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Dominik Sisejkovic

Publications and source records attributed to Dominik Sisejkovic.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

QTFlow: Quantitative Timing-Sensitive Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design on RTL

In contemporary Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, security often takes a backseat to the primary goals of power, performance, and area optimization. Commonly, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. Cutting-edge methods employ information flow analysis to identify inadvertent information leaks in design structures. Current information leakage detection methods use quantitative information flow analysis to quantify the leaks. However, handling sequential circuits poses challenges for state-of-the-art techniques due to their time-agnostic nature, overlooking timing channels, and introducing false positives. To address this, we introduce QTFlow, a timing-sensitive framework for quantifying hardware information leakages during the design phase. Illustrating its effectiveness on open-source benchmarks, QTFlow autonomously identifies timing channels and diminishes all false positives arising from time-agnostic analysis when contrasted with current state-of-the-art techniques.

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SoftFlow: Automated HW-SW Confidentiality Verification for Embedded Processors

Despite its ever-increasing impact, security is not considered as a design objective in commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools. This results in vulnerabilities being overlooked during the software-hardware design process. Specifically, vulnerabilities that allow leakage of sensitive data might stay unnoticed by standard testing, as the leakage itself might not result in evident functional changes. Therefore, EDA tools are needed to elaborate the confidentiality of sensitive data during the design process. However, state-of-the-art implementations either solely consider the hardware or restrict the expressiveness of the security properties that must be proven. Consequently, more proficient tools are required to assist in the software and hardware design. To address this issue, we propose SoftFlow, an EDA tool that allows determining whether a given software exploits existing leakage paths in hardware. Based on our analysis, the leakage paths can be retained if proven not to be exploited by software. This is desirable if the removal significantly impacts the design's performance or functionality, or if the path cannot be removed as the chip is already manufactured. We demonstrate the feasibility of SoftFlow by identifying vulnerabilities in OpenSSL cryptographic C programs, and redesigning them to avoid leakage of cryptographic keys in a RISC-V architecture.

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Work-in-Progress: A Universal Instrumentation Platform for Non-Volatile Memories

Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) represent a disruptive technology that allows a paradigm shift from the conventional von Neumann architecture towards more efficient computing-in-memory (CIM) architectures. Several instrumentation platforms have been proposed to interface NVMs allowing the characterization of single cells and crossbar structures. However, these platforms suffer from low flexibility and are not capable of performing CIM operations on NVMs. Therefore, we recently designed and built the NeuroBreakoutBoard, a highly versatile instrumentation platform capable of executing CIM on NVMs. We present our preliminary results demonstrating a relative error < 5% in the range of 1 k$Ω$ to 1 M$Ω$ and showcase the switching behavior of a HfO$_2$/Ti-based memristive cell.

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AutoLock: Automatic Design of Logic Locking with Evolutionary Computation

Logic locking protects the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit supply chain. However, recent machine learning (ML)-based attacks have challenged its fundamental security, initiating the requirement for the design of learning-resilient locking policies. A promising ML-resilient locking mechanism hides within multiplexer-based locking. Nevertheless, recent attacks have successfully breached these state-of-the-art locking schemes, making it ever more complex to manually design policies that are resilient to all existing attacks. In this project, for the first time, we propose the automatic design exploration of logic locking with evolutionary computation (EC) -- a set of versatile black-box optimization heuristics inspired by evolutionary mechanisms. The project will evaluate the performance of EC-designed logic locking against various types of attacks, starting with the latest ML-based link prediction. Additionally, the project will provide guidelines and best practices for using EC-based logic locking in practical applications.

