arXiv subjects

Dongmo Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Dongmo Zhang.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Why Autonomous Vehicles Are Not Ready Yet: A Multi-Disciplinary Review of Problems, Attempted Solutions, and Future Directions

Personal autonomous vehicles are cars, trucks and bikes capable of sensing their surrounding environment, planning their route, and driving with little or no involvement of human drivers. Despite the impressive technological achievements made by the industry in recent times and the hopeful announcements made by leading entrepreneurs, to date no personal vehicle is approved for road circulation in a 'fully' or 'semi' autonomous mode (autonomy levels 4 and 5) and it is still unclear when such vehicles will eventually be mature enough to receive this kind of approval. The present review adopts an integrative and multidisciplinary approach to investigate the major challenges faced by the automative sector, with the aim to identify the problems that still trouble and delay the commercialization of autonomous vehicles. The review examines the limitations and risks associated with current technologies and the most promising solutions devised by the researchers. This negative assessment methodology is not motivated by pessimism, but by the aspiration to raise critical awareness about the technology's state-of-the-art, the industry's quality standards, and the society's demands and expectations. While the survey primarily focuses on the applications of artificial intelligence for perception and navigation, it also aims to offer an enlarged picture that links the purely technological aspects with the relevant human-centric aspects, including, cultural attitudes, conceptual assumptions, and normative (ethico-legal) frameworks. Examining the broader context serves to highlight problems that have a cross-disciplinary scope and identify solutions that may benefit from a holistic consideration.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2016

Knowledge Sharing in Coalitions

The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose a new semantics for alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and perfect recall. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve all the desirable properties of coalition ability in traditional coalitional logics. Meanwhile, we investigate how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. This work provides a partial answer to the question: which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve their goals in the context of imperfect information.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Representing and Reasoning about Game Strategies

As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language (GDL) and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such, problems that require reasoning about games can be solved by the standard methods for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation\/: first, we formalise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Property

Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers preferences. We represent bargainers demands in propositional logic and bargainers preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Decomposing Truthful and Competitive Online Double Auctions

In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multiple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange one commodity. We show that there is no deterministic online double auction that is truthful and competitive for maximising social welfare in an adversarial model. However, given the prior information that sellers are patient and the demand is not more than the supply, a deterministic and truthful greedy mechanism is actually 2-competitive, i.e. it guarantees that the social welfare of its allocation is at least half of the optimal one achievable offline. Moreover, if the number of incoming buyers is predictable, we demonstrate that an online double auction can be reduced to an online one-sided auction, and the truthfulness and competitiveness of the reduced online double auction follow that of the online one-sided auction. Notably, by using the reduction, we find a truthful mechanism that is almost 1-competitive, when buyers arrive randomly. Finally, we argue that these mechanisms also have a promising applicability in more general settings without assuming that sellers are patient, by decomposing a market into multiple sub-markets.

cs.GT↗