arXiv subjects

Dong Hao

Publications and source records attributed to Dong Hao.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Alpha Discovery via Grammar-Guided Learning and Search

Automatically discovering formulaic alpha factors is a central problem in quantitative finance. Existing methods often ignore syntactic and semantic constraints, relying on exhaustive search over unstructured and unbounded spaces. We present AlphaCFG, a grammar-based framework for defining and discovering alpha factors that are syntactically valid, financially interpretable, and computationally efficient. AlphaCFG uses an alpha-oriented context-free grammar to define a tree-structured, size-controlled search space, and formulates alpha discovery as a tree-structured linguistic Markov decision process, which is then solved using a grammar-aware Monte Carlo Tree Search guided by syntax-sensitive value and policy networks. Experiments on Chinese and U.S. stock market datasets show that AlphaCFG outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in both search efficiency and trading profitability. Beyond trading strategies, AlphaCFG serves as a general framework for symbolic factor discovery and refinement across quantitative finance, including asset pricing and portfolio construction.

q-fin.CP↗

arXiv2025

Approximate Revenue Maximization for Diffusion Auctions

Reserve prices are widely used in practice. The problem of designing revenue-optimal auctions based on reserve price has drawn much attention in the auction design community. Although they have been extensively studied, most developments rely on the significant assumption that the target audience of the sale is directly reachable by the auctioneer, while a large portion of bidders in the economic network unaware of the sale are omitted. This work follows the diffusion auction design, which aims to extend the target audience of optimal auction theory to all entities in economic networks. We investigate the design of simple and provably near-optimal network auctions via reserve price. Using Bayesian approximation analysis, we provide a simple and explicit form of the reserve price function tailored to the most representative network auction. We aim to balance setting a sufficiently high reserve price to induce high revenue in a successful sale, and attracting more buyers from the network to increase the probability of a successful sale. This reserve price function preserves incentive compatibility for network auctions, allowing the seller to extract additional revenue beyond that achieved by the Myerson optimal auction. Specifically, if the seller has $ρ$ direct neighbours in a network of size $n$, this reserve price guarantees a $1-{1 \over ρ}$ approximation to the theoretical upper bound, i.e., the maximum possible revenue from any network of size $n$. This result holds for any size and any structure of the networked market.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Strategyproofness and Monotone Allocation of Auction in Social Networks

Strategyproofness in network auctions requires that bidders not only report their valuations truthfully, but also do their best to invite neighbours from the social network. In contrast to canonical auctions, where the value-monotone allocation in Myerson's Lemma is a cornerstone, a general principle of allocation rules for strategyproof network auctions is still missing. We show that, due to the absence of such a principle, even extensions to multi-unit network auctions with single-unit demand present unexpected difficulties, and all pioneering researches fail to be strategyproof. For the first time in this field, we identify two categories of monotone allocation rules on networks: Invitation-Depressed Monotonicity (ID-MON) and Invitation-Promoted Monotonicity (IP-MON). They encompass all existing allocation rules of network auctions as specific instances. For any given ID-MON or IP-MON allocation rule, we characterize the existence and sufficient conditions for the strategyproof payment rules, and show that among all such payment rules, the revenue-maximizing one exists and is computationally feasible. With these results, the obstacle of combinatorial network auction with single-minded bidders is now resolved.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Explainable Graph Neural Networks via Structural Externalities

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved outstanding performance across a wide range of graph-related tasks. However, their "black-box" nature poses significant challenges to their explainability, and existing methods often fail to effectively capture the intricate interaction patterns among nodes within the network. In this work, we propose a novel explainability framework, GraphEXT, which leverages cooperative game theory and the concept of social externalities. GraphEXT partitions graph nodes into coalitions, decomposing the original graph into independent subgraphs. By integrating graph structure as an externality and incorporating the Shapley value under externalities, GraphEXT quantifies node importance through their marginal contributions to GNN predictions as the nodes transition between coalitions. Unlike traditional Shapley value-based methods that primarily focus on node attributes, our GraphEXT places greater emphasis on the interactions among nodes and the impact of structural changes on GNN predictions. Experimental studies on both synthetic and real-world datasets show that GraphEXT outperforms existing baseline methods in terms of fidelity across diverse GNN architectures , significantly enhancing the explainability of GNN models.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