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Gate Camouflaging Using Reconfigurable ISFET-Based Threshold Voltage Defined Logic

Most chip designers outsource the manufacturing of their integrated circuits (ICs) to external foundries due to the exorbitant cost and complexity of the process. This involvement of untrustworthy, external entities opens the door to major security threats, such as reverse engineering (RE). RE can reveal the physical structure and functionality of intellectual property (IP) and ICs, leading to IP theft, counterfeiting, and other misuses. The concept of the threshold voltage-defined (TVD) logic family is a potential mechanism to obfuscate and protect the design and prevent RE. However, it addresses post-fabrication RE issues, and it has been shown that dopant profiling techniques can be used to determine the threshold voltage of the transistor and break the obfuscation. In this work, we propose a novel TVD modulation with ion-sensitive field-effect transistors (ISFETs) to protect the IC from RE and IP piracy. Compared to the conventional TVD logic family, ISFET-TVD allows post-manufacture programming. The ISFET-TVD logic gate can be reconfigured after fabrication, maintaining an exact schematic architecture with an identical layout for all types of logic gates, and thus overcoming the shortcomings of the classic TVD. The threshold voltage of the ISFETs can be adjusted after fabrication by changing the ion concentration of the material in contact with the ion-sensitive gate of the transistor, depending on the Boolean functionality. The ISFET is CMOS compatible, and therefore implemented on 45 nm CMOS technology for demonstration.

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Fault Injection in Native Logic-in-Memory Computation on Neuromorphic Hardware

Logic-in-memory (LIM) describes the execution of logic gates within memristive crossbar structures, promising to improve performance and energy efficiency. Utilizing only binary values, LIM particularly excels in accelerating binary neural networks, shifting it in the focus of edge applications. Considering its potential, the impact of faults on BNNs accelerated with LIM still lacks investigation. In this paper, we propose faulty logic-in-memory (FLIM), a fault injection platform capable of executing full-fledged BNNs on LIM while injecting in-field faults. The results show that FLIM runs a single MNIST picture 66754x faster than the state of the art by offering a fine-grained fault injection methodology.

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Quantitative Information Flow for Hardware: Advancing the Attack Landscape

Security still remains an afterthought in modern Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, which solely focus on enhancing performance and reducing the chip size. Typically, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. State-of-the-art approaches utilize information flow analysis to spot unintended information leakages in design structures. However, the classification of such threats is binary, resulting in negligible leakages being listed as well. A novel quantitative analysis allows the application of a metric to determine a numeric value for a leakage. Nonetheless, current approximations to quantify the leakage are still prone to overlooking leakages. The mathematical model 2D-QModel introduced in this work aims to overcome this shortcoming. Additionally, as previous work only includes a limited threat model, multiple threat models can be applied using the provided approach. Open-source benchmarks are used to show the capabilities of 2D-QModel to identify hardware Trojans in the design while ignoring insignificant leakages.

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A Temperature Independent Readout Circuit for ISFET-Based Sensor Applications

The ion-sensitive field-effect transistor (ISFET) is an emerging technology that has received much attention in numerous research areas, including biochemistry, medicine, and security applications. However, compared to other types of sensors, the complexity of ISFETs make it more challenging to achieve a sensitive, fast and repeatable response. Therefore, various readout circuits have been developed to improve the performance of ISFETs, especially to eliminate the temperature effect. This paper presents a new approach for a temperature-independent readout circuit that uses the threshold voltage differences of an ISFET-MOSFET pair. The Linear Technology Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis (LTspice) is used to analyze the ISFET performance based on the proposed readout circuit characteristics. A macro-model is used to model ISFET behavior, including the first-level Spice model for the MOSFET part and Verilog-A to model the surface potential, reference electrode, and electrolyte of the ISFET to determine the relationships between variables.In this way, the behavior of the ISFET is monitored by the output voltage of the readout circuit based on a change in the electrolyte's hydrogen potential (pH), determined by the simulation. The proposed readout circuit has a temperature coefficient of 11.9 $ppm/°C$ for a temperature range of 0-100 $°C$ and pH between 1 and 13. The proposed ISFET readout circuit outperforms other designs in terms of simplicity and not requiring an additional sensor.

