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Dominique Geissler

Publications and source records attributed to Dominique Geissler.

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Hyperlocal monitoring of urban activity reveals responses to heat exposure

Rising temperatures create new challenges for local heat adaptation. Yet, it remains unclear how urban activity changes during hot periods and which urban environments people concentrate in as temperatures rise. Here, we perform a hyperlocal spatiotemporal analysis of urban activity across 10 German cities over a two-month period in 2024 with different levels of heat exposure. To monitor urban activity, we use fine-grained telecommunication data to map locations of people with high spatio-temporal resolution (i.e., hourly at 100m x 155m grid cells), yielding more than 100 million data points. We then link activity counts with hourly weather records and point-of-interest data. We find that sustained periods of hot weather, defined as at least three consecutive days with daily maximum temperatures $\geq 25${\deg}C, are characterized by below-expected city-wide presence, with activity counts that are 1.5 percentage points below regular urban activity. During hot periods, urban activity concentrates more strongly around leisure- and culture-oriented amenities (e.g., caf\'es or swimming pools), with an increase of up to around 10 percentage points relative to cooler days, while public-service environments (e.g., educational and health facilities) show weaker or negative shifts. Our study provides policy-makers with fine-grained monitoring of which urban areas attract citizens during heat exposure, which can enable evidence-based, spatially-targeted urban heat adaptation plans.

physics.soc-ph

Analyzing Social Media Claims regarding Youth Online Safety Features to Identify Problem Areas and Communication Gaps

Social media platforms have faced increasing scrutiny over whether and how they protect youth online. While online risks to children have been well-documented by prior research, how social media platforms communicate about these risks and their efforts to improve youth safety have not been holistically examined. To fill this gap, we analyzed N=352 press releases and safety-related blogs published between 2019 and 2024 by four platforms popular among youth: YouTube, TikTok, Meta (Facebook and Instagram), and Snapchat. Leveraging both inductive and deductive qualitative approaches, we developed a comprehensive framework of seven problem areas where risks arise, and a taxonomy of safety features that social media platforms claim address these risks. Our analysis revealed uneven emphasis across problem areas, with most communications focused on Content Exposure and Interpersonal Communication, whereas less emphasis was placed on Content Creation, Data Access, and Platform Access. Additionally, we identified three problematic communication practices related to their described safety features, including discrepancies between feature implementation and availability, unclear or inconsistent explanations of safety feature operation, and a lack of evidence regarding the effectiveness of safety features in mitigating risks once implemented. Based on these findings, we discuss the communication gaps between risks and the described safety features, as well as the tensions in achieving transparency in platform communication. Our analysis of platform communication informs guidelines for responsibly communicating about youth safety features.

cs.HC

Designing Effective Digital Literacy Interventions for Boosting Deepfake Discernment

Deepfakes images can erode trust in institutions and compromise election outcomes, as people often struggle to discern real images from deepfake images. Improving digital literacy can help address these challenges. Here, we compare the efficacy of five digital literacy interventions to boost people's ability to discern deepfakes: (1) textual guidance on common indicators of deepfakes; (2) visual demonstrations of these indicators; (3) a gamified exercise for identifying deepfakes; (4) implicit learning through repeated exposure and feedback; and (5) explanations of how deepfakes are generated with the help of AI. We conducted an experiment with N=1,200 participants from the United States to test the immediate and long-term effectiveness of our interventions. Our results show that our lightweight, easy-to-understand interventions can boost deepfake image discernment by up to 13 percentage points while maintaining trust in real images.

cs.HC

The Effect of Education in Prompt Engineering: Evidence from Journalists

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in daily work. In this paper, we analyze whether training in prompt engineering can improve the interactions of users with LLMs. For this, we conducted a field experiment where we asked journalists to write short texts before and after training in prompt engineering. We then analyzed the effect of training on three dimensions: (1) the user experience of journalists when interacting with LLMs, (2) the accuracy of the texts (assessed by a domain expert), and (3) the reader perception, such as clarity, engagement, and other text quality dimensions (assessed by non-expert readers). Our results show: (1) Our training improved the perceived expertise of journalists but also decreased the perceived helpfulness of LLM use. (2) The effect on accuracy varied by the difficulty of the task. (3) There is a mixed impact of training on reader perception across different text quality dimensions.