DropEdge not Foolproof: Effective Augmentation Method for Signed Graph Neural Networks

The paper discusses signed graphs, which model friendly or antagonistic relationships using edges marked with positive or negative signs, focusing on the task of link sign prediction. While Signed Graph Neural Networks (SGNNs) have advanced, they face challenges like graph sparsity and unbalanced triangles. The authors propose using data augmentation (DA) techniques to address these issues, although many existing methods are not suitable for signed graphs due to a lack of side information. They highlight that the random DropEdge method, a rare DA approach applicable to signed graphs, does not enhance link sign prediction performance. In response, they introduce the Signed Graph Augmentation (SGA) framework, which includes a structure augmentation module to identify candidate edges and a strategy for selecting beneficial candidates, ultimately improving SGNN training. Experimental results show that SGA significantly boosts the performance of SGNN models, with a notable 32.3% improvement in F1-micro for SGCN on the Slashdot dataset.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Comparing discriminating abilities of evaluation metrics in link prediction

Link prediction aims to predict the potential existence of links between two unconnected nodes within a network based on the known topological characteristics. Evaluation metrics are used to assess the effectiveness of algorithms in link prediction. The discriminating ability of these evaluation metrics is vitally important for accurately evaluating link prediction algorithms. In this study, we propose an artificial network model, based on which one can adjust a single parameter to monotonically and continuously turn the prediction accuracy of the specifically designed link prediction algorithm. Building upon this foundation, we show a framework to depict the effectiveness of evaluating metrics by focusing on their discriminating ability. Specifically, a quantitative comparison in the abilities of correctly discerning varying prediction accuracies was conducted encompassing nine evaluation metrics: Precision, Recall, F1-Measure, Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), Balanced Precision (BP), the Area Under the receiver operating characteristic Curve (AUC), the Area Under the Precision-Recall curve (AUPR), Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG), and the Area Under the magnified ROC (AUC-mROC). The results indicate that the discriminating abilities of the three metrics, AUC, AUPR, and NDCG, are significantly higher than those of other metrics.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2023

SGA: A Graph Augmentation Method for Signed Graph Neural Networks

Signed Graph Neural Networks (SGNNs) are vital for analyzing complex patterns in real-world signed graphs containing positive and negative links. However, three key challenges hinder current SGNN-based signed graph representation learning: sparsity in signed graphs leaves latent structures undiscovered, unbalanced triangles pose representation difficulties for SGNN models, and real-world signed graph datasets often lack supplementary information like node labels and features. These constraints limit the potential of SGNN-based representation learning. We address these issues with data augmentation techniques. Despite many graph data augmentation methods existing for unsigned graphs, none are tailored for signed graphs. Our paper introduces the novel Signed Graph Augmentation framework (SGA), comprising three main components. First, we employ the SGNN model to encode the signed graph, extracting latent structural information for candidate augmentation structures. Second, we evaluate these candidate samples (edges) and select the most beneficial ones for modifying the original training set. Third, we propose a novel augmentation perspective that assigns varying training difficulty to training samples, enabling the design of a new training strategy. Extensive experiments on six real-world datasets (Bitcoin-alpha, Bitcoin-otc, Epinions, Slashdot, Wiki-elec, and Wiki-RfA) demonstrate that SGA significantly improves performance across multiple benchmarks. Our method outperforms baselines by up to 22.2% in AUC for SGCN on Wiki-RfA, 33.3% in F1-binary, 48.8% in F1-micro, and 36.3% in F1-macro for GAT on Bitcoin-alpha in link sign prediction.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Unified high-order multi-scale method for mechanical behavior simulation and strength prediction of composite plate and shell structures