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Designing ML-Resilient Locking at Register-Transfer Level

Various logic-locking schemes have been proposed to protect hardware from intellectual property piracy and malicious design modifications. Since traditional locking techniques are applied on the gate-level netlist after logic synthesis, they have no semantic knowledge of the design function. Data-driven, machine-learning (ML) attacks can uncover the design flaws within gate-level locking. Recent proposals on register-transfer level (RTL) locking have access to semantic hardware information. We investigate the resilience of ASSURE, a state-of-the-art RTL locking method, against ML attacks. We used the lessons learned to derive two ML-resilient RTL locking schemes built to reinforce ASSURE locking. We developed ML-driven security metrics to evaluate the schemes against an RTL adaptation of the state-of-the-art, ML-based SnapShot attack.

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X-Fault: Impact of Faults on Binary Neural Networks in Memristor-Crossbar Arrays with Logic-in-Memory Computation

Memristor-based crossbar arrays represent a promising emerging memory technology to replace conventional memories by offering a high density and enabling computing-in-memory (CIM) paradigms. While analog computing provides the best performance, non-idealities and ADC/DAC conversion limit memristor-based CIM. Logic-in-Memory (LIM) presents another flavor of CIM, in which the memristors are used in a binary manner to implement logic gates. Since binary neural networks (BNNs) use binary logic gates as the dominant operation, they can benefit from the massively parallel execution of binary operations and better resilience to variations of the memristors. Although conventional neural networks have been thoroughly investigated, the impact of faults on memristor-based BNNs remains unclear. Therefore, we analyze the impact of faults on logic gates in memristor-based crossbar arrays for BNNs. We propose a simulation framework that simulates different traditional faults to examine the accuracy loss of BNNs on memristive crossbar arrays. In addition, we compare different logic families based on the robustness and feasibility to accelerate AI applications.

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pHGen: A pH-Based Key Generation Mechanism Using ISFETs

Digital keys are a fundamental component of many hardware- and software-based security mechanisms. However, digital keys are limited to binary values and easily exploitable when stored in standard memories. In this paper, based on emerging technologies, we introduce pHGen, a potential-of-hydrogen (pH)-based key generation mechanism that leverages chemical reactions in the form of a potential change in ion-sensitive field-effect transistors (ISFETs). The threshold voltage of ISFETs is manipulated corresponding to a known pH buffer solution (key) in which the transistors are immersed. To read the chemical information effectively via ISFETs, we designed a readout circuit for stable operation and detection of voltage thresholds. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed key generation, we utilize pHGen for logic locking -- a hardware integrity protection scheme. The proposed key-generation method breaks the limits of binary values and provides the first steps toward the utilization of multi-valued voltage thresholds of ISFETs controlled by chemical information. The pHGen approach is expected to be a turning point for using more sophisticated bio-based analog keys for securing next-generation electronics.

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QFlow: Quantitative Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design in Verilog

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, have a major impact on the trustworthiness of an entire system. Information flow analysis can elaborate whether information from sensitive signals flows towards outputs or untrusted components of the system. But most of these analytical strategies rely on the non-interference property, stating that the untrusted targets must not be influenced by the source's data, which is shown to be too inflexible for many applications. To address this issue, there are approaches to quantify the information flow between components such that insignificant leakage can be neglected. Due to the high computational complexity of this quantification, approximations are needed, which introduce mispredictions. To tackle those limitations, we reformulate the approximations. Further, we propose a tool QFlow with a higher detection rate than previous tools. It can be used by non-experienced users to identify data leakages in hardware designs, thus facilitating a security-aware design process.

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NeuroHammer: Inducing Bit-Flips in Memristive Crossbar Memories

Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies offer unique advantages in energy efficiency, latency, and features such as computing-in-memory. Consequently, emerging NVM technologies are considered an ideal substrate for computation and storage in future-generation neuromorphic platforms. These technologies need to be evaluated for fundamental reliability and security issues. In this paper, we present \emph{NeuroHammer}, a security threat in ReRAM crossbars caused by thermal crosstalk between memory cells. We demonstrate that bit-flips can be deliberately induced in ReRAM devices in a crossbar by systematically writing adjacent memory cells. A simulation flow is developed to evaluate NeuroHammer and the impact of physical parameters on the effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we discuss the security implications in the context of possible attack scenarios.

