baselines at an industry-grade False Positive Rate (FPR) of $10^{-5}$. We define black-box data-driven attacks that successfully evade unprotected models, and develop defenses to mitigate them, producing adversarially robust variants of ML models. Ethical considerations are central to this work; we discuss safeguards for synthetic data generation and the responsible release of pre-trained models across four best performing architectures, including both adversarially and regularly trained variants: https://huggingface.co/dtrizna/quasarnix. Furthermore, we provide a malicious LOTL dataset containing over 1 million augmented attack variants to enable reproducible research and community collaboration: https://huggingface.co/datasets/dtrizna/QuasarNix. This work offers a reproducible, scalable, and production-ready defense against evolving LOTL threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Nebula: Self-Attention for Dynamic Malware Analysis

Dynamic analysis enables detecting Windows malware by executing programs in a controlled environment and logging their actions. Previous work has proposed training machine learning models, i.e., convolutional and long short-term memory networks, on homogeneous input features like runtime APIs to either detect or classify malware, neglecting other relevant information coming from heterogeneous data like network and file operations. To overcome these issues, we introduce Nebula, a versatile, self-attention Transformer-based neural architecture that generalizes across different behavioral representations and formats, combining diverse information from dynamic log reports. Nebula is composed by several components needed to tokenize, filter, normalize and encode data to feed the transformer architecture. We firstly perform a comprehensive ablation study to evaluate their impact on the performance of the whole system, highlighting which components can be used as-is, and which must be enriched with specific domain knowledge. We perform extensive experiments on both malware detection and classification tasks, using three datasets acquired from different dynamic analyses platforms, show that, on average, Nebula outperforms state-of-the-art models at low false positive rates, with a peak of 12% improvement. Moreover, we showcase how self-supervised learning pre-training matches the performance of fully-supervised models with only 20% of training data, and we inspect the output of Nebula through explainable AI techniques, pinpointing how attention is focusing on specific tokens correlated to malicious activities of malware families. To foster reproducibility, we open-source our findings and models at https://github.com/dtrizna/nebula.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Quo Vadis: Hybrid Machine Learning Meta-Model based on Contextual and Behavioral Malware Representations

We propose a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously employs multiple deep learning models analyzing contextual and behavioral characteristics of Windows portable executable, producing a final prediction based on a decision from the meta-model. The detection heuristic in contemporary machine learning Windows malware classifiers is typically based on the static properties of the sample since dynamic analysis through virtualization is challenging for vast quantities of samples. To surpass this limitation, we employ a Windows kernel emulation that allows the acquisition of behavioral patterns across large corpora with minimal temporal and computational costs. We partner with a security vendor for a collection of more than 100k int-the-wild samples that resemble the contemporary threat landscape, containing raw PE files and filepaths of applications at the moment of execution. The acquired dataset is at least ten folds larger than reported in related works on behavioral malware analysis. Files in the training dataset are labeled by a professional threat intelligence team, utilizing manual and automated reverse engineering tools. We estimate the hybrid classifier's operational utility by collecting an out-of-sample test set three months later from the acquisition of the training set. We report an improved detection rate, above the capabilities of the current state-of-the-art model, especially under low false-positive requirements. Additionally, we uncover a meta-model's ability to identify malicious activity in validation and test sets even if none of the individual models express enough confidence to mark the sample as malevolent. We conclude that the meta-model can learn patterns typical to malicious samples from representation combinations produced by different analysis techniques. We publicly release pre-trained models and anonymized dataset of emulation reports.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Shell Language Processing: Unix command parsing for Machine Learning

In this article, we present a Shell Language Preprocessing (SLP) library, which implements tokenization and encoding directed at parsing Unix and Linux shell commands. We describe the rationale behind the need for a new approach with specific examples of when conventional Natural Language Processing (NLP) pipelines fail. Furthermore, we evaluate our methodology on a security classification task against widely accepted information and communications technology (ICT) tokenization techniques and achieve significant improvement of an F1 score from 0.392 to 0.874.

cs.LG↗