The complicated mesoscopic configurations of composite plate and shell structures requires a huge amount of computational overhead for directly simulating their mechanical problems. In this paper, a unified high-order multi-scale method, which can effectively simulate the mechanical behavior and predict yield strength of composite plates and shells, is developed. Firstly, through the multiscale asymptotic analysis of multi-scale elastic equations in the orthogonal curvilinear coordinate system, a high-order multi-scale model is established, which can uniformly and effectively analyze the mechanical behavior of composite plate and shell structures. Moreover, the error estimation of the high-order multi-scale solutions is derived. Then, combining with the material strength theory, a high-order multi-scale model for the strength prediction of composite plate and shell structures is established. Next, based on the established high-order multi-scale model, a multi-scale algorithm is developed which can not only efficiently and accurately simulate the mechanical behaviors of composite plate and shell structures, but also predict their yield strength. Finally, the effectiveness of the established high-order multi-scale method is verified by extensive numerical experiments. The numerical experimental results indicate that the high-order multi-scale method can more accurately capture the meso-scale oscillatory behaviors of composite plate and shell structures. The unified high-order multi-scale method established in this paper is not only suitable for the prediction of mechanical properties of composite plate and shell structures, but also can be further extended to the prediction of multi-field coupling properties of composite plate and shell structures.

math.NA↗

arXiv2022

Social Sourcing: Incorporating Social Networks Into Crowdsourcing Contest Design

In a crowdsourcing contest, a principal holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social ties, existing crowdsourcing contest theories do not aim to answer how interpersonal relationships influence people's incentives and behaviors and thereby affect the crowdsourcing performance. In this work, we novelly take people's social ties as a key factor in the modeling and designing of agents' incentives in crowdsourcing contests. We establish two contest mechanisms by which the principal can impel the agents to invite their neighbors to contribute to the task. The first mechanism has a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and it is very simple for agents to play and easy for the principal to predict the contest performance. The second mechanism has an asymmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and agents' behaviors in equilibrium show a vast diversity which is strongly related to their social relations. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium analysis of these new mechanisms reveals that, besides agents' intrinsic abilities, the social relations among them also play a central role in decision-making. Moreover, we design an effective algorithm to automatically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the invitation crowdsourcing contest and further adapt it to a large graph dataset. Both theoretical and empirical results show that the new invitation crowdsourcing contests can substantially enlarge the number of participants, whereby the principal can obtain significantly better solutions without a large advertisement expenditure.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games

Revision game is a very new model formulating the real-time situation where players dynamically prepare and revise their actions in advance before a deadline when payoffs are realized. It is at the cutting edge of dynamic game theory and can be applied in many real-world scenarios, such as eBay auction, stock market, election, online games, crowdsourcing, etc. In this work, we novelly identify a class of strategies for revision games which are called Limited Retaliation strategies. An limited retaliation strategy stipulates that, (1) players first follow a recommended cooperative plan; (2) if anyone deviates from the plan, the limited retaliation player retaliates by using the defection action for a limited duration; (3) after the retaliation, the limited retaliation player returns to the cooperative plan. A limited retaliation strategy has three key features. It is cooperative, sustaining a high level of social welfare. It is vengeful, deterring the opponent from betrayal by threatening with a future retaliation. It is yet forgiving, since it resumes cooperation after a proper retaliation. The cooperativeness and vengefulness make it constitute cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium, while the forgiveness makes it tolerate occasional mistakes. limited retaliation strategies show significant advantages over Grim Trigger, which is currently the only known strategy for revision games. Besides its contribution as a new robust and welfare-optimizing equilibrium strategy, our results about limited retaliation strategy can also be used to explain how easy cooperation can happen, and why forgiveness emerges in real-world multi-agent interactions. In addition, limited retaliation strategies are simple to derive and computationally efficient, making it easy for algorithm design and implementation in many multi-agent systems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Combinatorial Procurement Auction in Social Networks

This paper studies one emerging procurement auction scenario where the market is constructed over the social networks. In a social network composed of many agents, smartphones or computers, one requester releases her requirement for goods or tasks to suppliers, then suppliers who have entered the market are also encouraged to invite some other suppliers to join and all the suppliers in the network could compete for the business. The key problem for this networked auction is about how to incentivize each node who have entered the sell not only to truthfully use her full ability, but also to forward the task to her neighbours. Auctions conducting over social networks have attracted considerable interests in recent years. However, most of the existing works focus on classic forward auctions. Moreover, there is no existing valid networked auction considering multiple goods/tasks. This work is the first to explore procurement auction for both homogeneous and heterogeneous goods or tasks in social networks. From both theoretical proof and experimental simulation, we proved that the proposed mechanisms are proved to be individual-rational and incentive-compatible, also both the cost of the system and the requester could get decreased.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Multi-Unit Diffusion Auctions with Intermediaries