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Logic Locking at the Frontiers of Machine Learning: A Survey on Developments and Opportunities

In the past decade, a lot of progress has been made in the design and evaluation of logic locking; a premier technique to safeguard the integrity of integrated circuits throughout the electronics supply chain. However, the widespread proliferation of machine learning has recently introduced a new pathway to evaluating logic locking schemes. This paper summarizes the recent developments in logic locking attacks and countermeasures at the frontiers of contemporary machine learning models. Based on the presented work, the key takeaways, opportunities, and challenges are highlighted to offer recommendations for the design of next-generation logic locking.

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Deceptive Logic Locking for Hardware Integrity Protection against Machine Learning Attacks

Logic locking has emerged as a prominent key-driven technique to protect the integrity of integrated circuits. However, novel machine-learning-based attacks have recently been introduced to challenge the security foundations of locking schemes. These attacks are able to recover a significant percentage of the key without having access to an activated circuit. This paper address this issue through two focal points. First, we present a theoretical model to test locking schemes for key-related structural leakage that can be exploited by machine learning. Second, based on the theoretical model, we introduce D-MUX: a deceptive multiplexer-based logic-locking scheme that is resilient against structure-exploiting machine learning attacks. Through the design of D-MUX, we uncover a major fallacy in existing multiplexer-based locking schemes in the form of a structural-analysis attack. Finally, an extensive cost evaluation of D-MUX is presented. To the best of our knowledge, D-MUX is the first machine-learning-resilient locking scheme capable of protecting against all known learning-based attacks. Hereby, the presented work offers a starting point for the design and evaluation of future-generation logic locking in the era of machine learning.

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ANDROMEDA: An FPGA Based RISC-V MPSoC Exploration Framework

With the growing demands of consumer electronic products, the computational requirements are increasing exponentially. Due to the applications' computational needs, the computer architects are trying to pack as many cores as possible on a single die for accelerated execution of the application program codes. In a multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC), striking a balance among the number of cores, memory subsystems, and network-on-chip parameters is essential to attain the desired performance. In this paper, we present ANDROMEDA, a RISC-V based framework that allows us to explore the different configurations of an MPSoC and observe the performance penalties and gains. We emulate the various configurations of MPSoC on the Synopsys HAPS-80D Dual FPGA platform. Using STREAM, matrix multiply, and N-body simulations as benchmarks, we demonstrate our framework's efficacy in quickly identifying the right parameters for efficient execution of these benchmarks.

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Challenging the Security of Logic Locking Schemes in the Era of Deep Learning: A Neuroevolutionary Approach

Logic locking is a prominent technique to protect the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit design and fabrication flow. However, in recent years, the security of locking schemes has been thoroughly challenged by the introduction of various deobfuscation attacks. As in most research branches, deep learning is being introduced in the domain of logic locking as well. Therefore, in this paper we present SnapShot: a novel attack on logic locking that is the first of its kind to utilize artificial neural networks to directly predict a key bit value from a locked synthesized gate-level netlist without using a golden reference. Hereby, the attack uses a simpler yet more flexible learning model compared to existing work. Two different approaches are evaluated. The first approach is based on a simple feedforward fully connected neural network. The second approach utilizes genetic algorithms to evolve more complex convolutional neural network architectures specialized for the given task. The attack flow offers a generic and customizable framework for attacking locking schemes using machine learning techniques. We perform an extensive evaluation of SnapShot for two realistic attack scenarios, comprising both reference benchmark circuits as well as silicon-proven RISC-V core modules. The evaluation results show that SnapShot achieves an average key prediction accuracy of 82.60% for the selected attack scenario, with a significant performance increase of 10.49 percentage points compared to the state of the art. Moreover, SnapShot outperforms the existing technique on all evaluated benchmarks. The results indicate that the security foundation of common logic locking schemes is build on questionable assumptions. The conclusions of the evaluation offer insights into the challenges of designing future logic locking schemes that are resilient to machine learning attacks.

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