cs.HC

Analyzing User Characteristics of Hate Speech Spreaders on Social Media

Hate speech on social media threatens the mental and physical well-being of individuals and contributes to real-world violence. Resharing is an important driver behind the spread of hate speech on social media. Yet, little is known about who reshares hate speech and what their characteristics are. In this paper, we analyze the role of user characteristics in hate speech resharing across different types of hate speech (e.g., political hate). For this, we proceed as follows: First, we cluster hate speech posts using large language models to identify different types of hate speech. Then we model the effects of user attributes on users' probability to reshare hate speech using an explainable machine learning model. To do so, we apply debiasing to control for selection bias in our observational social media data and further control for the latent vulnerability of users to hate speech. We find that, all else equal, users with fewer followers, fewer friends, fewer posts, and older accounts share more hate speech. This shows that users with little social influence tend to share more hate speech. Further, we find substantial heterogeneity across different types of hate speech. For example, racist and misogynistic hate is spread mostly by users with little social influence. In contrast, political anti-Trump and anti-right-wing hate is reshared by users with larger social influence. Overall, understanding the factors that drive users to share hate speech is crucial for detecting individuals at risk of engaging in harmful behavior and for designing effective mitigation strategies.

cs.SI

Analyzing the Strategy of Propaganda using Inverse Reinforcement Learning: Evidence from the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by a large-scale, pro-Russian propaganda campaign on social media. However, the strategy behind the dissemination of propaganda has remained unclear, particularly how the online discourse was strategically shaped by the propagandists' community. Here, we analyze the strategy of the Twitter community using an inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) approach. Specifically, IRL allows us to model online behavior as a Markov decision process, where the goal is to infer the underlying reward structure that guides propagandists when interacting with users with a supporting or opposing stance toward the invasion. Thereby, we aim to understand empirically whether and how between-user interactions are strategically used to promote the proliferation of Russian propaganda. For this, we leverage a large-scale dataset with 349,455 posts with pro-Russian propaganda from 132,131 users. We show that bots and humans follow a different strategy: bots respond predominantly to pro-invasion messages, suggesting that they seek to drive virality; while messages indicating opposition primarily elicit responses from humans, suggesting that they tend to engage in critical discussions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study analyzing the strategy behind propaganda from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine through the lens of IRL.

cs.SI

HQP: A Human-Annotated Dataset for Detecting Online Propaganda

Online propaganda poses a severe threat to the integrity of societies. However, existing datasets for detecting online propaganda have a key limitation: they were annotated using weak labels that can be noisy and even incorrect. To address this limitation, our work makes the following contributions: (1) We present HQP: a novel dataset (N = 30,000) for detecting online propaganda with high-quality labels. To the best of our knowledge, HQP is the first large-scale dataset for detecting online propaganda that was created through human annotation. (2) We show empirically that state-of-the-art language models fail in detecting online propaganda when trained with weak labels (AUC: 64.03). In contrast, state-of-the-art language models can accurately detect online propaganda when trained with our high-quality labels (AUC: 92.25), which is an improvement of ~44%. (3) We show that prompt-based learning using a small sample of high-quality labels can still achieve a reasonable performance (AUC: 80.27) while significantly reducing the cost of labeling. (4) We extend HQP to HQP+ to test how well propaganda across different contexts can be detected. Crucially, our work highlights the importance of high-quality labels for sensitive NLP tasks such as propaganda detection.

cs.CL

Russian propaganda on social media during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was accompanied by practices of information warfare, yet existing evidence is largely anecdotal while large-scale empirical evidence is lacking. Here, we analyze the spread of pro-Russian support on social media. For this, we collected N = 349,455 messages from Twitter with pro-Russian support. Our findings suggest that pro-Russian messages received ~251,000 retweets and thereby reached around 14.4 million users. We further provide evidence that bots played a disproportionate role in the dissemination of pro-Russian messages and amplified its proliferation in early-stage diffusion. Countries that abstained from voting on the United Nations Resolution ES-11/1 such as India, South Africa, and Pakistan showed pronounced activity of bots. Overall, 20.28% of the spreaders are classified as bots, most of which were created at the beginning of the invasion. Together, our findings suggest the presence of a large-scale Russian propaganda campaign on social media and highlight the new threats to society that originate from it. Our results also suggest that curbing bots may be an effective strategy to mitigate such campaigns.

cs.SI