arXiv subjects

Dong Young Kim

Publications and source records attributed to Dong Young Kim.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2024

Who ruins the game?: unveiling cheating players in the "Battlefield" game

The "Battlefield" online game is well-known for its large-scale multiplayer capabilities and unique gaming features, including various vehicle controls. However, these features make the game a major target for cheating, significantly detracting from the gaming experience. This study analyzes user behavior in cheating play in the popular online game, the "Battlefield", using statistical methods. We aim to provide comprehensive insights into cheating players through an extensive analysis of over 44,000 reported cheating incidents collected via the "Game-tools API". Our methodology includes detailed statistical analyses such as calculating basic statistics of key variables, correlation analysis, and visualizations using histograms, box plots, and scatter plots. Our findings emphasize the importance of adaptive, data-driven approaches to prevent cheating plays in online games.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2024

RTPS Attack Dataset Description

This paper explains all about our RTPS datasets. We collect malicious/benign packet data by injecting attack data in an Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) in the normal state. We assembled the testbed, consisting of UGV, Controller, PC, and Router. We collect this dataset in the UGV part of our testbed. We conducted two types of attack "Command Injection" and "Command Injection with ARP Spoofing" on our testbed. The data collection time is 180, 300, 600, and 1200. The scenario has 30 each on collection time, 240 total. We expect this dataset to contribute to the development of defense technologies like anomaly detection to address security threat issues in ROS2 networks and Fast-DDS implements.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Human Detection of Political Speech Deepfakes across Transcripts, Audio, and Video

Recent advances in technology for hyper-realistic visual and audio effects provoke the concern that deepfake videos of political speeches will soon be indistinguishable from authentic video recordings. The conventional wisdom in communication theory predicts people will fall for fake news more often when the same version of a story is presented as a video versus text. We conduct 5 pre-registered randomized experiments with 2,215 participants to evaluate how accurately humans distinguish real political speeches from fabrications across base rates of misinformation, audio sources, question framings, and media modalities. We find base rates of misinformation minimally influence discernment and deepfakes with audio produced by the state-of-the-art text-to-speech algorithms are harder to discern than the same deepfakes with voice actor audio. Moreover across all experiments, we find audio and visual information enables more accurate discernment than text alone: human discernment relies more on how something is said, the audio-visual cues, than what is said, the speech content.

cs.HC↗