This paper studies multi-unit auctions powered by intermediaries, where each intermediary owns a private set of unit-demand buyers and all intermediaries are networked with each other. Our goal is to incentivize the intermediaries to diffuse the auction information to individuals they can reach, including their private buyers and neighboring intermediaries, so that more potential buyers are able to participate in the auction. To this end, we build a diffusion-based auction framework which incorporates the strategic interaction of intermediaries. It is showed that the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism within the framework can achieve the maximum social welfare, but it may decrease the seller's revenue or even lead to a deficit. To overcome the revenue issue, we propose a novel auction, called critical neighborhood auction, which not only maximizes the social welfare, but also improves the seller's revenue comparing to the VCG mechanism with/without intermediaries.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller's revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Incentive Mechanism Design for ROI-constrained Auto-bidding

Auto-bidding plays an important role in online advertising and has become a crucial tool for advertisers and advertising platforms to meet their performance objectives and optimize the efficiency of ad delivery. Advertisers employing auto-bidding only need to express high-level goals and constraints, and leave the bid optimization problem to the advertising platforms. As auto-bidding has obviously changed the bidding language and the way advertisers participate in the ad auction, fundamental investigation into mechanism design for auto-bidding environment should be made to study the interaction of auto-bidding with advertisers. In this paper, we formulate the general problem of incentive mechanism design for ROI-constrained auto-bidding, and carry out analysis of strategy-proof requirements for the revenue-maximizing and profit-maximizing advertisers. In addition, we provide a mechanism framework and a practical solution to guarantee the incentive property for different types of advertisers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions

Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentially non-typical multidimensional mechanism design problems and agents' social relations are complicatedly involved with their bids. In such auctions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best for every agent to honestly report her valuation and fully diffuse the sale information to all her neighbors. Existing work identified some specific mechanisms for diffusion auctions, while a general theory characterizing all incentive-compatible diffusion auctions is still missing. In this work, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions. We formulate the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and show that any monotonic allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism. Moreover, given any monotonic allocation policy, we obtain the optimal payment policy to maximize the seller's revenue.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Diffusion and Auction on Graphs

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally conflicting in auction design. For the first time, we expand the domain of the classic auction to a social graph and formally identify a new class of auction mechanisms on graphs. All mechanisms in this class are incentive-compatible and also promote all buyers to diffuse the auction information to others, whereby both the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency are significantly improved comparing with the Vickrey auction. It is found that the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism is an extreme case with the lowest revenue in this new class. Our work could potentially inspire a new perspective for the efficient and optimal auction design and could be applied into the prevalent online social and economic networks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Selling Multiple Items via Social Networks

We consider a market where a seller sells multiple units of a commodity in a social network. Each node/buyer in the social network can only directly communicate with her neighbours, i.e. the seller can only sell the commodity to her neighbours if she could not find a way to inform other buyers. In this paper, we design a novel promotion mechanism that incentivizes all buyers, who are aware of the sale, to invite all their neighbours to join the sale, even though there is no guarantee that their efforts will be paid. While traditional sale promotions such as sponsored search auctions cannot guarantee a positive return for the advertiser (the seller), our mechanism guarantees that the seller's revenue is better than not using the advertising. More importantly, the seller does not need to pay if the advertising is not beneficial to her.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents' long-run interactions and things become even severer when self-interested agents work in collusion with each other to get extra benefits. It is commonly accepted that in such social dilemmas, there exists no simple strategy for an agent whereby she can simultaneously manipulate on the utility of each of her opponents and further promote mutual cooperation among all agents. Here, we show that such strategies do exist. Under the conventional repeated public goods game, we novelly identify them and find that, when confronted with such strategies, a single opponent can maximize his utility only via global cooperation and any colluding alliance cannot get the upper hand. Since a full cooperation is individually optimal for any single opponent, a stable cooperation among all players can be achieved. Moreover, we experimentally show that these strategies can still promote cooperation even when the opponents are both self-learning and collusive.

cs.GT↗