Donghyun Suh | Searcharxiv

arXiv2026

Generative AI and the Reallocation of Time: Productivity, Leisure, and Fulfilling Work

Using a representative survey of Korean workers, we provide evidence on the adoption of Generative AI (GenAI) and how GenAI reallocates time at work. We find that 51.8\% of workers use GenAI for work and GenAI reduces working time by 3.8\%. However, these gains may not materialize in aggregate productivity statistics yet: the correlation between time savings and output changes is near zero. We show this disconnect arises because workers capture efficiency gains primarily as on-the-job leisure, rather than increasing their output. These findings suggest that standard productivity measures may understate AI's impact by missing non-pecuniary welfare channels.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Scenarios for the Transition to AGI

We analyze how output and wages behave under different scenarios for technological progress that may culminate in Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), defined as the ability of AI systems to perform all tasks that humans can perform. We assume that human work can be decomposed into atomistic tasks that differ in their complexity. Advances in technology make ever more complex tasks amenable to automation. The effects on wages depend on a race between automation and capital accumulation. If the distribution of task complexity exhibits a sufficiently thick infinite tail, then there is always enough work for humans, and wages may rise forever. By contrast, if the complexity of tasks that humans can perform is bounded and full automation is reached, then wages collapse. But declines may occur even before if large-scale automation outpaces capital accumulation and makes labor too abundant. Automating productivity growth may lead to broad-based gains in the returns to all factors. By contrast, bottlenecks to growth from irreproducible scarce factors may exacerbate the decline in wages.

econ.GN↗