arXiv subjects

Dmitry Tanana

Publications and source records attributed to Dmitry Tanana.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Performance analysis of common browser extensions for cryptojacking detection

This paper considers five extensions for Chromium-based browsers in order to determine how effective can browser-based defenses against cryptojacking available to regular users be. We've examined most popular extensions - MinerBlock, AdGuard AdBlocker, Easy Redirect && Prevent Cryptojacking, CoinEater and Miners Shield, which claim to be designed specifically to identify and stop illegal cryptocurrency mining. An empirically confirmed dataset of 373 distinct cryptojacking-infected websites which was assembled during multi-stage procedure, was used to test those extensions. The results showed that all plugins in question had significant performance limits. Easy Redirect and Miners Shield only blocked 6 and 5 websites respectively, while MinerBlock had the greatest detection rate at only 27% (101/373 sites blocked). Most concerningly, despite promises of cryptojacking prevention, AdGuard (which has over 13 million users) and CoinEater were unable to identify any of the compromised websites. These results demonstrate serious flaws in cryptojacking detection products targeted for regular users, since even the best-performing specimen failed to detect 73% of attacks. The obvious difference between advertised capabilities and real performance highlights the urgent need for either accessibility improvements for laboratory-grade detection technologies that show 90%+ efficiency in controlled environment or fundamental upgrades to current commonly used extensions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Behavior-Based Detection of GPU Cryptojacking

With the surge in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, illegal mining for cryptocurrency has become a popular cyberthreat. Host-based cryptojacking, where malicious actors exploit victims systems to mine cryptocurrency without their knowledge, is on the rise. Regular cryptojacking is relatively well-known and well-studied threat, however, recently attackers started switching to GPU cryptojacking, which promises greater profits due to high GPU hash rates and lower detection chance. Additionally, GPU cryptojackers can easily propagate using, for example, modified graphic card drivers. This article considers question of GPU cryptojacking detection. First, we discuss brief history and definition of GPU cryptojacking as well as previous attempts to design a detection technique for such threats. We also propose complex exposure mechanism based on GPU load by an application and graphic card RAM consumption, which can be used to detect both browser-based and host-based cryptojacking samples. Then we design a prototype decision tree detection program based on our technique. It was tested in a controlled virtual machine environment with 80% successful detection rate against selected set of GPU cryptojacking samples and 20% false positive rate against selected number of legitimate GPU-heavy applications.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Vulnerablity analysis of Azure Blockchain Workbench key management system

With rise of blockchain popularity, more and more people seek to implement blockchain technology into their projects. Most common way is to take existing blockchain stack, such as Azure Blockchain Workbench or Oracle Blockchain Platform. While the blockchain technology is well-protected by its algorithms it is still vulnerable because its privacy relies on regular cryptography. And mistakes or vulnerabilities in key management protocols can affect even the most secure blockchain projects. This article considers question of vulnerabilities within Azure Blockchain Workbench key management system. We describe potential threats for each stage of key management lifecycle based on public reports and then assess how likely are those threats to realize within Azure Blockchain Workbench environment based on the technical documentation for Azure Blockchain Workbench and Azure Key Vault. Finally, we compile results of our assessment into the key management threat table with three distinct degrees of protection: fully protected, partially protected and not protected.

cs.CR↗